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ABSTRACT 
 
Smith, Andrea. M.Ed., Education Department, Cedarville University, 2011. How Have 
Descriptions of the Arab-Israel Conflict Changed in High School U.S. History Textbooks 
Since the 1950s? 
 
  
 
This study is a qualitative and quantitative analysis of textbook content regarding 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, among three of the top textbook publishers in the United States 
from the 1950s to the present.  The goal of this study was to highlight whether there has 
been more or less emphasis on particular events over time, and identify major patterns 
and changes in textbook content on the Arab-Israeli conflict.  This thesis also addresses 
some of the historic, political, social, and educational implications of those changes. The 
conclusions and recommendations portion of the research contains suggestions for 
overcoming the limitations of textbook portrayals of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 23, 2009, America‘s foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict took a subtle, yet significant turn.  In a speech to the United Nations, President 
Barack Obama stated: ―We continue to call on Palestinians to end incitement against 
Israel, and we continue to emphasize that America does not accept the legitimacy of 
continued Israeli settlements.‖  President Obama also said that of the four issues that 
separate the two sides (security, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem), the goal was clear: a 
secure, Jewish state for Israel and ―a viable, independent Palestinian state with 
contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967‖ (Obama, 2009).  In a 
television interview after the speech, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations 
John Bolton later summarized the subtlety and significance of this statement: 
Well, I think this is one of the indications why Israel should be very 
worried about the tone of the speech. He didn't say, no new settlements. 
He said, ‗the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements,‘ which to me 
calls into question everything that's been built in the territories occupied 
since 1967.  That was only one of the things he said, but it was very 
striking 
(Bolton, 2009). 
The effect of one word to inflame or calm this historic struggle between Israel and the 
Arab world and the significant change in foreign policy toward Israel on the part of the 
U.S. led to the research question, how have descriptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
changed in high school U.S. history textbooks since the 1950s?  In his review of history 
textbooks for the American Textbook Council, Sewall demonstrates the importance of 
this research question:  
In covering the Middle East since World War II, history textbooks cannot 
ignore Israel.  Its past and future are intertwined regionally with Islam, a 
religion with elements that are resolutely hostile to its existence and 
  
 
2 
people.  Religious tensions in the Middle East since the creation of Israel 
in 1947 are unresolved.  They are at the center of the most significant and 
intractable geopolitical confrontation in the world today.  Editors try to be 
evenhanded, with mixed results‖ (emphasis added) (Sewall, 2004). 
 
 A similar investigation of Israeli textbooks by Podeh cited a study in which Israeli 
students showed a gradual increase in the ―articulation of negative Jewish attitudes 
toward the Arabs since the 1970s‖ (Podeh, 2000).  Although there may be many reasons 
for this shift, Podeh suggests the main reason was ―biased textbooks [that] constitute an 
important factor in the adoption of negative attitudes toward the Arabs.‖  Similar to the 
U.S., he also states that since ―personal Jewish-Arab encounters have been a rare 
phenomenon, school textbooks have become a key medium for acquaintance with the 
‗other‘‖ (Podeh, 2000).  For U.S. history textbooks, however, it becomes a medium for 
acquaintance with and forming impressions of both sides of the conflict.  Conceivably 
then, these impressions that are internalized in school and later expressed as an adult 
become the foundation for understanding and responding to this conflict, especially 
politically.  Podeh encapsulates this need for examining textbook portrayals of the Arab-
Israeli conflict: ―Since human behavior is largely shaped not only by reality but by the 
perception of it, it is highly likely that perceptions (whether genuine or false) of this 
conflict affect the future course of events‖ (Podeh, 2000).  Several studies cited in 
Avery‘s article Exploring Political Tolerance with Adolescents found that ―similar to 
adults, the more negatively adolescents perceive a group, the less likely they are to extend 
rights to the group‖ (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thaihammer, 1992).  
Interestingly, a 2000 study investigating the depiction of Arabs and Muslims in American 
news media from 1956 to 1997 found that ―the editorials of major U.S. newspapers, the 
New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times, have consistently depicted 
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Europeans and Israelis in favorable light, while showing anti-Arab and anti-Muslim 
biases‖ (Young & Sharifzadeh, 2003). 
Before looking at the role of textbooks in U.S. history classrooms, it seems 
appropriate to examine the importance that the U.S. places on history education in 
general.  Ross and Marker describe social studies, along with its educators, in terms of 
polar purposes—from ―indoctrination‖ or a ―citizenship transmission‖ model of social 
studies education to ―critical thought‖ or ―informed social criticism‖ social studies 
education (Ross & Marker, 2005).  The former relies on the belief that certain 
information is essential for good citizenship, the information is generally constant over 
time, and it is agreed upon by a consensus of experts in the field.  The latter believes that 
the purpose of social studies is to provide students with opportunities for critical 
examination and even revision of ―past traditions, existing social practices, and modes of 
problem solving‖ (Ross & Marker, 2005).  History and social studies curriculum 
throughout the decades in the U.S. can be seen as a swinging pendulum between these 
two polarities, but often, U.S. history is considered ―the subject through which the 
political, social, and economic heritage of the nation is transmitted and, together with 
Civics, is considered essential preparation for citizenship‖ (Woodward, 1982).  Another 
oft-stated goal for history education is to ―cultivate a sense of national identity, heritage, 
and common values‖ (Lin, Zhao, Ogawa, Hoge, & Kim, 2009).  Using the history 
curriculum to promote patriotism and national unity is a way of life in most modern 
countries (G. B. Nash, C. Crabtree, & R.E. Dunn, 1998).  The way in which these goals 
are interpreted through the curriculum of the public schools will ultimately affect not 
only students‘ knowledge, but also their perceptions of the U.S..  Most content analysis 
  
 
4 
studies of history textbooks have the models of ―critical thought‖ or ―informed social 
criticism‖ as their basis and believe this is the ultimate purpose of social studies 
education (social reconstruction rather than reproduction); however, this study will 
primarily investigate patterns and changes over time to the depiction of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in the textbooks, and secondarily investigate how reflective textbooks have been 
of the major social and educational patterns and changes over time, through the lens of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.     
  During a recent conversation with a woman who attended high school in the 
U.S. during the 1960s, the woman stated that she could not resist buying a copy of her 
U.S. history textbook because she wanted a record of history ―the way it really 
happened.‖  What this woman, many educators, and almost certainly all students fail to 
understand is the simple fact that it is impossible for authors, editors, and publishers to 
write, create, and produce a strictly neutral, unbiased account of anything (see discussion 
in Holt, 1990).  Textbooks represent not just pedagogical power, but also symbolic 
power.  They are the results of ―political, economic, and cultural activities, battles, and 
compromises‖ (Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991).  Indeed, because history ―contains few 
technical terms, scientific concepts, or formulas,‖ readers feel more familiar with the 
subject and may readily accept information from the textbook with less critical 
examination that in other subject areas (Metcalf, 1963).  Textbooks have been such a 
hallmark in U.S. schools that Fitzgerald, in her book, America Revised, stated: ―A heavy 
reliance on textbooks was the distinguishing mark of American education; it was called 
‗the American system‘ by Europeans.  The texts were substitutes for well-trained 
teachers‖ (Fitzgerald, 1979).  
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In the past three decades, the word ―textbook‖ has come to inspire many different 
connotations, most of which are negative.  With the publication of the National History 
Standards in 1994 and the resulting scrutiny that textbooks faced, the connotations 
transformed into accusations of bias, presentism, political correctness, and exceedingly 
multi-cultural and politicized views (G. B. Nash, 1997).  The ―culture wars‖ over 
textbook content resulted in studies about the use of pictures (David, 2000), the depiction 
of Native Americans (Sanchez, 2007), the treatment of Japanese Americans (Ogawa, 
2004), portrayals of Martin Luther King, Jr. (Alridge, 2006), depictions of war and peace 
(Montgomery, 2006), the treatment of ethnic groups in general, (Foster, 1999a) and many 
more.  A comprehensive study by Ravitch (2004) on 6 widely-used American history 
textbooks gave overall failing scores to 3 of 6 books, with the highest rated textbook 
receiving only a 78 percent on the 12-point criteria Ravitch used to rate each book. Yet, 
textbooks continue to be the predominant source of information about U.S. history used 
in classrooms (Harison, 2002).  They so dominate classroom instruction it has been 
estimated that 80 to 90 percent of content knowledge available to a student comes from a 
textbook (Siler, 1990).  Furthermore, mergers and buyouts of independent publishing 
companies have created a multinational, largely-consolidated textbook market.  The 
following statistics are reflective of this trend: 
In 1960, over 100 companies produced the vision of society and history 
taught in U.S. schools.  In 1995, almost 90% of high-school textbook 
production was subsumed under just seven major media companies, each 
owned by larger corporations.  In 1995, the ‗el-hi‘ (elementary to high 
school) market generated almost $2 billion in sales.  These textbooks 
comprised 30% of the entire market for books in the U.S. (Perlmutter, 
1997). 
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While it is routinely lamented that history teachers do not know enough about 
their own subject—only 31percent of middle school and 41 percent of high school history 
teachers majored in history as an undergraduate, and an even smaller percentage teach in 
their specialty field (Stotsky, 2004)—it is also readily apparent that even well-prepared 
teachers cannot be expected to know everything required to teach a course in U.S. and/or 
world history.  As a result, textbooks provide structure for content and teaching.  It is also 
why the use of textbooks is so widely accepted as the norm in education (Foster, 1999a).  
However, it must also be recognized that textbooks represent what the books‘ authors and 
editors deem to be important, and by default contain a host of value judgments that may 
come to be shared by the students reading those textbooks (M. H. Romanowski, 2003a).  
The assumptions a textbook represents are often what inform curriculum and education 
policy (Issitt, 2004). 
For these reasons, textbook research can be very revealing.  It offers an 
opportunity for analysis spanning the disciplines of sociology, philosophy, and 
economics, as well as pedagogy.  Textbooks form an empirical basis for various lines of 
intra- and interdisciplinary analysis (Issitt, 2004).  As Appleby states in her book Telling 
the Truth about History: 
To interrogate a text is to open up the fullness of meaning within.  
Everyone uses language largely unaware of the cultural specificity of 
words, the rules and protocols of expression, the evasions in their 
euphemisms, the nuances from group associations, or the verbal detours 
imposed by social taboos.  When an astute reader points out these 
intriguing elements in a text, our understanding of what is being 
communicated, both intentionally and unintentionally, is vastly increased 
(Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, 1995). 
 
Because of the national standards controversy of the early 1990s and the close 
examination of textbook content, subsequent editions from major publishers have been 
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―sanitized‖ of any obvious markers of bias.  Research must now focus on the method of 
presentation and what is not included rather than what is included.  Instead of studying 
the assumptions of the textbook authors, the focus needs to be on the assumptions the 
authors make about the students who are going to read their textbook and the educators 
who are going to teach its content (Issitt, 2004). 
While Ravitch (2004) argues that the system of statewide textbook purchasing 
should be abolished, it is unlikely this recommendation will be adopted.  Few school 
districts can spend the time and money necessary for a thorough investigation of 
textbooks; as a result, textbook selection is generally determined at the state level (Tracy, 
2003).  For textbook publishers, the goal becomes to sell as many books as possible to a 
large and diverse population, with little resistance.  While it makes sense to subject these 
textbooks to detailed analysis, the reality, as Chester Finn notes in his foreword to the 
Ravitch study (2004), is that there are few independent organizations willing to engage in 
this type of review.   
Definition of Terms 
Arab-Israeli conflict: This term was chosen for simplicity and clarity, even though the 
conflict has gone through many variations since the 1950s and could be called by more 
precise names during specific points in history.  Several nations have been in conflict 
with Israel in varying proportion since the 1950s, but most can be fairly assigned to the 
Arab world.  This term is clear, inclusive, and can be applied throughout the decades to 
the present. 
Bias: ―Denotes a tendency in inquirers that prevents unprejudiced consideration or 
judgment…individual preferences, predispositions, or predilections that prevent 
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neutrality and objectivity‖ (Schwandt, 1997).  Heidegger (1889-1976) and Gadamer, as 
summarized in Schwandt, argue that prejudice or ―prejudgment‖ cannot be ―eliminated 
[or] set aside, for it is an inescapable condition of being and knowing.  In fact, our 
understanding of ourselves and our world depend on having prejudgment.  What we must 
do to achieve understanding is to reflect on prejudice (prejudgment) and distinguish 
enabling from disabling prejudice‖ (1997). 
Content Analysis: ―A generic name for a variety of means of textual analysis that involve 
comparing, contrasting, and categorizing a corpus of data.  Contemporary forms of 
content analysis include…both numeric and interpretive means of analyzing data‖ 
(Schwandt, 1997). 
Controversial Issue: Interpersonal conflict that is manifested in group- or individually-
held opposing beliefs (Wilson, Haas, Laughlin, & Sunal, 2002).  However, because the 
public school curriculum is, according to Camicia, ―embedded in the ebb and flow of the 
ideological struggles of society at large, the degree to which an issue in the curriculum is 
considered controversial also ebbs and flows‖ (Camicia, 2008). 
Epistemology: While there are many different types of knowledge, defined generally, 
epistemology is the study of knowledge—its limits, structures, sources, and conditions.  It 
is the study of the creation and distribution of knowledge in specific areas of 
investigation (Steup, 2005).  
Grounded Theory Methodology: ―This approach to the analysis of qualitative data 
simultaneously employs techniques of induction, deduction, and verification to develop 
theory.  Experience with data generates insights, hypotheses, and generative questions, 
which are pursued through further data collection…Grounded theory methodology 
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requires a concept-indicator model of analysis, which in turn employs the method of 
constant comparison…From this process, the analyst identifies underlying uniformities in 
the indicators and produces a coded category or concept‖ (Schwandt, 1997). 
Ideology: Ideology is a collection of ideas that reflect the values of a particular group, 
class, or culture.  This term usually has a negative connotation, connected with a 
distortion or obscuring of the truth.  
Implicit/Hidden Curriculum: This term refers to unnamed assumptions and values of a 
curriculum framework as opposed to what is outlined in the course outline or objectives 
(Chalmers, 2003). 
Intended Curriculum: This term is used to define curriculum that has been labeled as 
―official,‖ ―formal,‖ ―adopted,‖ or ―explicit‖ (Hofman, Alpert, & Schnell, 2007). 
Master Narrative: Master narratives are authoritative textbook representations of 
individuals or events that are discrete, one-dimensional, and/or heroic interpretations of 
past events (Alridge, 2006). 
National History Standards: These standards are related to American and world history 
and attempt to determine what history students should learn.  They were first issued by 
the National Center for History in the Schools in the fall of 1994; after being rejected by 
the U.S. Senate, they were revised in the spring of 1996, and remain a voluntary guide for 
history curriculum in the schools.   
Pedagogy: Pedagogy is the act of teaching and requiring students to engage with and 
analyze content in order to develop higher order thinking skills (Lavere, 2008). 
Presentism: Most often this term refers to interpreting past events through present terms, 
concerns, and value systems (Shedd, 2004). 
  
 
10 
Social History: In most cases, this term refers to the history of non-dominant groups such 
as women, working class, and African Americans in U.S. history (Bienstock, 1995). 
Textbook: While this term escapes all but the most general of definitions, it is a book of 
focused educational content that is coupled with some kind of curriculum framework for 
the purpose of learning and teaching (Issitt, 2004). 
The New Left: A movement that grew out of 1960s radicalism and rejected a nationalist 
view of American history, the New Left embraced a new social history approach 
(Schulman, 1999). 
The Political Right: In relation to history content and standards, this term often refers to 
individuals who believe that history is a collective body of universally-accepted truth and 
taught for the purpose of instilling patriotism and unity in young people (Foster, 1998). 
Traditional Curriculum: This often refers to the teaching of American history using a 
textbook and lecture format with a narrative, chronological approach (Yarema, 2002). 
Statement of Issue 
In 2001, a survey conducted by the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
found that 44 percent of twelfth-grade teachers reported their students read from a 
textbook every day, while 38 percent said their students read from textbooks once or 
twice a week (Ravitch, 2004).  The importance of the textbook in U.S. history 
classrooms, whether positive or negative, cannot be denied.  The issue is not limited to 
what topics are included in textbooks, but also includes the representations of what is 
included and the impressions those representations make on students.  Factual knowledge 
may be lost after graduation, but impressions remain (M. H. Romanowski, 2003b).    
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While many studies and articles written in the late 1990s pertained to history 
standards and textbook content, most articles written since that time provide only a 
general overview of textbook content quality or a very narrow focus on a specific topic.  
With publishers‘ aims to sell as many books as possible and new editions of widely-
adopted textbooks being printed, the need for continued analysis of textbook content is 
clear.  By analyzing textbook content, the knowledge of historical errors at worst and the 
limitations of textbooks in the classroom at best, may make the need for teacher training 
and content area knowledge more apparent and reduce classroom dependence on 
textbooks (Tracy, 2003). 
Scope of the Study and Delimitations 
A common misconception when analyzing texts and interpreting the results is 
assuming that all readers are uncritical consumers of information.  This study will not 
equate the text with the reader (Porat, 2006) or assume that what is in the textbook is 
what is taught or actually internalized by the student (Foster, 1999b).  It is important to 
acknowledge that textbooks are never ―unmediated,‖ but are rather subject to a variety of 
instructional practices and decisions (M. H. Romanowski, 1995).  This study, as Larsen 
states, will examine ―textbooks as written and not as read by a student or enhanced by a 
teacher‖ (Larsen, 1991).  This study is designed to examine the intended curriculum in 
regard to each textbook‘s representation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace processes 
from the Balfour Declaration to now and to present the findings in an organized and 
logical manner.  Through this process, suggestions for how teachers may enhance the 
textbook‘s presentation or overcome its limitations follow, where appropriate.  This study 
is not designed to be used as an evaluation tool for specific textbooks.  The evaluation 
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criteria and categories of analysis are not meant to outline how the conflict should be 
taught; the goal of this study is to highlight whether there has been more or less emphasis 
on particular events over time, and identify major patterns and changes to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and the political, social, and educational implications of those changes.  Kliebard 
summarized this approach in saying:  
History of the curriculum, in other words, is critically concerned with 
what is taken to be knowledge in certain times and places rather than what 
is ultimately true or valid.  In particular, it considers the factors that make 
certain forms of knowledge eligible for inclusion in the course of study in 
educational institutions as well as, in some cases, why other forms of 
knowledge are excluded (Kliebard, 1991). 
 
The recommendations and conclusions portion of the research contains suggestions for 
overcoming the limitations of textbook portrayals of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The 
categories of analysis were largely determined by what is included in the textbooks 
themselves, not what an expert in the field thinks should be included, since even 
―mainstream‖ sources can be biased.  Like Podeh‘s study, the textbooks were allowed to 
speak for themselves (Podeh, 2000).  Ultimately, this study is meant to ―enhance the 
application of textbook analysis to a specific chronological period‖ (Siler, 1987).  
However, the constant comparative method of research is dependent on the skills and 
sensitivities of the researcher and ―is not designed to guarantee that two analysts working 
independently with the same data will achieve the same results‖ (Glaser & Strauss, 
1999).  While qualitative content analysis focuses on semantic validity and is often 
criticized for its lack of quantitative reliability and validity measures, Krippendorf 
captures the qualitative aspects of even computer-based content analysis when he states: 
―Ultimately, all reading of texts is qualitative, even when certain characteristics of a text 
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are later converted into numbers.  The fact that computers process great volumes of text 
in a very short time does not take away from the qualitative nature of their algorithms‖ 
(Krippendorf, 2006).  This study will describe the Arab-Israeli conflict as presented in 
high school U.S. history textbooks—comparing texts within the same period, as well as 
changes among texts over time.  Inferences will be made about the causes of these 
changes, as well as the effects of these changes on students (Wade, 1993).  Textbooks 
will be examined in the context of social forces and pressures and will involve, to some 
degree, Anyon‘s ―unified field theory,‖ which involves ―the interconnections between 
school knowledge, school processes, contemporary society, and historical change‖ 
(Anyon, 1982).  Like Podeh, the aim of this study will be to ―illustrate the overall picture 
[of the Arab-Israeli conflict] acquired by students during their school years‖ (Podeh, 
2000). 
The study‘s analysis will not include a full review of each textbook and the 
positive and negative aspects of each; neither will it be a study of American diplomatic 
and military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan or the War on Terror in general, except as it 
relates to the specific issues of contention and proposals of peace between Israel and 
Palestinians.  The researcher will not be examining gender bias or ranking the overall 
level of engagement of the material, except as it relates to any mention of Israel and/or 
Palestine.  Finally, this study is not aimed at contributing suggestions for peaceful 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; it is simply designed to trace the changing 
emphases over time in high school U.S. history textbook representations of the Arab-
Israeli conflict from the Balfour Declaration to the present. 
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Significance of the Study 
Encyclopedia Britannica defines history as ―the discipline that studies the 
chronological record of events (as affecting a nation or people), based on a critical 
examination of source materials and usually presenting an explanation of their causes.‖ 
(emphasis added)  According to Webster’s Second International Dictionary, a history 
book is also ―a systematic written account of events, particularly of those affecting a 
nation, institution, science, or art, usually connected with a philosophical explanation of 
their causes.‖  (emphasis added)  Textbooks represent a very powerful means of 
solidifying a specific version of history for students.  Studying these textbooks can 
provide insight into shifts within culture and within the educational system, allowing 
teachers and others to critically analyze the context from which content and instruction is 
to take place (Foster, 1999b).  Teachers can also use conflict and controversy in the 
curriculum to help students see that ―the writing of history is a social and political 
construction and involves competing interpretation, value judgments, partial truths, 
omissions, and distortions‖ (Moore, 2006).  Curriculum research also informs educational 
practice with specific facts and ―ways of perceiving curricular situations, thinking about 
them, and acting in them‖ (Walker, Shippen, Alberto, Houchins, & Cihak, 2005).  
Research into the history of curriculum has become a legitimate area of study because, 
according to Kliebard (2006), ―the knowledge that becomes embodied in the curriculum 
of schools is a significant social and cultural artifact.‖  The textbooks themselves are a 
reflection of how historians of the past have interpreted the dominant values and 
ideologies of their age.  As Moreau wrote in his book Schoolbook Nation, changing 
textbooks are indicative of the ―national soul searching‖ that goes on in attempting to 
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explain the nation‘s past (Moreau, 2003).   Historical inquiry requires that students 
analyze information and develop an interpretation based on the information they are 
presented.  Students cannot do this without a complete contextual representation of 
people and events (Lavere, 2008).  Teachers who hope to avoid conflict by having the 
textbook settle differences of opinion—and members of the public who want to avoid 
controversy by pitting only good versus evil—miss the opportunity to allow students to 
develop critical discussion, thinking, and reflection skills (Wilson et al., 2002).  The 
worst-case scenario (one this study hopes to help educators avoid) would be a one-sided 
or incongruous view of history that reinforces stereotypes and justifies oppression 
(Gordy, Hogan, & Pritchard, 2004).  Fragmentation is one type of disinformation that 
Postman described as ―misleading, misplaced, fragmented or superficial information—
information that creates an illusion of knowing something but which in fact leads one 
away from knowing‖ (Postman, 1986).  The best-case scenario would be encouraging 
students to question their textbooks by exposing them to multiple perspectives, which is 
central to good history teaching (M. H. Romanowski, 1996).  If teachers and textbooks 
fail to do this, American students are, as James Loewen states, ―left with no resources to 
understand, accept, or rebut historical referents used in arguments by candidates for 
office, sociology professors, or newspaper journalists.  If knowledge is power, ignorance 
cannot be bliss‖ (Loewen, 2008).  As Loewen and Postman so succinctly stated, 
ignorance is not a neutral void.  Ignorance has important implications; it can affect ―the 
kinds of options one is able to consider, the alternatives that one can examine, and the 
perspectives from which one can view a situation or problem‖ (M. H. Romanowski, 
2009).  Ignorance through omission can also result in shaping readers‘ understandings 
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and impressions of foreign and domestic policies, legitimizing some and de-legitimizing 
others.  The Arab-Israeli conflict has enormous contemporary relevance to politicians, 
educators, and students because it deals with issues of national sovereignty, international 
diplomacy and security, equity and social justice.  If textbooks avoid these issues, they do 
students a disservice and render the conflict irrelevant.  Even more sobering is how 
Sewall, in his review of world history textbooks, relates the study of curriculum to 
national security issues:   
How citizens think about themselves, their country, and the U.S. 
relationship to the world depends on both knowledge and civic feeling.  If 
students grow up ignorant of the nation‘s Anglo-European roots and the 
evolution of modern liberal democracy, as citizens they will fail to 
appreciate their political fortune.  If students learn to consider their nation 
unworthy or malign, or if they embrace globalist fantasies and illusions, 
the ability of citizens to construct robust foreign policy will be hindered or 
checked.  In this respect, the curriculum becomes a national security issue 
(Sewall, 2004). 
 
Kenton Keith, a former diplomat with the U.S. Information Agency, said, ―As difficult as 
it may seem, the nation‘s reaction to the horror of 9/11 should include a focused effort to 
connect with those whose mistaken image of us contributes to the threats we now face‖ 
(Keith, 2005).  Part of this connection should include at least a preliminary investigation 
into the causes of discord in the Middle East—one of which is the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Since 9/11, American education systems have begun including the study of Islam in their 
curriculum, which according to Moore, is ―heavily influenced by the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the legacy of colonialism, and American policies throughout the Islamic world‖ 
(Moore, 2006). 
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Methods of Procedure 
Research Question: How have descriptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict changed in 
high school U.S. history textbooks since the 1950s? 
A qualitative content analysis research methodology will be used to answer this 
question.  According to Weber (1990), content analysis can be used for many purposes: 
to ―identify the intentions and other characteristics of the communicator; [to] reflect 
cultural patterns of groups, institutions, or societies; [and to] describe trends in 
communication content.‖  While the method of content analysis was developed in the 
mid-1920s to examine propaganda and began as a strictly quantitative approach, the 
forms and theory of content analysis have progressed to include a wide variety of 
techniques.  Weber (1990) acknowledges this shift in stating, ―There is no simple right 
way to do content analysis.  Instead, investigators must judge what methods are most 
appropriate for their substantive problems.  Moreover, some technical problems in 
content analysis have yet to be resolved or are the subject of ongoing research and 
debate.‖  In conducting this examination and comparison through inductive reasoning, 
this study hopes to produce answers to the research question as they emerge from the 
text.  Miles and Huberman (1994) as cited in Romanowski (2009) provide steps to guide 
this type of qualitative content analysis:  
First, all relevant passages are read and carefully examined and notes are 
taken.  The second step—data reduction—involves selecting, focusing, and 
condensing textbook content through thinking about the data that best answer 
the research questions.  The final step—data display—involves organizing and 
arranging data (through a diagram, chart, or text).  This process indentifies 
themes, patterns, connections, and omissions that help answer the research 
questions (2009). 
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The beginning inference of this study is that changes in the amount of space devoted to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in textbooks represent changes in the conflict‘s social, cultural, 
and political importance over time.  Content analysis is valuable for revealing these 
trends and is most effective when applied to specific categories of analysis, which, in the 
case of this present research study, will be guided by topical questions of analysis and 
limited by sentences that reference the topic of analysis being studied.  A topic matrix of 
important events, leaders, and key terms related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which are 
referenced in the sentences of the main text, review questions, index, and pictures from 
each textbook will produce visual representations of changes within the textbooks over 
time.  Berelson summarized the value of such a design in stating: 
The classification into a single set of categories of similar samples of 
communication content taken at different times provides a concise 
description of content trends, in terms or relative frequencies of 
occurrence…Such trend studies provide a valuable historical perspective 
against which the current content of the communication media can be 
more fully understood‖ (Berelson, 1952). 
 
This archival research thesis will focus on three major textbook publishers: 
 McDougal Littell (Houghton Mifflin)   
 Holt, Rinehart, Winston (Harcourt)  
 Prentice Hall (Pearson)  
Six of the most widely-used titles from each publisher will be examined, one from each 
decade since the 1950s.  A period of 50 years was chosen as a sufficient amount of time 
for revealing to what extent representations of the Arab-Israeli conflict have changed.  
For a list of other studies in which these textbooks were examined, and how each study 
determined textbooks that were widely used, see Appendix A.  The rationale for the title 
choices stands largely on the shoulders of these previous studies, whose researchers 
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compiled statewide adoption lists and surveyed state departments of education along with 
the nation‘s largest local school districts.  Compiling a list of widely-used textbooks in 
the present decade alone is not an easy task because publishers are extremely secretive 
about the volume and sales of textbooks.  Textbook titles with an asterisk denote titles 
that are currently listed by the American Textbook Council‘s website as having been 
included ―in major adoptions, that, combined, hold an estimated 80 percent of the 
national market in U.S. and world history, grades eight to twelve.‖  As much as possible, 
consideration was also given to titles that maintained a continuity of authorship.  
McDougal Littell (Houghton Mifflin) 
 
 1952: The Making of Modern America (Canfield and Wilder) 
 
 1962: The Making of Modern America (Canfield and Wilder) 
 
 1975: This is America’s Story (Wilder, Ludlum, and Brown) 
 
 1986: This is America’s Story (Wilder, Ludlum, and Brown) 
 
 1996: The Americans: A history (Winthrop, Greenblatt, and Bowes) 
 
 *2003: The Americans (Danzer) 
 
Holt, Rinehart, Winston (Harcourt) 
 
 1950: America’s History (Todd and Curti)  
 
 1966: The Rise of the American Nation (Todd and Curti)  
 
 1977: The Rise of the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
 1986: Triumph of the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
 1995: Todd and Curti’s the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
 *2003: American Nation (Boyer) 
 
Prentice Hall (Pearson) 
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 1957: The United States—the History of a Republic (Hofstadter) 
 
 1967: The United States—the History of a Republic (Hofstadter) 
 
 1976: The United States (Hofstadter) 
 
 1986: The American Nation (Davidson) 
 
 1995: America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton) 
 
 *2005: America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton) 
 
 
Because textbooks in this study are considered products of their particular time and 
culture, this study will endeavor to concisely reconstruct the historical context for each 
decade being studied before looking at the topics of analysis.  The goal in doing so is to 
increase the clarity of connections between the text and the time of its production.  This 
study will look at several areas of each textbook.  Similar to Podeh‘s study, textbook 
content will be divided into categories of analysis with identical questions for each topic.  
The analysis questions are quoted directly from Larsen (1991).  Following are the 
categories of analysis and the identical questions that will be answered for all categories, 
in a subjective narrative format for each textbook.  (See Appendix B)   
Mandate Period; Balfour Declaration/1948 War; 1956 Suez Canal Crisis; 1967 Six Day 
War; 1973 Yom Kippur War; 1979 Camp David Accords; 1980s Conflict in Lebanon; 
1991-1994 Peace Talks; Post 9/11 Conflicts: 
 What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse 
 What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
 What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
 On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation? 
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 What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged? 
  After the above questions have been answered for each topic of analysis, 
questions regarding the overall impressions of each text will be considered, in order to 
establish the numerical and pro-Israel, anti-Israel, or neutral ratings for each textbook.  
Unless directly quoted, the following questions are adapted from Podeh‘s study (2000) as 
well as Chambliss‘ (1998) characteristics of a well-designed textbook, specifically as it 
relates to the curriculum design.   
Questions for summary of textual impressions and curriculum design: 
 Categories of Analysis: How are the opposing sides, people groups, or leaders 
described—in terms of religion, ethnicity, specific nationality (i.e., Jordanian, 
Egyptian, etc.), or in the case of Palestinians, as simply part of the larger Arab 
nations? 
 Stereotypical Content: ―Is the ‗other‘ nation, group, or individual described in 
positive, negative or neutral terms?  Special emphasis is attached to the use of 
delegitimizing and dehumanizing terms (e.g., terrorists, thieves, Nazis, etc.)‖  
(Podeh, 2000). 
 Role Performance: Are the opposing sides, groups, or leaders described in a 
peaceful or conflicting context and/or roles? 
 Intentions, Blame, Lessons to be Learned: What are the aims or intentions of the 
opposing sides, groups, or leaders?  Whose fault is a particular conflict and who is 
to blame for failing to achieve peace?  Are there lessons to be learned about the 
opposing sides when reading about particular historical events? 
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 Bias by Omission and Self-Censorship:  Has information necessary to understand 
the motivations of both sides been omitted?  What kind of information has been 
censored, and is it done in an obvious or subtle way?  Would a typical high school 
student be able to readily discern any distortions?  What problems might either 
side have with the text‘s interpretation of a particular event? 
 Bias by Proportion or Disproportion:  Is there too much or too little information 
on specific topics?  
 Elements of the Text: Does the text include topics and events that are important to 
experts of the Arab-Israeli conflict?  Does it include those that would be 
considered trivial to experts? 
 Linkages of the Text: Does the structure of the text provide important links 
between cause and effect that experts would include? 
In order to clearly see what has gained more or less spatial coverage over time in 
the textbooks, a topic matrix including key events, leaders, and terms is included, as well 
as line and bar graphs derived from the completed matrix. (See Appendix C).  The 
number of sentences within the main text, index references, review questions, and 
pictures in which that event or leader is discussed or pictured was counted in each 
textbook. The review questions at the end of each chapter typically give the reader a 
sense of what is deemed most important from the content, and teachers pay attention to 
these instructional activities.  Pictures and captions within the text offer insight into the 
authors‘ attempts to aid the student in understanding chapter content. The numbers for 
each event or leader were totaled for each decade. Defining and examining terms as they 
related to the topics of analysis were of utmost importance since the political viewpoint 
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of one statement can be changed entirely depending on which politically charged word is 
chosen—this is why quantitative methods alone were insufficient for this study. 
To reiterate the importance of textbooks in the classroom (and in turn this study), 
a survey of thirteen thousand teachers from kindergarten through college level in the U.S. 
―found that they use textbooks and other printed teaching material 90-95 percent of their 
working time, and that students interact with textbooks more than they do with their 
teachers‖ (Gal, 1981).  Ravitch artfully summarizes the strange contradiction that exists 
in the life of a high school student today—the contrast that exists between the carefully 
constructed environment of school and the powerful, ever-present stimuli of media and 
entertainment outside its doors.  As she states:  
They [students] do not know and surely do not care than an entire industry 
of bias reviewers has insulated them from any contact in their textbooks 
with anything that might disturb them…this is as wacky a combination as 
anyone might dream up: schools in which life has been homogenized, with 
all conflicts flattened out, within the context of an adolescent culture in 
which anything goes‖ (Ravitch, 2003). 
 
Through this study, rather than suggesting to make history education ever more 
irrelevant, the hope is that it will shed further light on the fact that history textbooks are 
products of time and culture themselves and can be powerful teaching resources in the 
hands of wise educators.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Comprehensive Content Analyses 
Research on history textbooks prior to the 1960s is uncommon in educational 
literature (Siler, 1986).  Two comprehensive studies on history textbooks conducted prior 
to the 1960s are School Histories at War (Wolworth, 1938), which compares portrayals 
of wars throughout American history as represented in various international textbooks, 
and Intergroup Relations in Teaching Materials, sponsored by the American Council on 
Education (1949).  The 1949 study concluded that textbooks were ―inadequate, 
inappropriate, and even damaging to intergroup relations‖ (Siler, 1986).   
When content analysis became popular in the 1960s as applied to U.S. history 
textbooks, a body of research surrounding historical themes, groups, and events began to 
emerge (Siler, 1986).  There have been a host of valuable content analyses performed on 
themes (war, politics, economics, labor), groups (Native Americans, African Americans, 
women), and events (the Holocaust, World War II, Cold War, September 11) at all grade 
levels, so much so that the list is too extensive to include here.  However, the treatment of 
groups has been the greatest focus of the textbook studies, particularly the imbalanced 
treatment of minorities and women (Siler, 1986).  
 In general, the criticisms of content analysis studies performed on history 
textbooks fit into five categories: 
1.) Too dull   
These studies, among others, mourn the lifeless, bland writing of history 
textbooks (Cheney,1988; P. Gagnon, 1988; Graves & Slater, 1986; Loewen, 2008; G. T. 
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Sewall, 1988; Shug, Western, & Enochs, 1997; Tyson-Bernstein, 1988).  Crismore 
(1984) and Graves and Slater (1986) experimented with adding more descriptive 
narration to the text in order to improve memory retention; the results were inconclusive.   
2.) Inaccurate or contains unnamed sources  
 These studies, among others, lament the Eurocentric, male-dominated historical 
accounts of textbooks (Bigelow, 1989; P. Gagnon, 1987; Joseph, 1988; Zinn, 1995). 
3.) Overly broad in their coverage 
These studies, among others, criticize the all-encompassing nature of history 
textbooks (Newmann, 1988; G. Sewall, 1988; Wiggins, 1989; Woodward, 1987).  While 
very eye-catching, Ravitch points out that the average history textbook is around 1,000 
pages and difficult to follow because of the profusion of colors and graphics (2003).   
4.) Difficult to read and/or understand 
These studies, among others, highlight the need for educators to utilize students‘ 
background knowledge to aid in understanding the text (Armbruster & Anderson, 1985; 
Beck, McKeown, & Gromoll, 1989). 
  5.) Imbalanced coverage of minorities and/or women 
 There is a host of studies concerning the treatment of minorities and women in 
U.S. history textbooks.  A full listing would be too exhaustive to include here; however, 
prominent studies, and most often cited, include Banks, 1969; Costo & Henry, 1970; 
Garcia & Tanner, 1985; Kane, 1970; and Trecker, 1971.  Sadker and Sadker found that 
imbalanced gender representation in textbooks can reinforce the idea that women have 
done nothing noteworthy enough to be included in the history texts (1994).  Gordy‘s 
study also highlights the negative consequences of gender imbalance (2004).   
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Many studies contain more than one of the above-mentioned criticisms.  This 
review will focus briefly on major studies that have looked at secondary history 
textbooks in general and will look more thoroughly at those studies that have dealt with 
secondary textbooks‘ treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East in 
particular.   
General Textbook Reviews 
 While not technically a scholarly study, Fitzgerald‘s 1979 review of social studies 
texts from the 1900s to the 1970s was published in the New Yorker as a series of three 
articles in the spring of 1979 and created a firestorm of response, prompting researchers 
to do more specific and scientifically rigorous content analysis studies.  In the AHA 
Newsletter, Downey and Metcalf‘s review of Fitzgerald‘s work labeled it ―the most 
provocative document on the pedagogy of American history to be published in the 
seventies‖ (1980).  According to Ward, Fitzgerald wrote America Revised because U.S. 
history textbooks offered ―an index to the public mind‖ (Ward, 1980).  While Ward‘s 
(1980) review of Fitzgerald‘s book considers it worthy of attention for examining the 
connection between academic history and the broader population of the American people, 
Marty‘s (1982) assessment was unforgiving.  Marty criticized many aspects of 
Fitzgerald‘s work including the lack of methodology in book selection and evaluation and 
lack of an index: ―So faulty is America Revised that it is difficult to take Ms. Fitzgerald‘s 
legitimate criticisms seriously.  But America Revised needs to be criticized as a deficient 
book, not only in its argumentation but in its style as well‖ (1982).  Fitzgerald‘s book was 
also criticized for failing to suggest solutions to the many problems the author noted 
about textbook writing and publishing (Metcalf & Downey, 1980).  Deficient or not, 
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however, almost all content analysis studies of history textbooks after 1979 mention 
Fitzgerald‘s findings; even Marty recognized the need to come to terms with Fitzgerald‘s 
book ―if the history taught in junior and senior high schools is to be worth teaching and 
worth being learned‖ (1982).  According to Larsen (1990), Fitzgerald ―reminded readers 
of how the certain world of textbooks in their own childhoods had changed to an 
uncertain one in textbooks of their children.‖  While Fitzgerald did not explain how she 
chose the books included in her review, she lamented the passage of what she perceived 
to be the few good, entertaining texts of the past for the dull, lifeless books of the present, 
written in what she labeled ―textbook prose‖ (Fitzgerald, 1979).  For the most part, 
however, Fitzgerald claimed that textbooks had managed to maintain a fairly consistent 
level of dullness since the 1930s.  Summarizing Fitzgerald‘s research, Siler stated: ―The 
books lacked intellectual history, failed to personalize history by using abstract 
institutions rather than relating history as a dynamic of human interaction, and covered 
the major events of American history in a whizzing chronological order that could not 
help but be confusing‖ (Siler, 1990).  Fitzgerald‘s work represents the first step in 
attempting to engage the American public in considering the complexities of writing, 
teaching, and learning history.   
 In her 1979 study Ideology and United States History Textbooks, Anyon 
examined seventeen secondary U.S. history textbooks from the ―Books Approved for 
Use‖ lists in both New York City and Newark, New Jersey.  Defining ideology as ―an 
explanation or interpretation of social reality in which, although presented as objective, is 
demonstrably partial in that it expresses the social priorities of certain political, 
economic, or other groups,‖ Anyon concluded that dominant societal groups expressed 
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and legitimized power through the school curriculum (Anyon, 1982).  Camicia noted 
Anyon‘s study contributed to the realization that textbooks foster the ―dominant cultural 
norms and [promote] nation-bound metanarratives by limiting the number of perspectives 
in the curriculum‖ (2009). 
In 1986, People for the American Way released their report on fifteen eighth 
grade and sixteen tenth grade U.S. history textbooks entitled Looking at History: A 
Review of Major U.S. History Textbooks.  All of the reviewed books were published in 
1986 and were evaluated on eight criteria: authority, interpretation, significance, context, 
representativeness, perspective, engagement, and appropriateness.  In the foreword to the 
study, the 1980s was labeled the ―Decade of Educational Excellence,‖ with textbooks at 
the heart of the debate.  The study was prompted by concern about the overall quality of 
American education and to ensure protection from censorship and ideological views 
being imposed on American students.  People for the American Way designed a series of 
studies to help those involved in the textbook selection process make informed decisions 
and to encourage publishers to improve their books by ―providing constructive criticism‖ 
(Davis, 1986).  The study was founded on the belief that ―special interest groups have 
contributed to the decline of textbook quality‖ (1986).  A panel of five reviewers was 
selected for a ―diversity of expertise and perspective,‖ and the texts selected for review 
included those submitted to the 1985 Texas State Textbook Committee and other ―best-
selling texts available in other states‖ (1986).  The panel found that most of the books 
were ―good; some were excellent.  Overall, the quality had improved significantly over 
earlier generations of history textbooks‖ (1986).  The panel also found that the reversal of 
the dumbing down of textbooks proved that publishers were responding to public 
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pressure.  However, not every finding in the review was positive; there were two primary 
concerns.  First, the use of readability formulas contributed to the poor writing quality of 
textbooks.  Secondly, coverage of religion even in the ―best texts‖ was ―spotty...[and] 
simply not treated as a significant element in American life‖ (1986).  When addressing 
religious diversity in the textbooks, it is of particular interest to the present study that the 
panel found ―Jews exist [in the textbooks] only as the objects of discrimination…‖ 
(1986). While there were no major recommendations included in the study, its 
significance rests in the reviewers‘ and organization‘s belief that quality in American 
education and textbooks was an attainable, realistic goal.   
A 1987 report by editor Gilbert Sewall and the Education Excellence Network 
entitled American History Textbooks: An Assessment of Quality reviewed four 
―established texts in the marketplace‖ and focused on depth of analysis rather than a 
broad coverage of textbooks.  A panel of twelve individuals compiled their reviews and 
critical statements that depended on ―the critical powers, sensibilities, and interests of 
individuals…The validity of design then rested on the selection of reviewers with wide 
experience in the field.‖ (Sewall, 1987).  Each reviewer answered similar questions about 
each textbook regarding adequacy of examples and explanations, appropriate versus 
trivial details, narrative style, thematic coherence, instructional design, and review 
materials.  Reviewers were asked to ―determine what was good and what was bad about 
the textbooks they reviewed, to use specific examples to illustrate their opinions, and to 
reach some overall conclusions, first about the writing in leading American history 
textbooks, and second, about its impact on effective teaching and learning‖ (Sewall, 
1987).  The reviewers in this study reported several problems with the textbooks, with 
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overly broad coverage and ―mentioning‖ of material looming as the largest complaint.  
Joan Grady, one of the reviewers, stated: ―The books are universally bland, repetitious, 
fact-filled, and deadly in the lack of attempts to stimulate and catch the interest of the 
audience‖ (Sewall, 1987).  The study concluded with six recommendations: scale down 
the size of textbooks, rededicate textbooks to the text (i.e., reduce the amount of graphics 
and pictures), hire better textbook writers, emphasize primary sources, set minority group 
issues into historical context, and initiate textbook reviews by independent sources.  
Sewall‘s study received scathing criticism as being merely a political document with a 
complete disregard for assessment criteria and sound methodology, resulting in panelists‘ 
conclusions differing and sometimes contradicting one another (Kaltsounis, 1988).  
Kaltsounis, writing for Social Education, concluded: ―The report appears to be another 
U.S. Department of Education effort to discredit social studies with its interdisciplinary 
nature and replace it with history‖ (1988).  Whether or not this was Sewall‘s intent, his 
study represents an attempt to inform publishers and textbook selection committees on 
how to produce and select better textbooks. 
Although not an academic study, Woodward, Elliot, and Nagel‘s 1988 annotated 
bibliography entitled Textbooks in School and Society is a foundational starting point for 
any research involving textbooks in the United States.  Bibliography lists are categorized 
into five sections, including: ―textbooks and school programs, the production and 
marketing of textbooks, general discussion and special topics, subject matter content 
coverage, and ideology and controversy‖ (1988).   
Larsen‘s 1990 dissertation examined fourteen elementary, middle, and high 
school U.S. history textbooks and attempted to identify fragmented and ahistorical 
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elements in order to ―suggest the concentration of textbook influences for a given 
period…[and] more easily lead teachers, curriculum workers and, eventually, publishers 
to correction.‖  Using a parent population of all U.S. history textbooks used in Michigan 
in the 1980s, Larsen obtained the sample population of widely-used textbooks from three 
separate surveys conducted by the Michigan Department of Education.  The entireties of 
textbooks were examined for ahistoricism, while passages regarding four specific topics 
were examined for fragmentation.  The overall findings of the study suggested a 
superficial treatment of historical events, which in Larsen‘s assessment leads to presentist 
interpretations of history.  Fragmentation was ubiquitous at all textbook levels (Larsen, 
1991).  While Larsen does an excellent job explaining the types and root causes of 
ahistoricism and fragmentation in the textbooks, like Fitzgerald‘s book, the study 
proposes very few solutions to the problems that are identified. 
A 1991 study by Regester compared the visual and verbal content of two 1980s 
textbooks to two from the 1950s.  Even though textbooks from the 1980s contained thirty 
more years of history, were larger in size, and included more color graphics, surprisingly, 
the study found no significant change in content ―on the average total number of people, 
places, events, organizations, and statistical data‖ (Regester, 1991). 
Ravitch‘s 2004 study of six leading U.S. history textbooks conducted by a panel 
of scholars based its evaluation on ―accuracy, context, organization, selection of 
supporting materials, lack of bias, historical logic, literary quality, use of primary 
sources, historical soundness, democratic ideas, interest level, and graphics‖ (2004).  This 
study gave failing scores to two of the twelve textbooks; the highest score any textbook 
received was a seventy-eight percent, or a ―C.‖  This study incorporates both criticism 
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categories of ―too dull‖ and ―too broad.‖  Summarizing the panel‘s findings, Ravitch 
observed that textbooks ―blunt the edges of events and strip from the narrative whatever 
is lively, adventurous, and exciting.  In part, this happens because so much needs to be 
covered and compressed in the texts; in part, it is due to the lack of authorial voice and 
the abilities to express wonderment, humor, outrage, or elation‖ (2004).  Her 
recommendations included abolishing the statewide system of adopting textbooks, 
implementing a regular review of textbooks by independent agencies, hiring better 
educated teachers, and offering alternative history courses for graduation credit.  
Ravitch‘s study offers an updated companion to Sewall‘s earlier assessments and is 
intended largely for publishers and textbook selection committees in another effort to 
encourage quality in the production and selection of textbooks. 
Textbook reviews dealing with the Middle East or Arab-Israeli conflict 
A 1961 study by Lloyd Marcus examined forty-eight textbooks used in the 1950s 
for their treatment of Jews and other minorities.  Marcus concluded that textbook 
treatment of the minority groups was uneven, although gains had been made since 1949 
(Marcus, 1961).  Siler criticizes Marcus‘ study for failing to use a systematic 
methodology for choosing textual excerpts and failing to cite sources for textual quotes 
and references used in the study.  Essentially discounting Marcus‘ attempt at a useful 
research guide, Siler stated: ―The final evaluations and conclusions [of Marcus‘ study] 
were based upon the author‘s impressions of the textbooks as compared to the seven 
stated criteria‖ (Siler, 1986). 
An early study on the image of the Middle East in world history textbooks by 
Griswold (1975) found that ―the majority of textbooks erred in content, perpetuated 
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stereotypes in political and social description, oversimplified complicated issues, listed 
outcomes while ignoring causes, and often provided moral judgments on the actions of 
nations in the guise of factual history‖ (1975).  Griswold also took issue with the 
preferential tone of the writing, which favored Israel above Middle Eastern states.  While 
there was no explicit mention of superiority by the authors, the tone, according to 
Griswold, was enough to ―subtly convey political and religious biases which denigrate 
the Muslim world in general, and Arabs in particular‖ (1975).  While Griswold‘s study 
examined only world history textbooks, it stands out from others since it attempts to 
address the shortcomings found in the textbooks.  Griswold‘s contribution is especially 
significant for this study because he attempted to provide what he thought to be a 
balanced account of the Arab-Israeli conflict by providing suggested lesson plans and 
resources for teaching about particular events in the conflict. 
A 1976 dissertation by Samir Jarrar entitled Images of the Arabs in United States 
Secondary School Social Studies Textbooks: A Content Analysis and a Unit Development 
sought to examine how Arabs were represented in the most widely-used secondary U.S. 
history textbooks.  The research topic was investigated using quantitative (ECO analysis 
in which words thought to be negative or discriminatory are coded and counted) and 
qualitative (an evaluation criteria checklist for each textbook) analysis methods.  
According to Jarrar, the results ―indicated that the image of the Arab as presented in the 
texts is more negative than positive.  This is caused by a number of factors which include 
omissions, stereotypes, over-generalizations, and lack of balance in the presentation of 
the material‖ (Jarrar, 1976).  In addition, Jarrar asserted that the problem was only 
exacerbated by ―continual comparisons with Israel and numerous references to isolated 
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examples of extremist action by non-representative groups‖ (Jarrar, 1976).  Jarrar 
recommended offering a more balanced representation of Arabs, basing information on 
reliable sources instead of biased interpretations, utilizing Arab scholars to help textbook 
publishers revise old material and write new textbooks, increasing textbook publishers‘ 
awareness of current issues facing the Arab world, and avoiding conclusive statements 
about the Arab-Israeli conflict since it is an ongoing source of contention.  Jarrar stated 
that since most conclusions about the conflict ―support the Israeli point of view…it is 
recommended that the Arab-Israeli conflict either be set aside as a major topic of study in 
the textbooks or be presented as much from one side as it is from the other‖ (Jarrar, 
1976).  Jarrar‘s suggestion is unique among the literature reviewed here; he offers no 
alternative ideas for publishers and educators who are unwilling to dismiss the conflict 
except to advise them to ―solicit directly the assistance of middle eastern and Arab 
scholarly associations‖ (Jarrar, 1976). 
A series of twelve journal articles were published in the Social Studies Review 
between the Spring of 1989 and the Fall of 1992 (Sewall, 1992).  Sponsored by the 
American Textbook Council (ATC) and edited by Gilbert Sewall, the series was designed 
to provide information about and reviews of social studies textbooks.  Of particular 
interest to this study was issue six,―The Middle East and Islam,‖ which included the 
article ―Textbooks and the Middle East: A Review.‖  Three sixth grade and three high 
school world history texts published in 1990 were reviewed by the publication, with no 
explanation of how the texts were chosen.  The article is only three pages, half of which 
are devoted to the secondary text‘s treatment of the history of Byzantium and Islam, the 
concept of ―jihad,‖ and the subject of Middle Eastern affairs since 1945.  Overall, only 
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one of the three books was considered ―excellent‖ (History and Life published by Scott, 
Foresman).  The book‘s treatment of Middle Eastern affairs since 1945 was considered 
skillful and thorough, and the topic of ―Israel and the irresolution of the Palestinian 
problem are aptly covered‖ (1992). While not an academically rigorous review, the 
ATC‘s purpose in publishing these articles was to ―advance history and social studies 
curricula by establishing a national review service for instructional materials…[and] 
encourage the production of textbooks that embody vivid narrative style, stress 
significant people and events, and reflect accurate, balanced historiographic approaches‖ 
(1992).  In light of this motivation and the present study, it is interesting to note that the 
Council considered an understanding of Islam, the Middle East, and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to be an essential part of this balanced historiographical approach. 
A 1993 article by Garcia summarized various studies about ethnic groups in 
textbooks from the 1950s to the 1990s.  While he concluded that gains were made in 
making textbooks more multicultural, he suggests that publishing houses have incorrectly 
interpreted multicultural to mean ―the experiences of minority groups and women in the 
United States‖ (J. Garcia, 1993).  He noted, ―The quality of content describing white 
ethnic groups is no more informative than the content found in texts published before the 
1960s‖ (Garcia, 1993).  The white ethnic groups Garcia is referencing here, as cited 
earlier in his article, are Irish, Italian, Jewish, and Polish Americans.  Garcia‘s article is a 
good summary of ethnic content analyses from the 1950s to the 1990s. 
Barlow (1994), in conjunction with several other reviewers and the Center for 
Middle Eastern and North African Studies and the Middle East Studies Association, 
reviewed fourteen U.S. secondary history textbooks for their treatment of the Middle East 
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and North Africa.  While there is no explanation for how the books were chosen and 
many people reviewing the books have called into question the validity of the 
methodology used, the individual reviews of each book offer specific criticisms along 
with occasional suggestions for improvement.  Each book is given a letter grade, ranging 
from ―A: Use text as is, to E: Do not use this book‖ (Barlow, 1994). Considering the 
present study prompting this literature review, it is interesting to note that Barlow states 
in the project‘s introduction: 
Coverage of Israel is often problematic.  There is a tendency in the West 
to consider Israel as a Westernized country, hence like us, and hence 
good…In pictures and in text Israel is portrayed as modern, in contrast to 
the rest of the region, for which the symbol of the nomad and camel in the 
desert are used…Israel‘s conflict with the Palestinians and with other Arab 
states is too often explained exclusively from the Israeli point of view.  
Rarely does the Palestinian point of view emerge (Barlow, 1994). 
 
From the beginning, the assumption was that textbooks are biased in favor of Israel, and 
evidence of this bias is based on individual reviewers‘ qualitative narrative analysis, with 
various quotations given from the text for support, although it is not clear how these 
quotes were chosen.  Barlow‘s study is rare in that it was a review of U.S. rather than 
world history textbooks‘ treatment of the Middle East and North Africa. 
 While it only included an analysis of Israeli textbooks, Podeh‘s (2000) study 
bears mention because it was a content analysis of secondary history textbooks from 
1948 to 2000 regarding presentations of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as Arabs in 
general.  While Podeh did consider content analysis studies of international conflicts 
performed on textbooks in the U.S. and other Western countries, there was no similar 
study of U.S. history textbooks to which he could compare his own.  There were several 
comparable studies on Hebrew textbooks; however, Podeh‘s study differed from these in 
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three significant ways.  First, it analyzed textbooks over a period of fifty years.  
Secondly, it considered the historical context influencing textbook writers at the time of 
textbook production.  Thirdly, his research was divided into eleven main topics regarding 
the Arab-Israeli conflict; each topic was analyzed separately and presented 
chronologically.  Podeh‘s hope in conducting the study was ―that better textbooks—free 
of bias, prejudice, inaccuracies, and omission—on both sides of the conflict will result in 
a better atmosphere, congenial to the successful consummation of peaceful relations 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors‖ (Podeh, 2000).  The overall finding of the study 
lent some weight to this goal; newer textbooks, according to Podeh, ―…do indeed 
generate hope that the young Israeli generation will be exposed to a different kind of 
approach‖ (Podeh, 2000).  Al-Haj‘s study of Israeli textbooks yielded similar findings 
(2005).  This optimism was coupled with a caution, however, that new approaches must 
take place on both sides.   
A 2004 report by the American Textbook Council (ATC) entitled Islam and the 
Textbooks reviewed three junior high and four high school world history textbooks 
published between 1994 and 2001.  What Sewall labeled a ―comprehensive‖ textbook 
review that began in 2001 and was still in progress at the time found ―content distortions 
and inaccuracies that have not occurred by accident‖ (G. Sewall, 2004).  The review 
examined textbook treatment of three topics: jihad, shari‘a, and women.  In the report‘s 
preface, the ATC stated that it was going against ―thirty years of textbook advocacy in 
favor of sympathetic representations of Islam‖ (2004).  As the ATC expected, the 
publication of its report created an immediate response, primarily from the Council on 
Islamic Education, which was most often the target of Sewall‘s criticisms.  Douglass, in 
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conjunction with the Council on Islamic Education, responded to Sewall‘s study by 
stating: ―To begin with, it is not comprehensive, since it only deals with brief selections 
from six books of the dozen currently used in U.S. classrooms.  He [Sewall] does not 
systematically compare coverage of Islam in the books, nor does he compare textbooks to 
mandated state curriculum standards‖ (2004).  Of particular interest to the present study 
is Douglass‘ criticism that Sewall does not cite one textbook example relating to his 
accusations that Islam, Muslims, or Arabs are to blame for conflict in the Middle East; 
she goes on to state: ―In fact, Mr. Sewall should be delighted.  He would be hard pressed 
to find a textbook presentation of the Middle East conflict that could be construed as pro-
Arab, though some exhibit a bit more balance that they did a decade ago‖ (2003).     
Morgan (2008) used a subjective narrative methodology to compare textbook 
depictions of the Middle East from 1898 to 1994.  Her research surveyed textbooks from 
four time periods (1898-1920, 1920-1940, 1945-1965, and 1970-1994) and compared 
them on the topics of graphics, politics, culture, and religion (Morgan, 2008).  Relying 
heavily on Griswold‘s and Barlow‘s earlier studies, Morgan concluded that ―the Middle 
East has been portrayed negatively and inaccurately, and that this negative portrayal is 
diminishing‖ (2008). 
 Another study by the ATC and authored by Sewall (2008) entitled Islam in the 
Classroom: What the Textbooks Tell Us reviewed ten of the most widely-used junior and 
secondary high school history textbooks, although the secondary U.S. histories made up 
only three of the ten titles and focused exclusively on the twentieth century.  The review 
concluded that political and religious groups try to manipulate the textbook publishing 
process; the most serious failure found among the textbooks was ―the presence of 
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disputed definitions and claims that are presented as established facts‖ (Sewall, 2008).  
Sewall employed a subjective narrative methodology in his content analysis of the 
textbooks, citing various textbook quotations to support his major points.  Sewall‘s broad 
research questions dealt with how textbooks represent Islam‘s foundations and creeds, 
terrorism, September 11, weapons of mass destruction, Islamic challenges to global 
security, and future dangers to the United States and the world.  He also analyzed 
changes between textbook materials written before 2001 and current editions of the 
textbooks under review.  Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict in the textbooks, Sewall 
noted, ―Textbooks talk about ‗fighting‘ in a neutral way rather than emphasizing decades 
of repeated Arab attacks on Israel.  They fail to note that the Palestine Liberation 
Organization does not simply want a Palestinian state.  Its intent is to destroy Israel‖ 
(2008).  Other reviewers for this report felt that the world history textbooks in particular 
revealed a bias against Israel, while some felt that textbook editors intentionally avoided 
criticizing Israel.  Sewall recommended that textbooks ―summarize U.S. policy in the 
Middle East and outline the war against Iraq, delineating what elements of policy and war 
are related to Islamic fundamentalism and what elements are not‖ (2008).  
An analysis of the results of this literature review suggests that while the Arab-
Israeli conflict is a very narrow topic, it is important and calls for further study.  While all 
of the studies included in this review agree that Jews and/or Arabs are represented one 
dimensionally in textbooks and that representations of the Arab-Israeli conflict are 
biased, the majority of those studies have been conducted using world history textbooks.  
More rare than studies that examine U.S. history textbooks‘ treatment of the Middle East 
are those that suggest possible curriculum and teaching solutions to provide students with 
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a balanced approach, promoting critical thought about the current, seemingly intractable 
conflict.  Also, while many of the aforementioned studies suggest that textbooks have 
made progress towards a more balanced representation, they also maintain that pro-Israel 
viewpoints remain in the curriculum (Barlow, 1994; Douglass, 2003).  While Jarrar‘s 
study (1976) was an exception in that it examined U.S. history textbooks, and other 
studies do mention various textbook treatments of the Arab-Israeli conflict, none have 
looked exclusively at the Arab-Israeli conflict as represented in secondary U.S. history 
textbooks.  The motivation for the present study, therefore, is based on the above 
analysis. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 As discussed in the introduction, textbooks are important reference tools for 
teachers and students in U.S. classrooms.  Textbooks are also valuable to researchers 
interested in identifying facts and concepts considered to be core content in curriculum.  
Combining these findings with a desire to gain a historical perspective of a topic as it has 
been represented within a textbook enables researchers to recognize patterns of change as 
well as social, cultural, and political shifts in the significance of notable topics, 
interpretations, and ideologies.  Curriculum research can then inform educational practice 
by alerting educators to gaps in content at best and partial truths and distortions at worst.  
Understanding the causes and consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict is essential to 
understanding conflict throughout the Middle East and the world.  As stated in the 
introduction, this conflict has enormous contemporary relevance to politicians, educators, 
and students because it involves issues of national sovereignty, international diplomacy 
and security, equity, and justice.  
Rationale for the methodology 
 How have descriptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict changed in high school U.S. 
history textbooks since the 1950s?  The answer to this research question may be found 
using a qualitative content analysis methodology.  According to Weber (1990), content 
analysis can be used for many purposes: to ―identify the intentions and other 
characteristics of the communicator; [to] reflect cultural patterns of groups, institutions, 
or societies; [and to] describe trends in communication content.‖ Additionally, Weber 
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(1990) states: ―A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are 
classified into much fewer content categories.‖  Roberts‘ (1997) book, in part, analyzes 
the earliest definitions of content analysis in methodological literature, when the practice 
was beginning to be recognized as a valid scientific form of research.  Berelson (1952), 
Cartwright (1953), Janis (1949), Krippendorff (1969), Osgood (1957), and Stone (1966) 
were all considered pioneering researchers in content analysis methodology.  Roberts 
(1997) categorized their basic definitions of the methodology; his work proves helpful in 
summarizing the various uses and desired outcomes of content analysis.  Four of the six 
researchers believed text as well as symbolic material (e.g., symbolic behavior, 
communication, sign-vehicles, and messages) can be studied in content analysis.  The 
range of results from using content analysis included description, inference, and 
classification.  Five of the six researchers believed content analysis can go beyond the 
―manifest content‖ to the ―latent content‖ of the material being studied, and four of the 
six classified content analysis as quantitative and/or qualitative.  Finally, the researchers 
believed the descriptions and/or inferences of content analysis can apply to one or more 
of the following: the text, the source, and its receivers or audience (Roberts, 1997).  A 
literature database search of ―textbook‖ and ―content analysis‖ yielded over 1,600 results.  
The method‘s popularity can be attributed to it being adaptable to the topic of study and 
to the needs of the researcher.  In his Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry, Schwandt (1997) 
noted that content analysis includes ―both numeric and interpretive means of analyzing 
data.‖  The basic inference of this study‘s content analysis is that the amount of space 
devoted to the categories of analysis determines their importance over time.  Dutton 
(1988) observed that content analysis is most helpful when identifying trends over time, 
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even stating,  ―when classifications are less than adequate, if used consistently over time, 
valuable results may appear.‖  When content analysis became popular as a research 
methodology in the 1960s, a body of research surrounding historical themes, groups, and 
events began to emerge with treatment of groups becoming the greatest focus of the 
textbook studies (Siler, 1986).  While the present study focuses mainly on the events of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the terms ―Jew,‖ ―Jewish,‖ ―Israeli,‖ ―Arab,‖ and ―Palestinian‖ 
included in the terms of analysis could fit into the group category as well. 
 This thesis represents a unique approach to content analysis in relation to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; an effort was made to reconstruct the educational and historical 
zeitgeist for each decade in order to increase the clarity of the connections between the 
text and its time of production.  Identifying past patterns and themes allows the 
researcher to make inferences about future implications of curricular shifts.   
 Secondly, long-standing publishers that have consistently produced widely-used 
history textbooks since the 1950s were chosen for the study.  Sewall (1992) and Foster 
(1999) both listed Harcourt and Houghton Mifflin in the top five publishers for the 1980s 
and 1990s, with Sewall‘s list also including Pearson in the ninth spot of top publishers for 
the 1980s.  All three publishers included in this study have produced U.S. history 
textbooks that the American Textbook Council lists as having been included ―in major 
adoptions, that, combined, hold an estimated 80 percent of the national market in U.S. 
and world history, grades eight to twelve.‖  Specific textbook titles with copyright dates 
approximately ten years apart and that maintained similar authorship were given priority.  
The rationale for individual title choices was largely based on previous studies (included 
in Appendix A) whose researchers compiled statewide adoption lists and surveyed state 
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departments of education and the nation‘s largest local school districts in order to identify 
widely-used titles.  
Thirdly, key events, people, and terms relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict were 
identified and included in the list of topics of analysis as well as in the charts and graphs 
of Appendix C.  An event, person, or term relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
considered ―key‖ if more than one textbook made reference to it.  Key events included 
the British mandate period in Palestine, the Balfour Declaration and establishment of 
Israel as a nation, the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, the 1979 Camp David Accords, the 1980s conflict in Lebanon, the 1991-
1994 peace talks, and post 9/11 Arab-Israeli conflicts.  Key people included Yasir Arafat, 
Menachem Begin, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Yitzhak Rabin, 
and Anwar Sadat.  Key terms included Arab(s), Israel and/or Israeli, Jews and/or Jewish, 
Palestine, and Palestinian. 
Fourthly, each textbook was searched for references to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
beginning with the establishment of Israel to the end of the textbook.  References to 
people, places, and events of the conflict included index citations, timelines, pictures and 
their captions, chapter and unit review questions, and sentences in the main body of the 
text.  Index references for each topic of analysis, person, or term were counted and 
entered into the chart in Appendix C.  Pages cited more than once in the index for the 
same event, person, or term were not counted.  Review questions were counted only if the 
intended answer dealt specifically with the conflict or persons involved in the conflict.  
Key terms and people were counted using the number of actual word occurrences in the 
main text, picture captions, timelines, and special boxes of text within the main body.  
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Timelines and maps were counted as pictures.  Finally, all sentences pertaining to the key 
events were counted, including sentences in special text boxes and picture captions.  The 
data was totaled by decade and entered into the chart in Appendix C. 
The final step of this study involved an analysis of the findings along with 
curricular implications of those findings.  The recommendations and conclusions portion 
of the research contains suggestions for overcoming the limitations of textbook 
representations of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Arab-Israeli Historiography  
Before presenting the qualitative analysis of each textbook‘s treatment of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, it is important to note that the study author‘s knowledge of the 
conflict was not considered to be a baseline for this analysis; many sources were 
consulted.  It is appropriate to acknowledge these sources, since both scholarly, historical 
analyses as well as works of propaganda surround this intractable struggle.  The 
continued practice in Arab-Israeli scholarship of ―scholars who tend to follow a certain 
school of thought or senior scholar blindly as if they were a Messiah‖ (Lochery, 2001) 
presents a real problem.  Efforts to obtain sources that were as objective as possible were 
further complicated by the recent schism among Israeli historians along ―old‖ and ―new‖ 
lines of historic interpretation.  The relationship between career advancement and ―new‖ 
findings exerts pressure on Middle East historians, adversely affecting research on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  Lochery (2001) provides an excellent review of works by new 
historians along with a summary of differences between old and new interpretations.  Key 
differences include ―the transfer of Arab refugees in 1948, the David and Goliath 
argument, the collusion or unwritten agreement with Jordan, the Zionist movement: 
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conspiratorial or pragmatic and the responsibility for the failed peace between Israel and 
the Arabs.‖  Isacoff (2005) summarized the differences of interpretation regarding these 
issues, stating: ―Whereas the Zionists [‗old‘ historians] depict Israel as a weak, benign 
victim desperately seeking to eke out an existence in the Hobbesian Middle East of the 
1940s and 1950s, the new historians portray Israel as a strong, deliberate state that 
aggressively exploited opportunities to expropriate land and gain strategic advantage at 
the Arabs‘ expense.‖  Prominent ―old‖ historians, as identified by Isacoff (2005) include 
Anita Shapira, Avraham Sela, Efraim Karsh, and Michael Oren.  Benny Morris, Avi 
Shlaim, and Ilan Pappe are acknowledged as the ―new‖ historians‘ founders, with Yoav 
Peled, Gershon Shafir, Motti Golani, Uri Ram, Yagil Levy, and Uri Ben-Eliezer as 
important contributors.  Taking this into consideration, the following sources were 
consulted (some more heavily than others) when analyzing the textbooks included this 
study: 
 
Avneri, A. (1984). The claim of dispossession: Jewish land settlement and the Arabs  
1878-1948 (Kfar-Blum Translation Group). New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
Barari, H. (2009). Israelism: Arab scholarship on Israel, a critical assessment. Reading,  
United Kingdom: Ithaca Press. 
Bickerton, I., & Klausner, C. (2005). A concise history of the Arab-Israeli conflict  
(Fourth ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Carol, S. (2008). Middle East rules of thumb: Understanding the complexities of the  
Middle East (2nd ed.). New York: iUniverse, Inc. 
Gelvin, J. (2005). The Israel-Palestine conflict: One hundred years of war. New York:  
  
 
47 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gilbert, M. (2005). The routledge atlas of the Arab-Israeli conflict. New York:  
Routledge. 
Herzog, C. (1982). The Arab-Israeli wars. London: Arms and Armour Press. 
Isacoff, J. (2005). Writing the Arab-Israeli conflict: Historical bias and the use of history  
in political science. Perspective on Politics, 3(1), pp. 71-88. 
Lea, D., & Rowe, A. (Eds.). (2002). A survey of Arab-Israeli relations 1947-2001 (First  
Edition). London: Europa Publications. 
Reich, B., Goldberg, J., Gotowicki, S., Silverburg, S., & Erickson, M. (Eds.). (1996). An   
historical encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press. 
Smith, C. (2010). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Seventh Edition). Boston:  
Bedford/St. Martin's. 
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IV.  RESULTS 
 
 The following categories of analysis include only a summary of findings from all 
of the textbooks and decades included in this study.  For more detailed analysis of each 
textbook within each decade, see Appendix B.  A one to three rating has been assigned to 
each textbook from each decade and for each category of analysis.  A ―three‖ rating 
identifies the textbook from each decade that best addresses the category of analysis 
under study and a ―one‖ indicates the least adequate textbook for the category of analysis 
under study.  Textbooks with a ―three‖ rating were considered the most thorough of the 
three books under study for each decade and the textbook that leaves the least amount of 
perspectives, questions, and theories unacknowledged and/or unanswered.  Beside the 
number rating is a notation indicating whether the textbook‘s summary for that category 
of analysis was considered to be generally pro-Israel (―P‖), anti-Israel (―A‖), or mostly 
neutral (―N‖).  An ―X‖ indicates the absence in the textbook of the category of analysis 
under study. 
 
Category of Analysis 
Mandate System/Balfour Declaration/1948 War/Establishment of Israel: (See 
Appendix B pp. 147-167 for edition specific information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  The Cold War is undoubtedly the dominant underlying 
problem that prompts discussion of the Middle East in these textbooks.  Palestine and 
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Israel‘s independence is repeatedly seen in the light of East-West conflict and strategic 
importance.  A focus on British decline in the Mediterranean is a secondary theme in the 
early textbooks, while the region‘s oil reserves become the secondary focus beginning in 
the 1980s.  The root of the conflict over the land itself, between Jews and Arabs, is not 
readily apparent until the textbooks of the 1990s and 2000s. 
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought to be relevant?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  Worldwide and American sympathy for Jews after World 
War II and the Holocaust is the dominant theory leading to descriptions and explanations 
about the establishment of Israel.  The difficult diplomatic position of the U.S. between 
supporting Israel and maintaining relations with oil-rich Arab nations is also a theme.  
Great Britain‘s abdication of its mandate in Palestine is typically seen as the impetus for 
Israel‘s declaration of statehood; Zionism and its influence over the events leading up to 
1948 are not mentioned in textbooks until the 1990s. 
3.  What relationships, causes, and consequences are proposed?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  The dominant theme or relationship throughout the 
textbooks is the Arab nations‘ hatred toward Israel, before and after the 1948 War.  
Specifically, the Arab nations‘ refusal to accept Israel as a state is repeatedly mentioned, 
although reasons why are not always provided.  Ben-Gurion‘s leadership as well as Dr. 
Bunche‘s UN negotiations are frequently mentioned.  Primary causes leading to the 
outbreak of the 1948 War are Great Britain‘s end of the mandate period and the UN 
Partition Plan, although many times no cause for the 1948 War is given.  Key 
consequences addressed in the textbooks include the 1948 War, the Arab nations‘ 
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continued hatred for Israel, and an uneasy peace.  Beginning in the 1990s, some texts 
mention refugees remaining in Palestine after the 1948 War. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  The premises for this question are more varied than 
others.  Premises for textbook accounts of the 1948 War include American sympathy for 
Jews after World War II, the difficult diplomatic position of the U.S. in the Middle East, 
Cold War tensions, Arab hostility toward Jews and Israel, general threats to world peace, 
and maintaining world peace.   
A major assumption in many texts is that all Americans sympathized with Jews 
after World War II, as did the world.  Because many accounts of the mandate period and 
1948 War were within a Cold War context, the implicit assumption was that Middle East 
affairs were important only as much as they related to Cold War strategy.  Varied 
statements about who actually declared Israel an independent state can be observed, 
including the UN, President Truman, and David Ben-Gurion; however, some texts do not 
include this information at all.  The texts varied greatly in their descriptions of the peace 
negotiations following the 1948 War.  Texts that did not include peace negotiations often 
left students with the assumption that Israel‘s victory was decisive and accepted in the 
Arab world and that peace was immediate with no unresolved issues. Texts that did 
include peace negotiations typically excluded unresolved issues between the two sides. 
5.  What perspectives, questions, and theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  The first question often left unaddressed is why Great 
Britain gave up its mandate in Palestine.  This question is not addressed until the 1990s 
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and is rarely mentioned at all.  Even though many texts mention the Jews‘ desire for a 
national homeland, very few delve into the reasons why.  Zionism and its influence in 
this area are only found in textbooks from the 1990s onward.  Regarding immigration, no 
texts address the 1939 White Paper and continued limits on Jewish immigration to 
Palestine even after World War II.  The most glaring exclusions and gaps in information 
are seen in textbook content on the UN Partition Plan and root causes of the 1948 War.  
The fact that Arab states were angered by Israel‘s declaration of statehood is almost 
always included, but why the establishment of Israel angered the Arab world and which 
Arab states went to war with Israel are excluded.  Peace negotiations after the war are 
often absent, and if present, focus on Dr. Ralph Bunches‘ efforts on behalf of the UN.  
Only a few mention that his predecessor was assassinated for similar efforts and none 
give any reasons for why he was assassinated, although two textbooks mention he was 
killed at the hands of Israeli extremists.  Issues of contention left unresolved by peace 
negotiations are not included until the 1980s and later.  Even when Arab refugees 
remaining in Israel after 1948 are mentioned, Jewish refugees from Arab countries during 
the same period are never mentioned.  Although one text mentions competing claims 
about whether the Arab refugees fled or were driven out of Israel, it avoids a conclusive 
statement on the matter.  Finally, although the Arab states‘ continued refusal to recognize 
Israel as a state is often included, the reasons why are not.        
All Decade Summary: Mandate System/Balfour Declaration/1948 
War/Establishment of Israel: (See Appendix C pp. 263-264 for Mandate/1948 graphs) 
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Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X 2 (P) 1 (P) X 1 (A) 4 
HOLT 2 (N) 3 (N) 3 (N) 2 (N) 3 (P) 3 (P) 16 
PH 3 (P) 2 (A) 1 (A) 3 (A) 2 (N) 2 (N) 13 
Category of Analysis 
Category of Analysis 
1956 Suez War: (See Appendix B pp. 167-193 for edition specific information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  The predominant underlying problem in all of the 
textbooks is the Cold War competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union for influence 
in the Middle East.  Secondary problems mentioned mostly in the early textbooks include 
Egypt‘s diplomatic bargaining with the East and West and operation and control of the 
Suez Canal itself; two early textbooks also mention that Arab nationalism contributed to 
growing Cold War tensions.  There are significant changes in the way underlying 
problems are represented in the textbooks over the decades.  Early texts not only blame 
Cold War tensions for trouble in the Middle East but also include general Arab unrest and 
Arab nationalism.  Later books have much less detail about Nasser and his bargaining 
with both the East and West for weapons and Aswan Dam financing.  Oil is first 
mentioned in the 1986 Holt edition, and by the time of the 2000s textbooks, Cold War 
tensions seem to be downplayed, replaced by a focus on control of the Suez Canal and 
the effects this had on oil distribution.   
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
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ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  Most textbooks use Cold War theory to provide context 
for descriptions and explanations.  Some also use Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal as a focal point leading to follow-up descriptions and explanations.  Only a few 
early textbooks put Nasser‘s decision into historical context with explanation of the 
diplomatic nuances surrounding the Aswan Dam financing that led to the nationalization 
of the canal.  A few early textbooks spend more time on the Middle East Treaty 
Organization and the U.S.‘ delicate diplomatic balance between Arab support (oil) and 
sympathy for Israel.  These same texts rarely mention the formation of the Arab League 
as a result of the Suez War.   
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  One relationship evident in most textbooks is Nasser‘s 
anger when the U.S. withdrew Aswan Dam financing, but even those textbooks that do 
not include information on the Aswan Dam typically mention Nasser‘s nationalization of 
the Suez Canal being contrary to U.S. goals in the region.  Another predominant 
relational theme is the U.S. reaction to its NATO allies‘ (Britain and France) invasion of 
Egypt; words used to describe this reaction include consternation, embarrassment, and 
even shock.  Early texts spend more time on the strain this caused among NATO 
relationships and the fact that the U.S. was forced to side with the Soviet Union in calling 
for a cease-fire.  Later textbooks spend less time on the implications for NATO and more 
focus on UN efforts to bring about the cease-fire.  Causes for the cease-fire in early 
textbooks seem to center on the threats made by the Soviet Union to use military force, 
while later textbooks do not mention these threats and place responsibility for the cease-
fire with UN efforts. 
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 Early textbooks contextualize the Suez War with information on Nasser‘s and/or 
Egypt‘s anti-Western sentiments, although many times specific ―sentiments‖ are not 
listed.  Later textbooks emphasize Nasser‘s actions to nationalize the Suez Canal and the 
events that action set into motion.  Only one text (HM 1975) states that the conflict was 
primarily between Israel and Egypt.  Early textbooks identify Israel‘s attack as the spark 
that motivated Britain and France to involve themselves; later textbooks downplay 
Israel‘s unilateral involvement and stress Britain, France, and Israel‘s cooperative 
involvement in light of larger Cold War tensions.  Interestingly, PH 2005 does not even 
mention Israel in its account of the Suez War. 
 Almost every textbook listed the Eisenhower Doctrine as the primary result of the 
Suez War from a U.S. perspective.  Many textbooks also include information on the 
enhanced position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East after the Suez War. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  Almost without exception, the premise of each 
textbook‘s account of the Suez War is the Cold War and American competition for 
influence in the Middle East.  Two areas of assumption in the textbooks dealt with the 
cooperation among Israel, France, and Great Britain, as well as Israel‘s motivations for 
attacking Egypt.   
 Surprisingly, the 1957 PH text does imply possible collusion among Britain, 
France, and Israel in the attack on Egypt, but the rest of the 1960s and 1970s textbooks 
imply no cooperation among the countries.  Textbooks in the 1980s shift toward the 
opposite assumption, that there was cooperation.  By the 1990s, when textbooks include 
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France and Britain‘s efforts to get Israel and Egypt to agree to a cease-fire, it is submitted 
as the excuse France and Britain needed to join the attack, not as a sincere attempt at 
peace.   
 Israel‘s motivations for attack vary by publisher and decade.  While a few 
textbooks do not include any clear reason why Israel attacked Egypt, and the PH 2005 
textbook does not even include Israel‘s involvement in the Suez War, most include at 
least one reason for the attack.  The reason cited most often beginning in the 1950s and 
continuing to the 2000s is Egypt‘s decision to close the Suez Canal to Israel.  Only a few 
textbooks include the fact that this closure was also contrary to international law.  
Another interesting nuance is the observation that early textbooks that include the canal 
closure typically state that it was closed to ―Israeli ships,‖ while later textbooks state that 
the canal was closed to ―ships bound for Israel.‖  It is difficult to generalize additional 
reasons for Israel‘s involvement that were included in the texbooks.  PH 1957 and 1967 
include Israel‘s stated mission to destroy bases in Egypt from which ―Egyptian raids‖ had 
been launched into Israeli territory, while HM 1996 mentions ―terrorist raids‖ launched 
by Egypt into Israeli territory.  From the 1960s to the 1980s, Holt maintains that Israel‘s 
attack was made in order to ―forestall‖ Egypt‘s planned attack on Israel.  This reasoning 
is not found in their 1995 and 2003 editions.  HM 1962 and 1975 give no reasons for 
Israel‘s involvement, saying the attack was ―sudden‖ and ―unfair,‖ while the PH 1976 
edition bases Israel‘s involvement only on ―rising tensions‖ in the region.  Considering 
all of the textbooks together, the canal closure is most often the only reason given for 
Israel‘s involvement in the Suez War.      
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
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ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  Aside from the earliest textbooks, most make no mention 
of the arms buildup or events in Egypt and Israel prior to the Suez War that would 
provide historical context for tensions between the two nations.  Nasser‘s goals for Egypt 
and the Arab world and his motivations for bargaining with the U.S. and Soviet Union 
are mentioned in some early textbooks, but in later textbooks these goals and actions are 
either shortened to the all inclusive phrase ―anti-Western gestures‖ or not included at all.  
Later texts often exclude the diplomatic and financial negotiating over the Aswan Dam, 
thereby excluding important information like why the U.S. was willing to finance the 
dam and why the offer was eventually withdrawn.  When texts do mention the withdrawn 
financing offer, reasons vary from text to text.  Some mention Nasser‘s anti-Western 
gestures, though few are explicit about what that means (PH 1957 and 1967); some state 
it was simply because Nasser also turned to the Soviet Union; and early texts state that it 
was because the U.S. discovered the Soviet Union could not actually afford to finance the 
project (Holt 1966 and 1977). 
 Early texts do provide one reason why Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez 
Canal (withdrawal of financing), but later texts explain what that actually meant and how 
Nasser intended to use the tolls (to finance the dam).  While many texts state that Nasser 
closed the canal to Israeli access, only one gives any sort of explanation for this decision: 
―Egypt had closed the canal to Israeli shipping, and, along with other Arab states, had 
vowed to drive Israel into the sea‖ (HM 1962).  International reaction to nationalization 
of the canal is typically not included; however, U.S. reaction to Britain, France, and 
Israel‘s invasion of Egypt is almost always included.  Early texts include more detail on 
cease-fire negotiations and the Soviet Union‘s threats to use military force if Britain, 
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France, and Israel did not withdraw.  Interestingly, only one text mentions a counter-
threat made by the U.S. that this type of intervention would not be acceptable (HM 1996).  
Later texts treat the Suez War less like a ―brink of war‖ threat and more like a Cold War 
trouble spot for East/West relations.  Most texts exclude who controlled the canal at the 
end of the war. 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY: 1956 Suez War (See Appendix C p. 265 for chart) 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X 1 (P) 1 (A) 2 (P) 3 (P) 2 (N) 8 
HOLT X 3 (A) 2 (A) 3 (A) 2 (N) 3 (N) 13 
PH 1 (P) 2 (A) 3 (A) X X 1 (A) 7 
 
 
Category of Analysis 
1967 Six Day War: (See Appendix B pp. 193-204 for edition specific information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
 Underlying problems for the Six Day War are fairly consistent, yet vary with each 
publisher.  For HM, fighting simply broke out between Israel and the Arab states, and 
underlying problems are not discussed.  Holt cites Israel‘s belief that Arab states intended 
to destroy Israel, along with Soviet arms supplied to the Arab states and American arms 
supplied to Israel prior to 1967.  PH typically also cites the Soviet involvement, with the 
added detail that this act encouraged Nasser‘s militancy and troop increase in the Sinai 
Peninsula.  Interestingly, Holt was the only publisher to mention the Six Day War in a 
1990s edition; none of the publishers mention the conflict in the 2000s editions. 
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ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
 Similar to above, HM leaves out theory related to the cause of the Six Day War as 
well as consequences of the conflict.  Holt cites both sides‘ arms buildup prior to the 
conflict, raids by the Arab states with counterstrikes by Israel, and Israel‘s belief in 
Egypt‘s hostile attentions as causes.  One Holt text also mentions the Arabs‘ loss of 
territory during the Six Day War as a continued source of bitterness.  PH most thoroughly 
explained Israel‘s perspective and gave reasons for their preemptive strike, including 
Nasser‘s militancy and troop movement in the Sinai Peninsula. 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
 The most frequently mentioned relationship is the Arab states‘ bitterness toward 
Israel, both before and after the Six Day War.  A secondary detail mentioned in some of 
the texts is Israel‘s total, or as one text phrased it, ―crushing‖ victory in the conflict (Holt 
1995).  In the two HM textbooks (1975 and 1986), no cause for the conflict is given.  
Holt went through significant changes regarding the cause of the war. The 1977 edition 
cites raids by both sides and the Arab nations‘ massing of military forces; the 1986 
edition cites Israel‘s belief that Arab nations wanted to destroy their state; and the 1995 
edition gives no cause at all.  The two PH texts include only the 1976 and 1986 editions.  
The earlier text cites Nasser‘s militancy as the cause, while the later textbook includes 
arms being supplied to both sides along with Egyptian troop buildup in the Sinai 
Peninsula.  Consequences in the HM textbooks were very general and included increased 
Arab hostility and a situation that was ―more tense than before‖ (HM 1986 p. 691).  
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Holt‘s consequences in the 1977 and 1986 editions were fairly thorough (Israel‘s land 
acquisitions, Arab bitterness, Arab raids into Israel, Arab arms buildup after the war), but 
many were edited from the 1995 edition; this textbook gave no conclusion or 
consequence, mentioning only that the Arab-Israeli conflict was ―simmering‖ in the 
Middle East (Holt 1995 p. 904).  Prentice Hall‘s 1976 edition includes Egypt‘s 
humiliation and enhanced Soviet prestige in the Middle East as consequences, while the 
1986 edition highlights Israel‘s defeat of Egyptian forces in the Sinai and capture of 
territory in Jordan and Syria.   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
 Houghton Mifflin‘s premise in the 1975 and 1986 texts is that Johnson faced 
many international conflicts during his administration.  The Six Day War is depicted as 
another diplomatic challenge that took a back seat to the Vietnam War during his 
administration.  Holt‘s 1977 text is more general; the Middle East had long been and 
would continue to be an international trouble spot.  However, the 1986 and 1995 editions 
place the Six Day War in the context of détente and the challenge that the Middle East 
represented to this American diplomatic policy.  Prentice Hall‘s premise centers on the 
U.S.‘ diplomatic balance between Israel and the Arab states and the new reality that oil 
was a powerful political and economic weapon.  Assumptions included in one or more of 
the texts were that fighting simply broke out between Israel and the Arab states, that UN 
troops were the only entitity keeping the two sides apart, that Israel‘s belief that Arab 
states were massing military troops and arms to destroy Israel was unfounded or possibly 
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that this belief was not widely acknowledged internationally, that the conflict was 
unimportant because it did not directly involve Americans, and lastly, that a peaceful 
resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was unlikely. 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
 It would be easier to list what was acknowledged about this conflict in the 
textbooks since the information was so sparse, but listed here are some of the major 
historical and contextual pieces of information left out in most of the textbooks.  First, 
only Israel and Egypt were listed as participants in the fight, excluding the other Arab 
states who joined with Egypt.  The fact that Egypt, Jordan, and Syria were divided 
politically on almost everything but their hatred of Israel is never mentioned, making the 
agreements between the three countries seem less than the extraordinary alliance that it 
was.  The U.S. decision to become Israel‘s primary arms supplier and Soviet Union arms 
shipments prior to the war are almost never mentioned.  Other than sentiments about oil 
in two texts, international reaction to the conflict is absent.  In some cases, the results and 
official victor of the conflict are not included, only that the situation in the Middle East 
had worsened.  Egypt‘s (Nasser‘s) motivation for moving troops into the Sinai Peninsula 
is never included, and specific territories that Israel captured in the conflict are never 
mentioned, only that the territory previously belonged to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The 
Six Day War significantly decreased in importance with each textbook edition, discussed 
in only one 1990s textbooks and none of the 2000s. 
 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY: 1967 Six Day War (See Appendix C p. 266 for chart) 
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Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X 1 (N) 1 (N) X X 2 
HOLT X X 2 (A) 2 (A) 1 (A) X 5 
PH X X 3 (N) 3 (N) X X 6 
 
 
Category of Analysis 
1973 Yom Kippur War: (See Appendix B pp. 204-223 for edition specific information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
 Two predominant underlying themes are extant in the texts, with some 
exceptions.  First, early texts (1970s and 1980s) focus on the Cold War and view the 
Yom Kippur War as the first successful test of Soviet and American attempts at détente; 
second, later texts (1990s and 2000s) focus on American dependence on foreign oil and 
the economic crisis that the October War created for the American economy in particular, 
although PH 1976 first mentions the oil embargo and economic ramifications for the U.S. 
Secondary problems include the continuing military supply shipments from the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. to their Middle Eastern allies (Egypt and Israel, respectively) (HM 
1975), Egypt and Syria‘s lost territory from 1967 (PH 1986), and continued border 
disputes between Israel and its Arab neighbors (HM 2005).      
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
 Early text theories involve Soviet and U.S. arms supplies to Egypt and Israel, 
along with their powers of persuasion over their respective Middle Eastern allies 
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involving cease-fire negotiations.  With the exception of Holt (1995), which mentions 
lost Arab territory in 1967, later texts generally provide less historical context for the 
Yom Kippur War.  However, later texts still emphasize America‘s support for Israel and 
dependence on foreign oil.  Most texts, even early on, make the connection between the 
Arab oil embargo and the 1973 conflict.  With the exception of HM (1975), when texts 
do mention negotiations and opportunities for peace in the region, texts throughout the 
decades are not hopeful about the possibility for long-term peace in the region. 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
 Two relationships appear most often in the majority of the texts.  First is the 
alliance between Egypt and Syria (although most texts do not mention why the two 
nations cooperated in their attack on Israel); the second is American military aid to and 
diplomatic support for Israel.  Six texts also highlight Arab anger at America‘s friendship 
with Israel, and five mention Kissinger‘s diplomatic efforts on behalf of both sides.  
 A majority cause for the 1973 conflict is not found in the texts.  Five (HM 1975, 
1986, 1996, PH 1976, 1995) give no cause at all; three (HM 1975, 1986, PH 1986) only 
imply that American and Soviet arms shipments to the region encouraged the conflict; 
and four (Holt 1977, Holt 1986, PH 1986, and Holt 1995) mention lost Egyptian and 
Syrian territory during the 1967 Six Day War with Israel.  The cause of the Arab oil 
embargo is very clear in later texts; it was a result of American support for Israel during 
the Yom Kippur War.  
 Undoubtedly, the most frequently mentioned consequence of the 1973 conflict is 
the Arab oil embargo, with later texts also delineating the specific consequences the 
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embargo had on the American economy (economic recession, inflation, unemployment).  
Aside from the embargo, there is no majority consensus in the texts regarding 
consequences of the Yom Kippur War.  Early texts mention Israeli bitterness at being 
forced to end the fighting before a decisive victory (Holt 1977, 1986), Arab anger at 
American support for Israel (Holt 1977, 1986), and American diplomatic pressure on 
Israel to return ―occupied‖ lands from the 1967 Six Day War (PH 1986).  Later texts 
highlight the fact that even after the embargo, the price of oil remained high, and two 
texts (HM 2003, PH 2005) focus on Kissinger‘s diplomatic success, coordinating a cease-
fire and peace negotiations (although the peace negotiations are never discussed in the 
text).     
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
 The premise was different, yet consistent throughout the decades for each 
publisher.  Houghton Mifflin viewed the October War simply as another conflict in the 
long history of tensions in the region, acknowledging in its 2003 edition that, although it 
was short, it was a very brutal war.  Holt‘s premise maintained that the conflict was the 
first, successful test of détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union, although its 2003 
edition focused only on the fragility of the American economy because of its dependence 
on foreign oil.  Prentice Hall‘s primary premise was the search for peace in the Middle 
East, acknowledging that no easy solution had yet been found.  Like Holt, its 2005 
edition focused mainly on the American economy‘s dependence on foreign oil. 
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 Assumptions found in early textbooks include ―occupied lands‖ and refugees as 
stumbling blocks to peace (PH 1986); that the conflict did nothing to change the status 
quo in the region (PH 1986); U.S. and Soviet involvement only extended to cease-fire 
and peace negotiations (Holt 1986); and the conflict was unique because Israel was not 
the aggressor (HM 1986).  Later texts (with one exception) imply that the conflict was 
only important because it affected American oil supplies (PH 1976, Holt 2003, PH 2005), 
or texts assume that students already know about the Yom Kippur War and only list it as 
one of the many conflicts in the region (HM 1996, PH 1995). 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
 With a few individual exceptions, all publishers and decades leave some 
perspectives, questions, and theories unacknowledged.  The historical context prior to the 
war or even initial causes of the breakdown in peace among Egypt, Syria, and Israel is 
not included.  Motivations for why Syria and Egypt formed an alliance are excluded.  
There is no mention of Yom Kippur or the significance for the date of the surprise attack 
on Israel.  Actual locations of the fighting (Suez Canal, Sinai, Golan Heights) are 
excluded.  Other notable exclusions are the death of Nasser and succession of Sadat in 
Egypt; the breakdown of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union prior to the war; 
the PLO‘s increased importance in Middle East diplomacy; the ever-changing 
international opinion toward Palestinians (positive) and Israel (negative); Israel‘s 
technical military victory and the Arab states‘ psychological victory; international 
reaction to the Arab oil embargo and why OPEC eventually lifted the embargo; growing 
international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along with America‘s increased 
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influence in the region; and finally, details of cease-fire and peace negotiations among 
Israel, Syria, and Egypt are never included.  Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy is mentioned, 
but only in half of the texts. 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  
1973 Yom Kippur War (See Appendix C p. 267 for chart) 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X 2 (P) 1 (N) 1 (A) 3 (P) 7 
HOLT X X 3 (P) 3 (P) 3 (P) 1 (N) 10 
PH X X 1 (N) 2 (A) 2 (N) 2 (A) 7 
 
 
Category of Analysis 
1979 Camp David: (See Appendix B pp. 224-240 for edition specific information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 In the nine texts studied for this topic of analysis, three underlying problems were 
apparent, although only one or two were addressed in each textbook at a time.  Five out 
of nine texts described the Middle East as generally ―troubled,‖ ―unstable,‖ and a region 
of ―long-time‖ conflict between Egypt and Israel (Holt 1986, HM 1996, PH 1995, Holt 
2003, PH 2005).  A second impetus for Camp David was Carter‘s desire to find a 
peaceful solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict and address human rights for Palestinians 
(HM 1986, PH 1995, PH 2005).  Two texts mention the breakdown of prior peace talks 
as a problem leading into Camp David (PH 1986, Holt 1995).  Interestingly, four texts 
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mention Arab anger at Sadat for attempting peace talks with Israel (Holt 1986, PH 1986, 
HM 1996, Holt 1995).  
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 The most predominant theory regarding Camp David, found in seven of nine 
texts, described the negotiations as Carter‘s chief foreign policy triumph and a result of 
his personal efforts to keep the talks from breaking down again (Holt 1986, PH 1986, 
HM 1986, PH 1995, HM 2003, Holt 2003, PH 2005).  Only one text attempts to address 
why previous talks were unsuccessful, stating that it was because Sadat and Begin had 
such ―different personalities‖ (PH 1995).  Secondary theories among the texts include 
fighting for land and official Arab recognition of Israel (HM 1996), U.S. promises to 
Israel of advanced weaponry in exchange for returning the Sinai to Egypt (HM 1996), 
and, according to one text, Sadat‘s initiation and primary interest in peace; there was no 
mention of a troubled peace process or unresolved issues, only the resulting Nobel Peace 
Prize for Begin and Sadat (Holt 1995). 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 The most obvious relationship, found in five out of the nine texts, is Carter‘s role 
as mediator between Begin and Sadat (HM 1986, PH 1986, PH 1995, HM 2003, PH 
2005).  Four texts also mention Arab anger with Sadat for negotiating with Israel (Holt 
1986, PH 1986, HM 1996, Holt 1995).  Only three texts hint that negotiations between 
Sadat and Begin were difficult (PH 1986, HM 2003, PH 2005).  And only one mentions 
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the ―historic antagonism‖ between Egypt and Israel (HM 1996).  Only one text reminds 
readers of American dependence on foreign oil at this point (Holt 1986). 
 The most commonly cited cause for the Camp David negotiations, found in seven 
of the nine texts, is stalled peace talks in prior attempts at negotiation (Holt 1986, PH 
1986, HM 1996, Holt 1995, PH 1995, Holt 2003, PH 2005).  Four out of nine texts 
mention Carter‘s desire for peace in the region as a cause for Camp David (HM 1986, PH 
1995, HM 2003, PH 2005), and three texts cite Sadat‘s visit as the impetus (PH 1986, 
HM 1986, Holt 1995). 
 Consequences of Camp David vary broadly among the texts.  The most common, 
found in six of the nine texts, is Israel‘s return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (Holt 1986, 
PH 1986, HM 1996, PH 1995, HM 2003, PH 2005).  The second most common 
consequence, found in four out of the nine texts, is Israel‘s official recognition of 
statehood from Egypt (HM 1996, PH 1995, HM 2003, PH 2005).  Beyond these two 
consequences, texts begin to vary in their results of Camp David.  Three texts mention 
Sadat‘s assassination (Ph 1986, HM 1996, Holt 1995); three mention unresolved issues 
over ―occupied lands‖ and a Palestinian homeland (Holt 1986, PH 1995, PH 2005); and 
three simply mention that Camp David was the first official agreement between an Arab 
nation and Israel (HM 1986, PH 1986, HM 2003).  Two texts mention the Nobel Peace 
Prize (Holt 1995, Holt 2003), and two mention that Camp David established a process for 
future peace talks (PH 1995, Holt 2003).  The following consequences are listed in only 
one text: the continued threat of war (Holt 1986), PLO terror raids in Israel and Israel‘s 
response (HM 1996), criticism of Carter for favoring Arab nations over Israel (Holt 
1995), Israel and Egypt‘s pledge to work toward a Palestinian solution (PH 1986), and 
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mention of the two specific agreements that came out of Camp David, along with the 
terms for each (HM 1996). 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  
 The premise in most of the texts relates to Carter – his desire for peace and 
stability in the Middle East (HM 1986, PH 1995, PH 2005) and that Camp David was his 
greatest diplomatic triumph (Holt 1995, HM 2003, Holt 2003).  Two texts saw Camp 
David as an extraordinary step toward peace that still left unresolved issues (Holt 1986, 
PH 1986), while one simply saw it as an extension of Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy (HM 
1996). 
 Assumptions vary greatly from text to text, and if found, are typically only 
included in one text: War remained a constant threat after Camp David (Holt 1986); 
Carter favored the Arab states in negotiations (Holt 1986); the major point of contention 
at Camp David was the return of the Sinai to Egypt (PH 1986); there were ―signs‖ in the 
1980s that moderate Arab states were willing to follow Sadat‘s example and enter into 
peace agreements with Israel (PH 1986); many people were cheered by the news of Camp 
David (HM 1996); Sadat played a more active role than Begin (Holt 1995); prior 
negotiations failed because Sadat and Begin had different personalities (PH 1995, PH 
2005); Camp David succeeded because of Carter‘s personal diplomacy (PH 1995, PH 
2005); it was the U.S. policy to mainly support Israel at Camp David while trying to 
resolve the Palestinian issue (HM 1996).  Lastly, it was assumed that students already 
knew which issues were that left ―unresolved‖ by Camp David (HM 2003). 
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5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
 The following list includes information that none of the textbooks addressed: 
Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s call for a ―Palestinian homeland‖ in March 
of 1977; Carter‘s departure from step-by-step diplomacy and preference for more 
comprehensive diplomatic action; with the exception of HM 96, none of the textbooks 
mention that there were two separate agreements between Egypt and Israel, and none of 
the texts include the actual titles for those agreements; the avoidance of the dispute 
surrounding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in the Accords; disagreement within the 
PLO about a compromise Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza; reasons why 
Israel was willing to give up the Sinai Peninsula but not the West Bank or Gaza; Egyptian 
and American hopes that Jordan would be drawn into the negotiations; motivating factors 
that led Egypt and Israel to make concessions in the negotiations; Egypt‘s reaction to the 
Camp David Accords; and increased Arab suspicion of Israel and the U.S. because of 
Camp David.   
 The following list includes information not included in six or more textbooks: the 
date of the signing of the peace accords; Sadat‘s motivations for negotiating; specific 
conditions of each peace agreement within the Camp David Accords; U.S. reaction to 
Camp David; the Arab world‘s reaction to Camp David; Sadat‘s assassination, reasons 
for it, and who assassinated him. 
 The following list includes information not included in four textbooks or less: any 
acknowledgement of who initiated the peace process; attempts at previous peace talks; 
reasons why previous peace talks failed; how long negotiations at Camp David lasted; the 
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fact that Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt; U.S. reaction to Camp David; and any 
unresolved issues not addressed by Camp David.  
ALL DECADE SUMMARY: 1979 Camp David (See Appendix C p. 268 for chart) 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X 1 (N) 2 (P) 2 (N) 5 
HOLT X X X 2 (P) 1 (N) 1 (N) 4 
PH X X X 3 (N) 3 (N) 3 (N) 9 
 
 
Category of Analysis 
1980s Conflict in Lebanon: (See Appendix B pp. 240-249 for edition specific 
information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
 Two texts (Holt 1986 and HM 1996) begin their discussion of the Middle East 
and Lebanon by providing context on Egypt-Israeli relations and include the fact that 
Sadat‘s successor, Hosni Mubarak, had much cooler relations with Israel and began re-
establishing the ties with Arab nations that had been broken after Camp David.  The same 
two texts (Holt 1986 and HM 1996) also cite Palestinian claims to Israeli land as an 
underlying source of conflict in the region.  PH 86 and PH 95 both cite Lebanon‘s 
different groups of Christians and Muslims as the source of the conflict there, while the 
PH 2005 edition cites various ―armed political groups, some backed by neighboring 
countries‖ as the underlying source of conflict in Lebanon (p. 1106). 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
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2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
 With the exception of PH 2005, all of the texts‘ theories center on Israel attacking 
Lebanon in order to drive the PLO out of the country, although none mention how the 
PLO had come to be centered in Lebanon or why the PLO presence in Lebanon was even 
a problem for the Israelis.  Theories regarding the presence of U.S. troops in Lebanon 
include guaranteeing the safety of the PLO as it pulled out of Lebanon (Holt 1986, HM 
1996), restoring order (PH 1986), and keeping the peace in the region (PH 1995, PH 
2005). 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
 Earlier texts explicitly mention relations in the region, including cooled relations 
between Egypt and Israel (Holt 1986, HM 1996), the U.S. protest of Israeli action in 
Lebanon (Holt 1986, PH 1986), fighting between Christian and Muslim groups in 
Lebanon (Holt 1986, PH 1986), a continued Israeli presence in Lebanon (PH 1986), and 
increased Palestinian hostility toward Israel (HM 1996).  The cause of Israel‘s invasion of 
Lebanon, if it is mentioned at all, is to clear PLO presence and bases from the region 
(Holt 1986, PH 1986).  Only one text mentions that the civil war between Christians and 
Muslims in Lebanon resulted in Syria‘s invasion of the country (PH 1986).  
Consequences of the unrest in Lebanon, according to the texts, included an international 
and/or U.S. peacekeeping presence in Lebanon (Holt 1986, PH 1986, HM 1996, PH 
2005), an attack on the U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon (Holt 1986, PH 1986, HM 1996, 
PH 1995, PH 2005), an attack on the U.S. embassy in Lebanon (Holt 1986, HM 1996, PH 
1995), pulling American forces out of Lebanon (Holt 1986, PH 1986, HM 1996, PH 
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1995, PH 2005), and ultimately, an unsuccessful attempt at establishing peace in the 
region (Holt 1986, PH 1986).  Later texts tend to focus only on the removal of troops as a 
consequence instead of the unsuccessful attempt at establishing peace in the region.    
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
 With the exception of PH 95 and PH 2005, all of the texts base their accounts on 
the premise that Israel was successful in driving the PLO out of Lebanon but 
unsuccessful in establishing peace in the region.  HM 1996 even points out that anti-
Israeli sentiments among the Palestinians were only increasing. While implicit 
assumptions vary from text to text, one found in all of the texts is that the terrorist attacks 
on the American marine barracks and embassy in Beirut were responses to the American 
military presence in Lebanon.  Since no attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon and 
carried out by the PLO are mentioned in the texts, a student could imply that the PLO, 
while centered in southern Lebanon, had not carried out any attacks on Israel prior to 
Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon.  An example of this implicit assumption is found in Holt 
86: ―Israel was seeking to wipe out bases from which the PLO could make raids and to 
destroy its effectiveness‖ (emphasis added p. 936). 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
 It is interesting to note that PH 2005 is the first text not to mention Syria, the 
PLO, or Israel by name in its discussion of Lebanon; it is also the first text not to mention 
the bombings of the American embassy in Lebanon or that American forces were part of 
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a larger UN peacekeeping effort.  Other perspectives, questions, and theories left 
unacknowledged include no mention of Egypt-Israeli relations since Camp David (PH 
1995 and PH 2005); why Egypt-Israeli relations cooled since Camp David (Holt 1986, 
PH 1986, HM 1996); how the PLO came to be centered in Lebanon (all five texts); who 
was in charge of the PLO (all five texts); the fact that Israel even invaded Lebanon (PH 
1995 and PH 2005); divided Israeli opinion on the invasion of Lebanon (all five texts); 
U.S. opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon (HM 1996, PH 1995, PH 2005); international 
opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon (all five texts); why Syria invaded Lebanon (all 
texts except PH 1986); the tenuous political situation in Lebanon between Christian and 
Muslim groups (all five texts); why Israel and Syria involved themselves in Lebanese 
politics (all five texts); what terrorist organization was responsible for the Lebanon 
marine base bombing (all five texts) and the motivations of the responsible terrorist group 
(all five texts); and what actions, if any, the U.S. took to secure peace in Lebanon and 
negotiate with Israel (all five texts). 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY: 1980s Lebanon (See Appendix C p. 269 for chart) 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X X 2 (A) X 2 
HOLT X X X 1 (A) X X 1 
PH X X X 2 (P) 1 (P) 1 (N) 4 
 
 
Category of Analysis 
1990s Peace Negotiations: (See Appendix B pp. 249-258 for edition specific 
information) 
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1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 None of the texts identify specific underlying problems regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict that lead to the peace agreement; the texts begin with the peace agreement and 
continue from there.  Three texts imply that underlying problems were post-Cold War in 
nature, more regional conflicts rather than confrontations between superpowers, and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was no exception to this pattern (HM 1996, Holt 1995, PH 2005).  
One text (PH 1995) is exceptionally detailed in its description of underlying problems, 
while one (Holt 2003) does not include any underlying problems that lead up to the peace 
agreement or influence it thereafter. 
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 Each text was extremely different when it came to the theories that guided 
descriptions and explanations in the text.  Since there was no discernable pattern, see 
Appendix B pp. 250-251 for the detailed theories found in each textbook. 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 Relationships in the majority of the texts consist of Rabin and Arafat signing the 
peace agreement and mention Clinton‘s involvement in some capacity (HM 1996, Holt 
1995, Holt 2003).  Without exception, there is a picture of Rabin and Arafat‘s handshake 
while Clinton looks on in approval.  Interestingly, only two texts (both from the same 
publisher) hint at difficulties between Arafat and Rabin, one stating that it was a ―prickly 
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process‖ (PH 1995), and the other that ―it was an extremely difficult step‖ for both 
leaders (PH 2005).  PH 95 also includes the challenges to Arafat‘s authority from within 
the PLO and arguing between Arafat and Rabin over border crossing.  PH 2005 includes 
a statement that Israeli Prime Minister Barak had ―a greater commitment to peace talks,‖ 
but his successor Sharon was ―a fierce critic of the concessions Israel had made in the 
search for peace.‖ 
 None of the texts include a cause for the 1993 peace agreement.  One text (PH 
1995) does imply that both sides‘ weariness in fighting over the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank could be a cause.   
 Regarding consequences, the majority of texts, especially later ones, present this 
as another missed opportunity for peace.  Holt 95 and 05 clearly pin the blame for 
continued violence on Israel, while PH 95 and PH 05 make attempts to be more even-
handed.  Two of the early texts (HM 1996, PH 1995) mention some Arab hostility toward 
Arafat for the agreement, and only one (HM 1996) mentions U.S. financial assistance to 
the PLO as a result of the peace agreement. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:   
 The premise of each text was much the same, proposing that the 1993 peace 
agreements were a hopeful step forward in gaining stability in the Middle East.  The texts 
do acknowledge that events following the peace agreement were setbacks in the process, 
but only PH 05 totally abandons hope, stating that peace ―faded rapidly as violence 
increased again‖ (p. 1137).  All of the texts imply that Arafat and Rabin signed the peace 
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agreement themselves, when in fact, they did not.  Other assumptions include that the 
Palestinians may have been cooperating only to gain financial assistance from the U.S. 
(HM 1996); the ―other issues‖ of negotiations that were left for a later date might be 
easily worked out since a framework for peace was already begun (HM 1996); the only 
reason for violence following the peace accords was due to a Jewish gunman‘s attack on 
Muslim worshipers in the West Bank (Holt 1995); that both sides were weary of fighting 
over the Gaza Strip and West Bank and ready to make concessions (PH 1995); there were 
no outstanding issues of contention left after the 1993 peace accord (Holt 2003). 
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  
The following topics are not included in any of the texts: historical context for the 
peace talks (particularly the end of the Cold War and how it resulted in the PLO losing its 
financial sponsor in the Soviet Union; the Persian Gulf War); the ―Oslo Accord‖ or 
―Declaration of Principles‖ by name; Israel‘s agreement to limit further settlement in the 
West Bank; that Rabin and Arafat did not actually sign the agreement themselves; 
Jordan‘s motivations for negotiating a separate peace with Israel; or Palestinian division 
among the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas.   
Only one out of the five texts mention the following: prior secret meetings 
between PLO and Israeli leaders (PH 1995); Israel‘s withdrawal of forces from Gaza and 
the West Bank (PH 1995); Palestinian responsibility for security in areas the Israeli 
Defense Force evacuated (HM 1996); Jordan‘s separate peace agreement with Israel (HM 
1996). 
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Two out of five texts mention the following: specific issues of contention left 
unresolved by the agreement (PH 1995, PH 2005); increased terrorist attacks against 
Israel after the signing (PH 1995, PH 2005); Rabin‘s assassination, who assassinated him, 
and why (Holt 2003, PH 2005). 
A majority of the texts mention the following: the peace agreement‘s affirmation 
of a Palestinian right to self-government (HM 1996, Holt 2003, PH 2005); the PLO‘s 
formal recognition of Israel (PH 1995, Holt 2003, PH 2005); U.S. reaction to the peace 
agreement (HM 1996, Holt 1995, Holt 2003); Israeli reaction to the peace agreement 
(Holt 1995, PH 1995, PH 2005); Palestinian reaction to the agreement (HM 1996, PH 
1995, PH 2005). 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY:  
1990s Peace Negotiations (See Appendix C p. 270 for chart) 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X X 2 (N) X 2 
HOLT X X X X 1 (A) 1 (A) 2 
PH X X X X 3 (N) 2 (N) 5 
 
 
Category of Analysis 
Post 9/11: (See Appendix B pp. 258-261 for edition specific information) 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
 Because only two texts were analyzed for this category, it is difficult to make 
generalizations and identify patterns for all of the analysis questions.  More specific 
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information on each text can be found in Appendix B.  The two texts identified conflict 
over the land itself (HM 2003) as well as Israeli Prime Minister Sharon‘s unwillingness 
to compromise (PH 2005) as the underlying problems for the continuing conflict. 
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
 HM 03 identified Arab terrorist groups as being the chief cause of a continued 
lack of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, while PH 05 is more hopeful that the 
2003 ―roadmap‖ to peace may lead to a lasting solution. 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
 Relationships in the two texts included ―widespread Arab anger‖ at Israel and the 
U.S. for its support of Israel, along with a continual cycle of violence between Israel and 
―terrorists‖ (HM 2003) and/or ―Palestinian extremists‖ (PH 2005).  The ultimate 
consequence in HM 03 was Israel‘s declaration of a ―‗war on terrorism,‘ patterned after 
the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks‖ (p. US8).  In PH 05, the ultimate 
consequence was Israel‘s 2003 acceptance of the ―roadmap to peace‖ that led to Israel 
first recognizing the Palestinians‘ right to a state. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
 The concluding premise of each text was that only time would tell if a lasting 
peace could be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians. Two implicit assumptions in 
HM 03 are that Palestinians would establish peace with Israel if terrorist organizations 
were not preventing them and that the only issue dividing the two sides is the land itself.  
PH 05 assumes that both sides approved the three-step roadmap to peace without 
reservations, establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. 
  
 
79 
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
 The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged in 
one or both of the texts: specific terrorist groups in the Middle East or their various 
motivations for carrying out attacks against Israel; Israeli perspectives and feelings about 
terrorism; contention over security, borders, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, 
and the status of Jerusalem; contextual background information on the terrorist groups the 
texts identify (Palestine Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah) and the groups‘ terms for a 
Palestinian homeland; further U.S. interaction with Arafat, the PLO, and Israeli leaders 
following the 1993 peace accords; specific terms of the roadmap to peace, ensuing 
negotiations, and why both sides agreed. 
ALL DECADE SUMMARY: Post 9/11 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X X X 3 (N) 3 
HOLT X X X X X X X 
PH X X X X X 2 (A) 2 
 
Overall Summary of Research Findings 
 
 Several patterns emerged when looking at the textbook data as a whole.  When 
considering the number of neutral, pro-Israel, and anti-Israel textbooks over the decades, 
it became apparent that the number of neutral textbooks steadily increased with each 
decade.  The neutral category was the most prevalent type of textbook in only half of the 
decades, however (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s).  The 1950s was the only decade that 
contained more pro-Israel textbooks than any other category.  The 1960s, 1970s, and 
  
 
80 
2000s contained more anti-Israel than pro-Israel textbooks, and the 1980s were evenly 
tied at five textbooks each for pro-Israel and anti-Israel.  Also, the 1960s and 1970s 
contained more anti-Israel textbooks than any other category. 
 While some publishers were rated better than others in various categories of 
analysis (see Appendix C), there was a clear leader.  The one to three ratings on the 
quality and thoroughness of each publisher‘s Arab-Israeli content throughout the decades 
ranked Prentice Hall the highest with 53 points; Holt was a close second with 51 points; 
and Houghton Mifflin was a distant third with 33 points.   
 When examining counts for all categories of analysis and terms for each decade, 
the amount of information on the Arab-Israeli conflict in textbooks increases steadily 
through the 1990s then sharply declines in the 2000s.  In fact, several categories of 
analysis saw their peak in the 1990s textbooks, including the mandate period, the 1948 
war, the 1979 Camp David Accords, and the 1993 peace agreements.  People and terms 
that peaked in the 1990s were David Ben-Gurion, Arab(s), Israel/Israeli, and Palestinian. 
 When considering all three publisher‘s totals for the individual categories of 
analysis, significant trends were observed.  Information on the mandate period steadily 
increased (sharply in the 1980s and 1990s) then decreased in the 2000s, though remaining 
above 1980 levels.  After taking a slight dip in the 1960s, information on the 1948 war 
steadily increased in all of the remaining decades.  Information on the Suez Canal peaked 
in the 1960s and steadily declined thereafter.  Information on the 1967 Six Day War 
peaked in the 1970s and steadily declined thereafter.  Information on the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War peaked in the 1980s and declined to its lowest levels in the 2000s textbooks.  
Camp David information peaked in the 1990s and declined in the 2000s but remained 
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above 1980 levels.  Information on Lebanon was most prevalent in the 1980s and sharply 
declined to the lowest levels in the 2000s textbooks.  Information on the 1993 peace 
agreements was highest in the 1990s textbooks and declined sharply thereafter. 
When considering all three publishers‘ totals for the individual terms of analysis, 
several trends were observed.  The only terms that steadily increased and reached their 
highest levels in the 2000s textbooks were Jew(s)/Jewish and Palestine (although 
Palestine did slightly dip during the 1970s).  The term Arab rose sharply through the 
1990s then sharply declined in the 2000s textbooks.  The terms Israel/Israeli and 
Palestinian also steadily increased through the 1990s then sharply declined in the 2000s.   
Loewen, in his book Lies My Teacher Told Me (2008), correctly points out that 
―to understand how textbooks in the 1930s presented the Civil War, we do not look at the 
history of the 1860s but at the society of the 1930s.‖  This thesis has made a small, yet 
concerted effort to accomplish this task—first, to identify patterns and changes in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict over time, and secondly, to investigate possible reasons why those 
changes occurred.  Because six decades of information are being considered, the complex 
political, social, and educational reasons why changes occurred in each decade and for 
each category of analysis are too numerous to include here; however, several factors 
relating to the causes of major patterns and changes of each decade are discussed in 
chapter five. 
In general, one of the most frequently-neglected areas in the textbooks concerned 
reasons for why events happened in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The textbooks typically 
begin with simple, factual statements about the occurrence of some new conflict in the 
Middle East.  An analysis of a number of studies by Kuhn (1992), as cited in Chambliss 
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(1994), found that ―particularly young and less well educated people cannot distinguish 
between a claim and its evidence.‖  Perhaps this is why textbooks do not waste time 
explaining why things happened, only stating that the events occurred.  Unfortunately, as 
Chambliss points out, ―Readers with less expertise than the subjects…might construct 
text representations that are even more inaccurate.‖ 
Another important gap in the textbooks was the absence of inter-relationships and 
their explanations.  One example is how significant the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), since it was the PLO‘s primary 
international sponsor.  Of course, none of that is mentioned in the texts‘ description of the 
1993 Oslo Accords – a detail that sheds significant light on the proceedings.  Herz (1979) 
states: ―General statements without a factual foundation are empty and unconvincing.‖  
Herz continues with a content analysis question: ―Are readings provided that allow the 
reader to form a reasoned opinion?‖  Like Herz and his study of the Cold War in 
textbooks, the answer in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict as presented in the textbooks 
for this thesis would be an emphatic, ―No.‖  Increased neutrality has left generic 
information in its wake; it would be impossible for a student to form a reasoned opinion 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict using textbook content alone. 
Regarding the changing amount of information in the different categories of 
analysis (e.g., the overall decrease of information about the Six Day War, the overall 
increase in information about Israel‘s mandate period and 1948 War), Marty (1982) 
reasons, ―In different times we ask different questions…Most frequently revisionism is a 
natural side effect of attempts to write contemporary history.  If it is true, as Santayana 
said, that history always needs to be rewritten because it is always written wrong, the 
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reason may be that it is written too soon.‖  The intractable nature of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the continuous influx of new information mandate that publishers edit and 
shorten content.  As Bragdon (1969), a former textbook author, states: ―To shorten you 
must simplify, and you inevitably falsify, since history is never simple.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
84 
 
V.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The Historic Progression of History Education, the Social Studies, and Textbooks  
It is impossible to understand the place of history education, the social studies, 
and textbooks in secondary schools from the 1950s onward without first considering 
important events within the historical and educational community prior to this decade.  
One of the most notable events is the American Historical Association‘s (AHA) 
appointment of the Committee of Seven in 1899 ―to consider the subject of history in the 
secondary schools and to draw up a scheme of college entrance requirements‖ 
(McLaughlin et al., 1899).  Even though the professionalization of history in the U.S. 
began around this time and secondary schools were growing in number, the Committee of 
Seven only recommended a broad curricular framework of four years of historical study: 
ancient history; medieval and modern European history; English history; and U.S. history 
and government.  The Committees‘ recommendations are considered to be the ―birth of 
modern history education in the United States,‖ firmly establishing history‘s core 
curricular position in the public schools (Orrill & Shapiro, 2005).  However, secondary 
teachers were left to fill in the specifics of curricular content, and because of this 
shortcoming, failure rates on college entrance examinations were higher in history than in 
any other subject (Wrobel, 2008). 
Following World War I, widespread skepticism over humanity‘s progress and the 
growing popularity of the social sciences began to challenge history‘s centrality within 
the schools.  Historians began using the pejorative term ―educationists‖ to describe 
school administrators and teachers who advocated a ―social studies‖ approach to the 
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curriculum, organized around pressing social problems and the needs of society (Wrobel, 
2008).  David Snedden, a prominent educationist, believed the purpose of schooling was 
not intellectual development, but socializing students to function well in group life.  
Along with other educationists, Snedden sought control over teacher certification laws 
and legislature requirements; he was so successful that, beginning in the 1920s, 
―…required courses in education dominated teacher preparation in most states, with only 
minimal attention given to disciplinary knowledge and expertise‖ (Orrill, 2005).  Results 
of this influence can be seen today in teacher certification programs that stress pedagogy 
over subject content.  The May 1933 issue of the Bulletin of the American Association of 
University Professors addressed concerns about this shift in teacher preparation (Munro, 
1933). 
The formation of the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) in 1921 
consolidated the educationists‘ approach to history education in the schools, and the 
changing titles of the AHA‘s journal for teachers signifies its retreat from the school 
curriculum debate, along with its waning influence: The History Teacher’s Magazine 
(1909), The Historical Outlook (1918), The Social Studies (1934), Social Education 
(1937).  In ceding its magazine, financially and editorially, to the NCSS, the AHA 
essentially ―left school history to fend for itself‖ (Wrobel, 2008).    
1950s 
Typical textbooks of the 1950s focused on America‘s greatness.  Publishers 
during this period were particularly concerned with avoiding criticism from the political 
right and ardent anti-Communists – criticisms that had cost them during the 1940s.  Seen 
in a Cold War context, textbooks were meant to contribute to the overall goal of 
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education in the 1950s: ―to strengthen Americans‘ resolve to fight the Cold War and to 
identify each generation‘s technical and intellectual elite‖ (Moskowitz, 1988).  Fitzgerald 
criticized textbooks of the 1950s for failing to show any kind of relationship between one 
event and another and a near absence of economic analysis (Fitzgerald, 1979).  
Criticizing educational policymakers, Fitzgerald stated that they had ―managed to put the 
reformist curriculum of the Progressive era to work for conservative purposes; they had 
created a utopia of the present‖ (1979).  Fitzgerald also highlighted the publishers‘ 
loyalty oath that Texas required, illustrating the fear of experimentation in curriculum 
during this period (Fitzgerald, 1979).  This decade saw the formation of the Committee 
on the Role of Education in American History.  This conference of historians concluded 
that a lack of knowledge of educational history ―affected adversely the planning of 
curricula, the formation of policy, and the administration of educational agencies in the 
present crisis of American education‖ (Cremin, 1988).  Cold War rhetoric was sometimes 
used to save history education from the ―educationists‖; by the middle to end of the 
decade, a ―back to basics‖ transmission model of education seemed to be winning out 
over the educationists‘ progressive, student-centered model.  The Progressive Education 
Association disbanded in 1955, the same year that a White House Conference on 
Education highlighted problems within the schools – problems that required immediate 
attention after the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik (Ryan & Townsend, 2010).  The 
National Defense Education Act of 1958 began funding math, science, foreign language, 
and teacher training programs to resolve these problems (Gutek, 2000).  Large suburban 
school districts also heralded new developments in American education (Gutek, 2000).  
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1960s 
 While the textbook publishing industry‘s sales were up to approximately 300 
million dollars per year (Alexander, 1960) and the industry had been institutionalized for 
many years (Watt, 2007), the policy of ―benign neglect‖ on the part of the AHA toward 
secondary history curriculum continued into the 1960s.  This allowed social scientists, 
according to Link, to ―[move] into the vacuum and [begin] to reorganize high school 
curricula‖ (1985).  Indeed, a 1960 article in Social Education stated that history textbooks 
―…encourage little respect for the historian‘s craft‖ (Alexander, 1960).  In the midst of 
the social and cultural upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s, Hertzberg summarized the 
approach of social scientists: ―The new emphasis was both ahistorical and antihistorical.  
The past was relevant only when it dealt with matters of burning social or personal 
concern‖ (1980).  Some educational reformers even viewed schools as an environment 
where the unequal distribution of resources in society could be equalized (Moskowitz, 
1988).  A student in the 1960s typically took one year of world history and one year of 
U.S. history (Wrobel, 2008).  In her book America Revised, Fitzgerald stated that reading 
textbooks from the 1960s was a ―bewildering experience,‖ since she claims that changes 
made to the textbooks were changes ―to nothing less than the character of the United 
States‖ (1979).   
Many academics writing about changes that occurred in history textbook content 
trace those changes back to the 1960s when textbook publishers began to acknowledge 
the U.S. as a multicultural and multiracial society.  As Barton Bernstein stated: ―…The 
rediscovery of poverty and racism, the commitment to civil rights and the Negroes, the 
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criticism of intervention in Cuba and Vietnam, shattered many of the assumptions of the 
fifties and compelled intellectuals to re-examine the American past‖ (Bernstein, 1968).  
The 1960s saw a massive influx of government funding to math and science programs 
throughout the country; of the 53 projects funded by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) between 1956 and 1975, 43 were math and science programs, and 10 were social 
studies programs (Gutek, 2000).  Attempting to balance the concentration of resources, 
the U.S. Office of Education (USOE) began Project English and Project Social Studies.  
Among the projects begun were ―an analysis of public issues, an American history 
program for high school, history for able students, economics for elementary students, 
and geography, anthropology, and sociology programs‖ (Larsen, 1991).  Also funded 
through the USOE were 12 university curriculum centers dealing specifically with social 
studies disciplines.  Describing these curriculum efforts, Larsen states: ―Generally, like 
most National Science Foundation curriculum efforts, the projects in the social studies 
were designed for the above average student and downplayed or omitted citizenship 
education, affective learning, social problems, and the relationships among the social 
sciences‖ (Larsen, 1990).  Characteristics of reform efforts generally included less history 
and more social studies, a focus on broad concepts, emphasis on values, and the 
occasional use of in-depth topic studies during a survey course.   
Despite all of this, wide-scale adoption of the new social studies approach was 
limited.  More history content was seen by some as protection against communism, and 
publishers were very cautious about statements that could offend social, political, or 
religious groups (Alexander, 1960).  Larsen (1990) cites public attitudes, teacher 
competence, and availability of materials as factors that discouraged adoption of many 
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reform efforts.  He states: ―The demands for equity in society and for relevance in the 
schools did not square with the reformers‘ stress on academic disciplines…Once the 
pendulum swung to relevance and self-realization, the massive federal funding 
expired…A new role for students emerged, that of social activist instead of academic 
inquirer‖ (Larsen, 1990).    
In writing about the changes that took place in historical writing between the 
1960s and 1970s, Myron Marty compared two similar publications: the National Council 
for the Social Studies 1961 publication Interpreting and Teaching American History 
edited by William Cartwright and Richard Watson and the NCSS 1973 publication The 
Reinterpretation of American History and Culture by the same editors (Marty, 1982).  
After detailing how the 1961 publication of ―standard essays on standard themes‖ shifted 
toward the 1973 publication of ―changing fundamental assumptions of historians and 
society,‖ Marty states: ―To lay the two volumes side by side and compare their contents 
is a stunning experience‖ (1982).  Such a radical shift in the boundaries of history meant 
that the writing, teaching, and learning of history could not remain unchanged.  In his 
introduction to The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United 
States, Kammen uses a 1968 quote by notable historian, Richard Hofstadter: ―If there is a 
single way of characterizing what happened in our historical writing since the 1950s, it 
must be, I believe, the rediscovery of complexity in American history…a new awareness 
of the multiplicity of forces‖ (Kammen, 1980).  While this ―rediscovery‖ in historical 
scholarship began finding its way into textbooks, one textbook selection committee also 
began to notice other trends, one of which was the publishers‘ emphasis on visual appeal 
over content (Alexander, 1960). 
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1970s 
 Culturally, living in the 1970s meant facing ―economic crisis, rising cost of living, 
continuing social and political revolution, emerging militant radical groups fomenting 
terrorism against innocent members of the public, and unprecedented technological 
advances in communication and multifunction tools‖ (McKenzie, 2005).  History 
textbooks of the 1970s began elevating social studies above strictly historical content, 
and publishers released new textbooks to state-level adoption buyers like Texas and 
California (Broudy, 1975).  According to Hertzberger, writing in Kammen‘s The Past 
Before Us, the new social studies were ―typically ahistorical,‖ as well as preoccupied 
with ―the desire to include the social sciences and social issues [with a] distinct air of 
social betterment‖ (Kammen, 1980).  Peloso‘s 1972 article about writing U.S. history 
from a ―third-world perspective‖ is an example of this approach.  Defining third-world 
students as ―those student groups whose concern for the study of history flows logically 
from the nature of their dissatisfaction with American society today,‖ Peloso suggested 
that traditional history was no longer relevant and even detrimental to the psychology of 
third-world students since their experiences were so different from the ―Anglo-Saxon 
version‖ of U.S. history (Peloso, 1972).  Specifically referencing students of African 
origin, he states that third-world students cannot accept standard history texts because 
they are excluded from the story.  Moskowitz (1988) summarized the shift toward social 
studies since the 1950s:  
The untenability of the 1950s ideology of prosperity and the failures of the 
overly ambitious educational rehetoric of the 1960s led many educators in 
the 1970s to advocate curriculum improvement.  In the texts this shift took 
the form of a new emphasis on cultural differences…textbook companies, 
with this new educational agenda and a host of ethnic and racial advocacy 
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groups at their doors, published textbooks that reinterpreted American 
history.    
 
Hertzberg traced the continual movement toward social studies over history back 
to the NEA‘s 1913 Committee on the Social Studies in the Secondary Schools.  The 
committee defined social studies as ―those whose subject matter relates directly to the 
organization and development of human society, and to man as a member of social 
groups‖ and its purpose as ―the cultivation of good citizenship‖ (Kammen, 1980).  In 
summarizing the 1970s social studies reforms, Hertzberg characterized the movement as 
having a ―kaleidoscopic quality‖ and a ―widespread mindlessness‖ (Kammen, 1980).  
Concluding his dissertation review of education reform movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, Larsen states: ―Mindlessness marred reforms in the sixties and seventies; 
curriculum leaders refused to consider classroom realities and historical precedent‖ 
(Larsen, 1990).  He faulted the country‘s own historical amnesia for the ―intense focus on 
the present, to the rise of the youth culture, to the retreat of historians from school 
concerns, and to the impact of the ahistorical social sciences‖ (Larsen, 1990). 
1980s 
In 1979, the New York Times reported on a 20-year decline in SAT scores, and in 
1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education released their report entitled 
A Nation at Risk.  The report specifically emphasized textbook quality and recommended 
that textbooks be more rigorous, demanding, and diversified according to student 
abilities, giving attention to recent scholarly research (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983).  A Nation at Risk prompted several inquiries into 
textbook quality during the 1980s, but interestingly enough, few government proposals 
resulted from the report.  One author reasoned the lack of initiative was because the idea 
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of local school control regained strength during this time, and the tendency of local 
control was to resist curriculum change (Larsen, 1990).  Because of this resistance and a 
failure to define common curriculum, the textbook publishing industry ―acquired a de 
facto role as a national curriculum authority‖ (Westbury, 1990).  At the time of Anyon‘s 
1979 study, analysts estimated that 40 publishing houses could produce a profitable 
textbook on a nationwide basis.  The American Textbook Council released 1988 
estimates of the top ten U.S. school publishers; all three textbook publishers used for this 
study appear on the list, with Harcourt (now Holt, Rinehart, Winston), Houghton Mifflin, 
and Pearson/Prentice Hall rated at numbers one, five, and nine, respectively (G. Sewall, 
1992).  According to Marty, writing history in the 1980s meant writing from the bottom 
up and using various research methods to ―make moral judgments in the writing of 
history; to engage in national self-criticism rather than national chauvinism; to use oral 
interviews as ways of gathering information; and turning to non-literary sources for 
information about the past – artifacts, photographs, buildings, material culture, and the 
cultural landscape‖ (Marty, 1982).  Shorter segments of history attempted to engage the 
students‘ interest, and many social studies skills from the 1960s were now incorporated 
into the text—study skills, problem solving, reading graphs, and more (Dutton, 1989).  
While publishers‘ historic reluctance to avoid offending statements remained, some 
complained that the conservative tone of the 1950s had been abandoned for 
environmental, feminist, and liberal ideologies (Vitz, 1986).  In his 1984 Presidential 
Address, the president of the AHA reignited questions from early in the century about 
social studies versus history education when he called for, according to Wrobel‘s 
summary, ―closer ties between the history academy and the schools, greater interest in 
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helping shape the school history curriculum, and greater assistance to school teachers in 
their efforts to come to grips with new scholarship‖ (Wrobel, 2008)  
Another problem, cited specifically in Sewall‘s 1987 report on textbook quality, 
was overly broad coverage, resulting in ―mentioning‖ of material rather than a cohesive 
narrative of the nation‘s past (G. Sewall, 1987).  At the time of Frances Fitzgerald‘s 
publication in 1979, about half of the states had textbook approval/adoption lists from 
which textbook selection committees could choose (Metcalf & Downey, 1980). 
1990s 
 In 1993, 4 billion of the total 13 billion dollar domestic book market was spent on 
textbooks and other instructional materials.  Foster (1999) postulates why the textbook 
industry is so attractive to publishers: ―…Most textbooks have a print run of several 
million copies, are adopted for five- to seven-year cycles, require little marketing once 
adopted, and are exceedingly simple to distribute.‖  At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
five largest companies, Macmillan; Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich; Simon and Schuster; 
Scholastic; and Houghton Mifflin dominated 58% of all national sales (Foster, 1999).  In 
the midst of this vast market, a tension arose among curriculum experts about what 
constituted the right balance between Western and non-Western topics in history 
curriculum.  According to Sewall, European political history alone was no longer 
sufficient, and a move to politicize historical content began among multicultural activists, 
scholars, and textbook editors (G. Sewall, 2003).  Ravitch (2010) provides an excellent 
synopsis of the movements and challenges facing the field of history in the late 1980s and 
1990s.  Beginning in 1987 with California‘s history curriculum, the movement to revive 
history education continued into 1988 with the Bradley Commission on History in the 
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Schools.  Both sought to ―counter the baneful effects of the social studies field, which 
[had] quietly driven history out of the lower grades and attempted to replace it in the high 
schools with courses about contemporary issues absent any historical grounding‖ (2010).  
Ravitch claims the ethnic activism of the early 1990s once again stalled movement 
toward history education over social studies.  Attempts at defending history education in 
the early 1990s were most often denounced as ―Eurocentric,‖ with the 1994 publication 
of proposed national history standards fanning the flames of debate.   
Initially, when history was identified as one of the five core curriculum areas in 
1992, the Bush administration contracted the National Center for History in the Schools 
at the University of California at Los Angeles to develop national history standards for 
U.S. and world history.  The voluntary standards were broken down into two categories: 
historical content (understanding) and historical process (thinking).  In summarizing the 
standards, Foster stated: ―On the one hand, therefore, the creators of the standards 
deserve praise for challenging existing practice and encouraging students to view history 
as a critical discipline rather than a mindless trivia game.  On the other hand…teachers 
are offered little guidance on how they might introduce and structure students‘ historical 
thinking in meaningful and progressive ways‖ (Foster, 1999b). 
In the introduction to his book Schoolbook Nation, Joseph Moreau cites a Gallup 
poll showning four out of five Americans supported the general concept of standards; 
however, agreeing on a general concept of standards was far different than agreeing on 
the standards themselves (Moreau, 2003).  Moreau identified three opposing factions of 
the standards debate: ―Cultural nationalists, conservatives, and a more heterogeneous 
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group that defied a simple label but was defined mostly by its opposition to the first two 
camps‖ (Moreau, 2003).   
The first group, cultural nationalists, found their champions in academics like 
E.D. Hirsch, an English professor at the University of Virginia, as well as Diane Ravitch 
and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., two prominent historians.  While all three had allied 
themselves in the debate, their motives were largely different: Hirsch was concerned with 
disadvantaged students‘ lack of access to elite knowledge and training; Ravitch with 
declining standards of intellectual rigor in pre-collegiate curriculum; and Schlesinger 
with the threat of national disintegration from the absence of a unified story of American 
history (Moreau, 2003).  Hirsch believed that schools were failing to impart the ―cultural 
literacy‖ to students that all Americans should know in order to communicate effectively 
with one another.  This problem was compounded by the fact that most of the students 
not receiving this education were already poor and disadvantaged.  Hirsch blamed Dewey 
and the educators who followed his belief that learning should be built around a child‘s 
interests and prior knowledge.  While Hirsch believed this approach to education called 
―formalism‖ was valid to a point, he argued that it had been taken too far when educators 
assumed that curriculum did not matter because students would invariably develop 
necessary analytical skills despite the topic being studied.  Blaming the same educational 
philosophy was Diane Ravitch, whose ire was provoked by the breakdown of history into 
the ―pseudo-discipline‖ of social studies (Moreau, 2003).  In the same vein of Hirsch‘s 
Cultural Literacy, Schlesinger published a book in 1991 entitled The Disuniting of 
America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society.  Like Hirsch, Schlesinger achieved 
national popularity for his work.  Moreau commented, ―Where Hirsch‘s opponent had 
  
 
96 
been an abstract theory, formalism, Schlesinger‘s enemies were flesh and blood.  He 
offered an especially unflattering portrait of Afrocentrists…[and] was especially troubled 
by claims from some that young Blacks learned differently from Whites‖ (Moreau, 
2003).  In his book, Schlesinger warned:  
The use of history as therapy means the corruption of history as 
history…Instead of a transformative nation with an identity all its own, 
America in this new light is seen as a preservation of diverse alien 
identities…The multiethnic dogma abandons historic purposes, replacing 
assimilations by fragmentation, integration by separatism.  It belittles 
unum and glorifies pluribus (Schlesinger Jr., 1998). 
 
While cultural nationalists argued for a cultural tradition for its own sake and 
because it was an inherited tradition, the second group in the standards debate, 
conservatives, went further: 
They argued not only that the heritage of the West formed the core 
of American identity but that it was superior to its rivals abroad 
and to the intellectual mélange offered by multiculturalists, 
deconstructionists, feminists, and others of that ilk at home.  Their 
vision of the nation‘s past, and of the way it had been taught until 
the 1960s was warmly sentimental‖ (Moreau, 2003). 
 
 Conservative champions were Allan Bloom, who wrote The Closing of the 
American Mind, and Newt Gringich ,who wrote To Renew America.  For Gingrich, the 
1960s were to blame, and Democrats like Bill Clinton reflected the moral void left in its 
wake.  ―Thus even before the standards appeared, history teaching was becoming a proxy 
in a broader cultural and political war‖ (Moreau, 2003).   
While Moreau attempts to label the third group ―progressives‖ or ―radical 
multiculturalists,‖ he admits the names fail to express the group‘s lack of ideological 
unity.  What did unite them was their less than sentimental feelings for ―traditional‖ 
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history and a distrust of those who supported it, along with ―open hostility to 
conservatives like Gingrich‖ (Moreau, 2003).  Included in this third group were educators 
who employed the social-studies-over-history approach to teaching and learning; 
professional historians who, in the years since the 1960s, had created specialized fields of 
historical research; and political ―pressure groups‖ who felt these specialized research 
fields ought also to be included in national curriculum standards. A prominent 
spokesperson for this group was Gary Nash who wrote Red, White, and Black: The 
Peoples of Early America.  To make their point, these radical multiculturalists often 
exaggerated the lack of historical research before the 1960s and the profusion of it 
afterward.  The thesis of Frances Fitzgerald‘s 1979 book America Revised was perfectly 
suited for their platform. 
The struggle over a politicized history was not new, as many contended in the 
1990s.  Early struggles over content in the history curriculum date back to the years 
following the Civil War and will be discussed later, as related to the textbook publishing 
industry in the U.S.  However, according to Ravitch, as a result of this contention, 
educators ―became convinced that it was better to stick with contentless ‗social studies‘ 
than to risk a struggle over whose history should be taught‖ (Ravitch, 2010). 
2000s 
 Taking into consideration that America‘s high school dropout rate remains 
between 5% and 9% (Hoyle & Collier, 2006) (Haycock & Huang, 2001) and graduation 
rates remain approximately the same in comparison to the 1970s (Haycock & Huang, 
2001), Wehling (2007) offers an unflattering portrait of America‘s educational system 
today:  
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―Our current educational system is designed to produce a million or more 
dropouts per year; high school graduates with inadequate knowledge or 
skills for further education or the workforce; and education opportunities 
that are closely linked to the wealth and education of a child‘s parents and 
community…it is inconceivable that 16,000 school districts and 50 states 
will all wake up tomorrow and agree to enact what we all know as best 
practices.‖  
  
Incensed that our nation‘s educational system was not listed as an important issue in 2008 
election polling data while other nations consider it a top national priority and having one 
million dropouts per year continue to be tolerated by the American public, politicians, 
and news media, Wehling wrote his report in hopes of raising awareness and positing a 
solution.  A national system of education, complete with national standards, curriculum, 
testing, teacher training, and funding that is independent of local communities‘ wealth 
summarizes his solution.  According to Jackson (2008), the 21
st
 century also brings two 
specific challenges: ―Two intertwined imperatives face U.S. education today.  The first is 
addressing the problem of persistent underachievement…the second is preparing students 
for work and civic roles in a globalized environment, where success increasingly requires 
the ability to compete, connect, and cooperate on an international scale.‖  According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau (2004), one in five U.S. jobs is tied to international trade.  A 
2009 report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Center for American Progress, and 
Frederick Hess of the American Enterprise Institute entitled ―Leaders and Laggards: A 
State by State Report Card on Educational Innovation‖ echoed the current lack of 
preparation and the need to prepare students for the modern workplace.  The overview of 
the report encourages ―purposeful‖ and ―far-reaching‖ innovation while praising 
independent ventures like Citizen Schools and Teach for America; it recognizes, 
however, that the nation‘s 100,000 schools and 3.2 million teachers are in dire need of 
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reform (Hess & Stoddard, 2007).  While the report‘s methodology and findings are too 
comprehensive to summarize here, the overview includes an interesting comparison of 
America‘s schools to recent economic troubles: 
In many respects the recent troubles of the auto and newspaper industries 
provide a cautionary tale for today‘s education policymakers.  Analysts 
predicted structural challenges in both industries for decades.  Outside 
consultants urged major change.  Yet altering entrenched practices at 
businesses from General Motors to the now-defunct Rocky Mountain 
News proved enormously difficult.  And the results of inaction for both 
organizations were disastrous.  The same must not happen to our nation‘s 
education system.  The stakes are just too high (Hess, 2009).           
 
Beginning in 2002, this emphasis on the work place and civic engagement 
compelled the Partnership for 21
st
 Century Skills (now referred to as P21) to begin 
collaborating with educators, civic and community groups, and business leaders to build a 
framework for incorporating 21
st
 century skills into already existing curriculum (Johnson, 
2009).  In July of 2008, after two years of collaboration between educators and business 
leaders, the NCSS in cooperation with P21 released a 21
st
 Century Skills and Social 
Studies Map, which ―provides educators with examples of how 21st century skills can be 
integrated into classroom instruction and which highlights the critical connections 
between social studies and the 21
st
 century skills‖ (Russell, 2010).  The map can be 
downloaded at www.p21.org/documents/ss_map_11_12_08.pdf; it identifies 12 desired 
skills and their related activities for fourth, eighth, and twelfth grades, along with 
intended outcomes and teaching ideas, each promoting civic, financial, or global literacy 
(Schachter, 2009).  Although P21 has the backing of corporations like Adobe Systems, 
Apple, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, and Verizon, it has critics.  Senechal (2010), 
writing for American Educator, disagrees with P21‘s assumption that schools‘ primary 
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objective is to meet current workplace demands and calls P21‘s demands for less formal, 
explicit instruction and more immediate, useful, and hands-on instruction reminiscent of 
progressive ideas over the past 100 years.  Senechal (2010) and other critics of reform 
efforts like P21 point out that the broad concepts and skills of critical thinking, problem 
solving, creativity, and innovation cannot occur before students have a core of 
foundational knowledge.  Ravitch (2010) sees P21 as yet another initiative in a long line 
of initiatives beginning in the early 1900s that has left ―American education with a deeply 
ingrained suspicion of academic studies and subject matter.  ‗It‘s academic‘ came to 
mean ‗it‘s purely theoretical and unreal.‘‖  Citing efforts to ―generalize and expand 
subjects beyond their disciplinary base – for instance, by replacing history with social 
studies,‖ critics call for more focused study and practice of core content knowledge, 
much of which cannot be learned only by hands on activities. 
Reformers forget, for instance, that knowledge enhances the very learning 
process in a number of ways, as Daniel T. Willingham (Willingham, 2010) 
and other cognitive scientists have found.  They forget that fluency in the 
fundamentals allows students to engage in inquiry.  They forget that 
content is not simply dry matter; it has shape and meaning; it is the result 
of centuries of critical thought and the basis for future critical thought.  To 
neglect to teach our intellectual and cultural traditions is to limit the kind 
of thinking that students will be able to do throughout their lives 
(Senechal, 2010).  
 
In relation to the broad concerns and suggested reforms of 21
st
 century education, 
the culture wars and concerns over history and social studies education in the 1980s and 
1990s resulted in the September 2002 announcement of three initiatives led by the U.S. 
Department of Education as well as the ―Teaching American History‖ (TAH) initiative.  
In his introductory remarks announcing the initiatives, President Bush stated: 
Our Founders believed the study of history and citizenship should be at the 
core of every American's education. Yet today, our children have large 
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and disturbing gaps in their knowledge of history. Recent studies tell us 
that nearly one in five high school seniors think that Germany was an ally 
of the United States in World War II. Twenty-eight percent of eighth 
graders do not know the reasons why the Civil War was fought. One-third 
of fourth graders do not know what it means to ‗pledge allegiance to the 
flag.‘ Graduating seniors at some of our leading colleges and universities 
cannot correctly identify words from the Gettysburg Address or do not 
know that James Madison is the father of the Constitution (Bush, 2002). 
 
  According to Wrobel, this infusion of tens of millions of dollars and emphasis on 
―traditional American history‖ has handed university and K-12 historians ―a financial 
lifeline to together pull themselves out of the mire of their separate spheres‖ (2008).  
Indeed, Brysiewicz (2003), a high school history teacher who attended a two-week 
summer institute funded by the TAH initiative, stated: ―If professors want their students 
armed with the tools to ‗do history,‘ they need to spend some time in the trenches, 
learning how best to bring the historian‘s craft to the highly regimented environment of 
high school.‖   
Concerning the state of history education versus social studies, in writing her 
book, The Language Police, Diane Ravitch reviewed 49 states‘ history standards and 
found that ―history is making a comeback‖ (Ravitch, 2003).  In 1994, only 4 states 
(California, Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas) had adopted history standards compared to 
14 states in 2002 with ―strong‖ history standards and 10 states with ―reasonably good‖ 
standards, in Ravitch‘s opinion.   
As of 2003, there were approximately 45 million public school students in the 
U.S., and ―el-hi‖ textbook sales was a 4 billion dollar industry (G. Sewall, 2003).  Sewall  
points out that, during this decade, textbook editors became even more sensitive to 
potentially-controversial subjects.  In his words, ―Textbooks pare to a minimum such 
touchy subjects as Israel and oil as agents of change in the Middle East since 
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1945…textbooks talk about ‗fighting‘ in a neutral way‖ (G. Sewall, 2008).  It is also 
relevant for the present study to note that according to Keith (2005), a former overseas 
diplomatic officer for the U.S., after 9/11, virtually all Muslims, including those outside 
the Arab world, came to reject what they regarded as ―America‘s biased support for 
Israel‖ (Keith, 2005).   
The intent of this study was to see, at least as far as high school history textbooks 
are concerned (and through the lens of the Arab-Israeli conflict), if there was support for 
all of these generational patterns and changes in American education.       
History of the Textbook Publishing Industry and Process 
 After considering the historic progression of American education in general and 
history education in particular, the historical context for the present study would not be 
complete without a look into the textbook publishing industry.  Textbook publishers 
today face a unique challenge because, in Ogawa‘s words, ―The United States houses the 
most diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic school population in the world‖ (Ogawa, 
2004).  Even so, fewer textbook publishers mean fewer chances for the inclusion of these 
diverse backgrounds (Spring, 2000).  In preparing to publish a textbook today, publishers 
begin with gathering information from a variety of organizations.  These organizations 
are discipline-oriented (e.g., the National Council for the Social Studies) and can include 
state and national education agencies as well as particular ―pressure groups‖ that seek to 
influence curriculum on their behalf (Garcia, 1993).  Those that contend these groups 
have too much influence on textbooks should also take into consideration that the 
processes of textbook production and selection actually work against it, with the high 
financial stakes for publishers and school districts working as a check-and-balance 
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system against change.  Initial research and development costs for a history textbook 
series can exceed $500,000 – a venture not undertaken lightly by publishers (Foster, 
1999).  The limited selection system that many states have can operate as a powerful 
economic weapon against publishers.  The increasing use of multimedia resources by 
teachers and students, in and out of the classroom, has also diminished – though certainly 
not eliminated – the place of the textbook (Podeh, 2000). 
Textbook publisher consolidation began in the 1890s, when three prominent 
textbook companies merged to create the American Book Company; the company very 
quickly gained dominance over 75 to 80 percent of the textbook market (Siler, 1987).  
The process of textbook adoption began around this time as well, shortly after the Civil 
War.  Distrustful ex-Confederates established textbook committees to ensure that books 
with anti-Confederate sentiments were excluded from Southern schools (Ravitch, 2004).  
Publishers, headquartered in the North, acquiesced to Southern demands and began 
publishing separate textbooks.  At the time of Ravitch‘s 2004 publication, most adoption 
states were still in the South and West, with California, Texas, and Florida dominating 
the market.   
As early as 1960, an article in Social Education acknowledged that ―copyright 
recency‖ was an important consideration on the part of publishers, and yet there was no 
guarantee for teachers that textbooks were current (Alexander, 1960).  Ravitch‘s 
assessment of the work of editors today is especially critical:  
To produce history textbooks, teams of writers and editors have mastered 
the art of compression, reducing complex controversies to a few lines or a 
page, smoothing out the rough edges of reality, eliminating the confusion 
and rancor that invariably accompanied major crises.  Historical debates 
disappear or shrink to a few leaden sentences.  Historical conflicts lose 
their drama, and the ideas of passionate individuals shrivel to simple 
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platitudes.  When history is compacted as severely as space requires, with 
the life squeezed out of it, the predigested pap that is left is not 
memorable, does not establish a foundation for future learning, and is 
guaranteed not to inspire in young people a sense of excitement about the 
past (Ravitch, 2003). 
 
While editors may not intentionally be trying to kill history along with students‘ 
enthusiasm for it, the reality is that their work is produced in an industrial and capitalist 
environment.  While Perlumutter (1997) recognized editors as ―hard working, well-paid, 
respected, and talented professionals, with artistic or English backgrounds,‖ he also noted 
that ―Aesthetic considerations are more important than critical questions of educational 
value; pretty takes precedence over thought provoking‖ (Perlmutter, 1997). 
Textbook authors also face problems and criticisms.  In Watt‘s (2007) research of 
the textbook publishing industry, he found that as early as the 1950s, writing required 
collaboration between the authors, editors, and publishers, with most attention given to 
production techniques rather than authorship and content.  By the 1960s, Watt states: 
―The authors of textbooks…offered the endorsement of authorship to the product rather 
than their contribution to the writing process‖ (2007). Bragdon, who helped author a 
popular American history textbook series over a 20-year period, wrote of his concerns 
about the process in an article for Social Education (1969).  Watt (2007) summarized his 
findings:   
Bragdon became concerned by two issues as development of the textbook 
proceeded.  First, the organization of the content in the textbooks to 
facilitate its use for memorizing and regurgitating facts was not 
overcome…second, concerns to reduce the length of the text led to 
simplifications, the lack of comprehensive knowledge of the subject 
matter led to plagiarism, and the requirement not to offend different 
pressure groups led to the omission of controversial issues.  Bragdon 
concluded that writing a textbook involved a requirement to make 
compromises in the interest of commercial success (2007). 
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Textbook authors, most often professional educators and/or historians, also face criticism 
from their own professional community.  Bierstadt (1955) recognized that financial 
benefit, rather than professional advancement and prestige, was the primary motivating 
factor for textbook authors.  Broudy (1975) found that publishers sometimes paid authors 
who lent professional credibility but little in actual writing a higher royalty. Sewall 
summarized this continued practice into the 1990s: 
The major incentive for skilled children‘s writers or history professors to 
contribute to school texts is a financial one.  What serious writer for 
children or adults would be willing to submit to readability formulas and 
other indignities beyond authorial control?  The writing of core text…is 
completed by anonymous writers in development houses and production 
companies: these are subcontractors laboring under the direction of a text 
editor (1994).  
 
Loewen (2008), in writing about textbook authors, stated: ―The first thing editors do 
when recruiting new authors is to send them a half-dozen examples of the 
competition…When historians do write textbooks, they risk snickers from their 
colleagues—tinged with envy, but snickers nonetheless: ‗Why are you devoting time to 
pedagogy rather than original research?‘‖  Even amid this kind of criticism, Bragdon 
(1969), coauthor of the nationally popular History of a Free People, wrote: ―I found 
writing a textbook the most difficult form of composition I have ever attempted.‖  No 
author, he acknowledged, could be expected to know everything about what needed to be 
included in a single volume of U.S. history.  Along with a textbook author‘s reliance on 
secondary sources came this admission, albeit regretfully: ―To shorten, you must 
simplify, and you inevitably falsify, since history is never simple‖ (Bragdon, 1969). 
 Big changes in the next few years may be in store for the multibillion dollar 
textbook industry in the U.S.  An April 2010 article in Education Week detailed two 
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measures passed by Texas lawmakers in 2009 that would allow state textbook aid to be 
used to purchase digital textbooks and gain access to open-source textbooks, which are 
available free on the Internet (Robelen, 2010).  These measures preceded Texas governor 
Rick Perry‘s remarks in April 2010 that he wants Texas to move toward solely using 
digital textbooks.  Considering this and California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger‘s 
initiative to provide digital textbooks in math and science for California high schools, 
publishers will be adapting to these new demands for years to come.  Even if the 
influence of Texas and California is sometimes exaggerated as publishers like to claim, 
they are the two leading markets among the 20 ―adoption‖ states in the U.S.  The move 
toward electronic resources, coupled with various states‘ concerns about the growing 
expense of textbooks, could open the door for more local control of curriculum selection, 
along with an expansion of niche publishers who cannot currently compete with the 
development costs typically spent by the three largest publishing companies, Pearson, 
McGraw-Hill, and Houghton Mifflin (Robelen, 2010). 
Textbook Publishing Industry and Process Conclusion 
 So how does one account for all of the changes in history and social studies 
teaching, textbook writing, and publishing since the 1950s?  History teaches that effects 
rarely have one cause.  It is clear that the tensions of the 1950s within the educational 
community between pedagogical methods of ―essentialist transmission and progressive 
facilitation‖ and educational goals of intellectual development versus social behavior 
continue today (Ryan, 2010).    Mehta, who studied educational reform movements 
throughout American history, found a common theme in each movement: education was 
always defined as ―under-performing, inefficient, and unable to meet the challenges of a 
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changing society‖ (Mehta, 2006).  In every case – the 1910s, 1920s, 1960s, and today – 
reformers sought to win public support by pledging to shift power upwards within the 
educational system: the historic progression was first to superintendents, then to states, 
and finally to the federal government (Mehta, 2006).   
While history education may be making a comeback, one author‘s simple but 
profound observation that ―no other national community of historians [and student body] 
is so inherently international,‖ partially explains why social studies is not ceding its place 
in the curriculum either (Graser, 2009).  A quick look at each decade reveals a pendulum 
swinging between the two.  One author also likened curriculum reform efforts throughout 
the decades to perpendicular axes, with the vertical representing ―excellence and 
heightened achievement‖ and the horizontal ―toward equity and social justice‖ (Jackson, 
1983).  No matter which direction the pendulum is swinging or to which axis the reform 
has moved, it is always tempting to blame textbooks or to view them as a silver bullet for 
a quick solution. 
Generational Patterns Regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Textbooks 
Specifically addressing patterns and changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict by 
decade, and referring back to the summaries of each decade, the 1950s‘ focus on the 
status quo and publishers‘ particular concern with not offending the political right may 
explain why the 1950s is the only decade with no anti-Israel texts.  The 1960s‘ focus on 
revision, relevancy, broad concepts, and visual appeal in textbooks may explain why 
there is such a dramatic increase in anti-Israel textbooks and decrease in specific 
information regarding the 1948 war.  Suez Canal Crisis coverage was highest in the 
1960s since it held the possibility for the first major conflict of the Cold War and was 
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therefore considered to be very relevant.  The 1970s‘ focus on social betterment, cultural 
differences, and more ahistorical content is reflected in the decrease in information on the 
Suez Canal, continued increase in both pro- and anti-Israel textbooks, and dramatic 
increases in uses of the terms Arab(s), Jew/Jewish, and Israel.  The 1970s is also the first 
decade in which the term Palestinian is used in a textbook.  The 1980s saw shorter 
textbook accounts with less conservative and more ―bottom up‖ interpretations of 
content.  This is reflected in continued increases in the terms Arab(s), Jew/Jewish, Israel, 
Palestine and Palestinian.  Information on the 1948 war increased, while Suez crisis 
information decreased considerably in the 1980s.  Information about the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War was at a dramatic all-time high in the 1980s, possibly because Americans 
were realizing the rising importance of foreign oil and the Middle East to the domestic 
economy.  Information on the fighting in Lebanon is also most prevalent in the 1980s 
textbooks, only to decrease to its lowest point in the 2000s.  In the textbooks, Lebanon 
was often overshadowed by the Iran hostage crisis and other concerns during Reagan‘s 
presidency.  While it could be argued if the 1990s debate (between those supporting a 
multicultural/social studies approach in the classroom and those supporting 
core/historical content) produced better content, it can certainly be said regarding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, that it produced more content.  Indeed, the total amount of 
information on the Arab-Israeli conflict was highest in the 1990s.  Several categories also 
continued rising and/or peaked in the 1990s, including the mandate period, the 1948 war, 
Camp David, 1993 peace agreements, and the terms Arab, Jew/Jewish, Israel, Palestine, 
and Palestinian.  Educational trends in the 2000s emphasized the work place and 
promoting civic, financial, and global literacy, and in many ways, generic or non-
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discipline-specific academic skills.  Then came 9/11 and publishers‘ heightened 
sensitivity for controversial subjects.  Together, these factors created the perfect 
combination for a decrease in specific information on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is 
what happened in the textbooks.  The total amount of information on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict returned to 1980 levels and several individual categories decreased, including the 
mandate period, Suez Canal, 1967 war, 1973 war, 1979 Camp David, Lebanon, 1993 
peace agreements, and the terms Arab (dropping dramatically to below 1970 levels), 
Israel, and Palestinian.   
As previously stated, there could be many more political, social, and educational 
causes for the patterns and changes noted above; however, this thesis has attempted to 
identify the most significant factors.  These, along with the specific changes to each 
category of analysis over time as summarized in chapter four, would not be helpful 
without also considering some of the general curricular and classroom implications of 
these patterns and changes.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
On a systemic level, Ravitch and the Fordham Institute (2004) make a compelling 
case to abolish statewide textbook adoption:  
This archaic and dysfunctional arrangement persists rather because of its 
accustomed familiarity and the instituational self-interests of publishers, 
political pressure groups, and the state educational departments in 
California and Texas, all of which have reached a mutual accommodation 
at the expense of the nation‘s schoolchildren…Eliminating statewide 
textbook adoption would make adoption states like open territory states, 
and would refashion the current K-12 textbooks procurement system to 
make it operate more like a healthy market—one with competition among 
publishers, and incentives to produce quality textbooks that work. 
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Since this is an unlikely solution, especially for the immediate future, preparation 
programs should teach future educators to recognize the limitations of textbooks and to 
use them as a resource.  Lindaman and Ward (2004) explain: 
In order to meet the market‘s demands, [textbook publishers] are doing 
away with what is most interesting about history: perspective, 
interpretation, historiography, bias, debate, and controversy.  By reducing 
history to a set of inoffensive facts and figures, no matter how attractively 
packaged, book publishers are effectively judging students incapable of 
dissecting and debating important topics and issues. 
 
When considering the omissions, oversights, bias, and misinformation regarding 
the Arab-Israeli conflict (and other topics) in high school U.S. history textbooks, one 
encouraging viewpoint is that the textbooks do not ―force‖ bad teaching (Bragdon, 1969).  
Teachers and students can do something about textbook shortcomings unlike so many of 
the systemic and social problems that schools and students face today.  Teachers would 
do well to adopt Marty‘s (1982) opinion of textbooks:  
My evaluations of textbooks are tempered by my low expectations as to 
what they can and should do in the teaching-learning process and my 
reluctant admission that I see little prospects for drastic improvement in 
the quality of the books.  My low expectations make me tolerant, though 
not indifferent, to their shortcomings.  My pessimism leads me to urge that 
teachers focus their efforts on something they can control, that is, the way 
textbooks are used.  I believe that textbooks should function primarily as 
reference books; beyond this they can give a course a framework for study 
and students a sense of continuity…as works of literature offering 
coherent accounts of the American past—well, that is too much to expect. 
 
Romanowski (2009) also has several recommendations for how teachers can approach 
and overcome textbook omissions.  Like Marty (1982), he states that textbooks should 
not be the final authority for the teacher or the students on a particular topic.   
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 Unless students have had no prior exposure to information about the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, it can be a controversial and emotionally-charged topic.  Of course, most history 
teachers would extol the virtues of examining both sides of a conflict, but Pingel (2008) 
reminds readers of the oft-neglected practice of questioning one’s own preconceptions.  
In his article, he compares various methods of teaching reconciliation through history and 
warns of the “didactic trap” for teachers and students in simply comparing two versions 
of one event: “…They [teachers] neglect the challenge of the blank space: they train their 
students to confront views and conduct a controversial debate that may strengthen 
extreme positions but that does not necessarily help them engage in a process of critical 
self-reflection and revision of preconceived opinions.”  As a class, simply listing student 
opinions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and periodically revisiting the list could be a useful 
evaluative tool.  By referring back to the list as they learn more about the conflict, 
students can track their own learning progress and evaluate how and why their 
perspectives change along the way.  Hahn and Tocci (1990) studied the relationship 
between classroom climate and controversial issues.  Their introduction states: 
“Researchers have consistently found that school instruction has little effect on the 
development of political attitudes and value orientations…[however] instruction can 
influence political attitudes under particular conditions.”  The article and the number of 
cited studies are too vast to summarize here; however, the crux of Hahn and Tocci’s 
argument and the most pertinent point regarding controversial issues in the classroom is 
this:  
“Attention to controversial issues is not sufficient to produce positive civic 
attitudes in students—at least as regards political efficacy and perhaps 
cynicism/trust; an open supportive classroom climate in which the issues 
are discussed seems to be a necessary condition…students who perceived 
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their classes to be “high participatory,” reported higher levels of political 
efficacy and interest and lower levels of trust than did students in “low 
participatory” classes.  Additionally, those students who perceived their 
classrooms to be more participatory exhibited higher levels of support for 
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.” 
 
So prompting students to explore controversial public issues and adopt more 
active roles in the classroom and community means not only focusing on the issues but 
also on the classroom environment in which those issues are addressed.  Essentially, 
Hahn and Tocci, along with the many other cited studies found that ―an open classroom 
climate was related to increases in political interest and political confidence‖ (1990). 
Secondly, Romanowski (2009) notes it is the teachers‘ responsibility to provide 
students with the means to investigate differing perspectives of a historical event.  In an 
effort to be neutral and unbiased, many of the textbooks in this study excluded Arab, 
Israeli, and American perspectives and reactions to major events in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  Students are left to wonder why something happened and what happened next 
or adopt the impression that the conflict was resolved.  Textbooks stifled the meaning by 
―suppressing causation‖ (Loewen, 2008).   It is essential that students understand why 
events occurred, different points of view, and unresolved issues concerning the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  For example, Wade (1993) cites a study by Beck (1989) in which 
students who also read from revised versions of textbooks ―understood why events 
occurred, and saw connections between events more often than students who read the 
original text version.‖  Is it important to understand that students do not naturally 
compare sources or question why something happened.  A study by Wineburg (1991) on 
how historians and students analyzed eight written and three pictorial documents on the 
Battle of Lexington found, ―In contrast to the historians, the high school students failed to 
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compare the documents, neglecting to recycle back through them to check for 
consistency in facts and reliability of the sources.  They decided a textbook 
treatment…was the most trustworthy and chose pictures based on artistic merit rather 
than consistency with written documents.‖  A simple, but profound step in teaching 
students how to think like historians would be to read a textbook account then list the 
perspectives, questions, and theories left unacknowledged in the text.  Because one must 
know the content before being able to identify what has been left out, some of the 
responsibility for content knowledge lies with the teacher.  However, a high school 
student should be able to identify the two most typical gaps in history textbook accounts 
– causation and consequences. 
In order to make connections with the meaning and importance of a historical 
topic, Tunnell (1993) also suggests the use of historical trade literature in the history 
classroom: ―When facts are an integral part of a compelling story, they are much more 
interesting and of more immediate consequence to a young reader than when presented in 
lists and pseudo-prose collections, as in a textbook.‖  Because there are a plethora of 
resources on the Middle East, the use of historical trade literature lends itself well to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Thirdly, Romanowski suggests using primary documents and writing 
assignments ―that give students the opportunities to go through the same process 
of selections as textbook authors.‖  For example, when dealing with the territories 
acquired by Israel in 1967, students could read UN Resolution 242 and compare 
secondary source information on Arab and Israeli perspectives of how the 
document justifies Israel‘s right to keep the territories for Israelis and proves 
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Israel‘s illegal occupation of the territories for Arabs.  In many respects, students, 
like textbook authors and editors, are just as dependent on secondary sources of 
information.  Teaching students how to identify and utilize reliable sources of 
information is an essential skill, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
Lastly, Romanowski (2009) reminds teachers of pictures‘ power to encourage 
critical thinking.  Studying the Arab-Israeli conflict, students could question why the 
textbook editors chose to include a particular photo, what important information the 
photo reveals that the textbook content does not, and write down questions that the photo 
leaves unanswered.  Masur (1998) shares some unique perspectives on using images in 
the classroom, along with this caution:  
We must remind our students that images reproduced in books carry 
limitations: we cannot see the brush strokes or the texture; we cannot 
discern the quality of the print; and when we see the pictures in color, the 
tones are not true.  Further, the locations of seeing are as revealing as what 
is seen.  We are unable to hold the magazine or newspapers, happen upon 
the broadside or poster, or visit the printshop or gallery of earlier times. 
 
Images of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been a powerful tool in wielding international 
opinions and policy – a fact that students must be aware of.  While images of the conflict 
are typically very emotionally charged, students must be reminded to evaluate images in 
light of factual information as well.  Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is ongoing, it lends 
itself to learning from current events and a variety of media outlets for up-to-date 
information.   
Romanowski includes the reminder that reasons for textbook omissions are 
―complex, and the ‗true‘ motives for the exclusion of content could be debated‖; 
however, textbooks should no longer be seen as just information to get through but as 
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content that needs to be ―questioned, analyzed, and negotiated‖ (2009).  In this way, 
Loewen (2009) states that students will become ―independent learners who can sift 
through arguments and evidence and make reasoned judgments…and neither a one-sided 
textbook nor a one-sided critique of textbooks will be able to confuse [them].‖   
Future teachers and those already in the classroom should remember that there are 
reliable, interesting, and challenging supplemental materials on most any historical topic; 
it simply takes time, effort, and research to find them.  University centers for Middle 
Eastern studies are a good resource for grade-appropriate lists of references, curriculum 
guides, kits, and supplemental materials on the Arab-Israeli conflict and are available at 
little or no cost to schools.  Although it does not include events after the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, William Griswold (1975) has an exemplary unit of four major Arab-Israeli 
wars, created for secondary school classes and complete with ―knowledge and 
comprehension goals‖ for each war.  Rock‘s (1996) thesis, The Arab-Israeli conflict as 
depicted in children's and young adult non-fiction literature, is also a very 
comprehensive list of resources available for classroom use.     
In their efforts to defend history‘s educational value, the early professional 
historians known as ―the Seven‖ answered that the study of history produced what they 
called ―historical mindedness‖ – an attentiveness to cause and effect that is ―both 
humanizing in its outlook and essential to the intelligent exercise of civic responsibility‖ 
(Orrill, 2005).  Teachers must remember that learning well is discipline specific, and as 
Wineburg (2003) states: ―There is no such thing as generic critical thinking.‖  Avoiding 
the controversy of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or teaching it solely as presented in a 
textbook, robs students and teachers of an opportunity to challenge their preconceptions 
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and engage in an academic exercise that will develop discipline-specific critical thinking 
skills that can translate into real-world application. 
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Appendix A 
 
This appendix lists all textbooks used in this present thesis, along with other similar 
content analysis studies in which these same textbooks were analyzed.  The American 
Textbook Council currently lists textbooks with an asterisk as having been included ―in 
major adoptions, that, combined, hold an estimated 80 percent of the national market in 
the United States and world history, grades eight to twelve.‖ 
 
 
McDougal Littell (Houghton Mifflin) 
 
1952: The Making of Modern America (Canfield and Wilder) 
 
*1948 version used in America Revised by Frances Fitzgerald. 
 
*1952 version used in Molding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High School 
History Texts by Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai, and Stanley Rothman.  All state 
departments of education were surveyed with 72 percent responding.  The largest 
120 school districts in the nation were also surveyed to obtain titles used prior to 
the 1980s since most did not have statewide adoption prior to 1980.  The list came 
from the Digest of Educational Statistics as compiled by Dr. Vance Grant in 
education statistics for the U.S. Department of Education.  The top five books in 
the state and district lists were merged into a single list per decade.  Top ranking 
books common to both state and district lists were given priority in the study.  
 
*1952 version used in Has the Texas Revolution Changed?  A Study of U.S. 
History Textbooks from 1897-2003 by Connee Duran.  The author studied five 
textbooks over a span of 100 years, with no attempt to determine which books had 
been widely used. 
 
*1954 version used in Visual and Verbal Content of U.S. History Textbooks of the 
1950s and 1980s  by Charlene Regester.  She used textbooks adopted by four of 
the largest textbook purchasing states: Texas, California, Florida and North 
Carolina.  She also cross referenced this with textbooks appearing the most 
frequently on state or district level adoption lists of these four states. 
 
1962: The Making of Modern America (Canfield and Wilder) 
  
*1962 version used in Molding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High School 
History Texts by Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai, and Stanley Rothman.  All state 
departments of education were surveyed with 72 percent responding.  The largest 
  
 
138 
120 school districts in the nation were also surveyed to obtain titles used prior to 
the 1980s since most did not have statewide adoption prior to 1980.  The list came 
from the Digest of Educational Statistics as compiled by Dr. Vance Grant in 
education statistics for the U.S. Department of Education.  The top five books in 
the state and district lists were merged into a single list per decade.  Top ranking 
books common to both state and district lists were given priority in the study.  
 
*1964 version used in Women in U.S. History High School Textbooks by Janice 
Law Trecker.  She surveyed twelve of what she claimed were the most popular 
U.S. history textbooks. 
 
*1964 version used in Textbooks and the American Indian by the American 
Indian Historical Society.  Over three hundred books were reviewed, all were 
claimed to be currently in use in classrooms, and not yet retired by publishers.   
 
*1964 version used in How Much of the Sky?  Women in American High School 
History Textbooks from the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s by Roger Clark.  Sampled 19 
textbooks, six each from the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s.  1990 textbooks were taken 
from the American Textbook Council‘s website of ―widely adopted‖ books.  1980 
textbooks were derived from a simple random sample of Mary Kay Thompson 
Tetreault‘s study, who wrote to textbook companies at the Nation Council for the 
Social Studies Annual Conference in 1980.  1960 textbooks were a simple 
random sample of Janice Law Trecker‘s list of the most popular textbooks of the 
1960s. 
 
1975: This is America’s Story (Wilder, Ludlum, and Brown) 
 
*1970, 1975 version used in America Revised by Frances Fitzgerald. 
*1975 version used in Lessons in Achievement in American History High School 
Textbooks of the 1950s and 1970s by Eva Moskowitz.  The author chose six 
books from the 1950‘s and eight from the 1970s.  The author reasons that because 
textbooks of the 1950s are so similar, six were simply chosen from the decade.  
1970s textbooks were chosen more carefully to reflect the educational and 
political differences in textbooks of this decade.   
 
1986: This is America’s Story (Wilder, Ludlum, and Brown) 
 
1996: The Americans: a history (Winthrop, Greenblatt, and Bowes) 
 
*1982 version used in How Much of the Sky?  Women in American High School 
History Textbooks from the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s by Roger Clark.  Sampled 19 
textbooks, six each from the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s.  1990 textbooks were taken 
from the American Textbook Council‘s website of ―widely adopted‖ books.  1980 
textbooks were derived from a simple random sample of Mary Kay Thompson 
Tetreault‘s study, who wrote to textbook companies at the Nation Council for the 
Social Studies Annual Conference in 1980.  1960 textbooks were a simple 
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random sample of Janice Law Trecker‘s list of the most popular textbooks of the 
1960s. 
 
*1982 version used in The Portrayal of Black Americans in U.S. History 
Textbooks by Jesus Garcia and David Tanner.  Texts were selected from the 
Social Studies Laboratory of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at 
Texas A&M University. 
 
*1985 version used in United States History Textbooks: Cloned Mediocrity by 
Carl Siler.  He used a representative sample of 14 books from the submission list 
of Texas in 1986 and the 1984 official adoption list from the Indiana Departmen t 
of Education. 
 
*1988 version used in Fleeing Democratic Ideals by Michael Romanowski.  The 
author used the top five publishing companies‘ ―best sellers‖ according the 
marketing departments of each publisher.  
 
*1992 version used in Evaluation of Secondary-Level Textbooks for Coverage of 
the Middle East and North Africa by the Middle East Studies Association and the 
Middle East Outreach Council; Elizabeth Barlow, editor. 
 
*1996 version used in The Treatment of Asian Americans in U.S. History 
Textbooks Published 1994-1996 by Violet Harada.  This author based textbook 
selection on a survey conducted by the Hawaii Department of Education to 
identify the most widely used textbooks in U.S. history courses in the state‘s 
public schools. 
 
*1998 version used in How Much of the Sky?  Women in American High School 
History Textbooks from the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s  by Roger Clark.  Sampled 19 
textbooks, six each from the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s.  1990 textbooks were taken 
from the American Textbook Council‘s website of ―widely adopted‖ books.  1980 
textbooks were derived from a simple random sample of Mary Kay Thompson 
Tetreault‘s study, who wrote to textbook companies at the Nation Council for the 
Social Studies Annual Conference in 1980.  1960 textbooks were a simple 
random sample of Janice Law Trecker‘s list of the most popular textbooks of the 
1960s. 
 
****2003: The Americans (Danzer) 
 
*1998 version used in Assessing ‘Herstory’ of WWII: Content Analysis of High 
School History Textbooks” by Laurie Gordy, Jennifer Hogan, and Alice Pritchard.  
Sample included ten of the major textbook publishers.   
*2000 version used in, The Quality of Pedagogical Exercises in U.S. History 
Textbooks by Bruce Lavere.  The author chose thirteen textbooks, five of them 
secondary, currently in use in the state of South Carolina. 
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*2002 version used in The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What 
Students Learn by Diane Ravitch.  There is no explanation of how the author 
chose the textbooks that were evaluated. 
 
*2003 version used in Framing American Indians as the ‘First Americans’: Using 
Critical Multiculturalism to Trouble the Normative American Story by Annalee 
Good.  The author used six U.S. History textbooks from the American Textbook 
Council‘s list of widely adopted books. 
 
*2003 version used in A Consumer’s Guide to High School History Textbooks by 
Diane Ravitch for the Thomas B. Fordham Institute.  All six United States history 
textbooks were claimed to be ―in wide circulation and broadly representative of 
the genre.‖     
 
*2005 version used in The Limits of Master Narratives in History Textbooks: An 
Analysis of Representations of Martin Luther King, Jr. by Derrick Alridge.  This 
author examined six books and chose this one based on the list created by the 
American Textbook Council for widely used textbooks. 
 
Holt, Rinehart, Winston (Harcourt) 
 
1950: America’s History (Todd and Curti) 
  
*1950 version used in Fitzgerald‘s ―America Revised.‖   
*1950 version used in Lessons in Achievement in American History High School 
Textbooks of the 1950s and 1970s by Eva Moskowitz.  The author chose six 
books from the 1950‘s and eight from the 1970s.  The author reasons that because 
textbooks of the 1950s are so similar, six were simply chosen from the decade.  
1970s textbooks were chosen more carefully to reflect the educational and 
political differences in textbooks of this decade.   
1966: The Rise of the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
*1961, 1966, 1969, 1972 version used in America Revised by Frances Fitzgerald. 
 
*1966 version used in Women in U.S. History High School Textbooks by Janice 
Law Trecker.  She surveyed twelve of what she claimed were the most popular 
U.S. history textbooks. 
 
*1966 version used in How Much of the Sky?  Women in American High School 
History Textbooks from the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s  by Roger Clark.  Sampled 19 
textbooks, six each from the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s.  1990 textbooks were taken 
from the American Textbook Council‘s website of ―widely adopted‖ books.  1980 
textbooks were derived from a simple random sample of Mary Kay Thompson 
Tetreault‘s study, who wrote to textbook companies at the Nation Council for the 
Social Studies Annual Conference in 1980.  1960 textbooks were a simple 
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random sample of Janice Law Trecker‘s list of the most popular textbooks of the 
1960s. 
 
*1966 and 1972  version used in Molding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High 
School History Texts by Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai, and Stanley Rothman.  
All state departments of education were surveyed with 72 percent responding.  
The largest 120 school districts in the nation were also surveyed to obtain titles 
used prior to the 1980s since most did not have statewide adoption prior to 1980.  
The list came from the Digest of Educational Statistics as compiled by Dr. Vance 
Grant in education statistics for the U.S. Department of Education.  The top five 
books in the state and district lists were merged into a single list per decade.  Top 
ranking books common to both state and district lists were given priority in the 
study.  
 
1977: The Rise of the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
*1974 version used in Lessons in Achievement in American History High School 
Textbooks of the 1950s and 1970s by Eva Moskowitz.  The author chose six 
books from the 1950‘s and eight from the 1970s.  The author reasons that because 
textbooks of the 1950s are so similar, six were simply chosen from the decade.  
1970s textbooks were chosen more carefully to reflect the educational and 
political differences in textbooks of this decade.   
 
*1977 version used in How the Cold War is Taught: Six American History 
Textbooks Examined by Martin F. Herz.  He used, according to Carl Siler in his 
1986 article, Content Analysis: A Process for Textbook Analysis and Evaluation, 
―a systematic process that involved checking with textbook authors, senior 
educators, and high school teachers in different parts of the country.‖ 
 
*1977 version used in A Study of Historical Source Materials on Women’s Topics 
Which Appear in United States History Textbooks: A Content Analysis by Beverly 
Ann Hogg Reid.  The author surveyed the District of Columbia and five school 
districts from each state, taken from the Education Directory using a random 
number table.  A request for the title and publication date of U.S. History books 
used by the schools in grades nine to twelve was made to 247 schools, with 173 
replying, for a response rate of 70 percent.  The 1982 version was also included in 
the study as a more current edition. 
 
*1982 version used in Benjamin Franklin to Watergate: The Press in U.S. History 
Textbooks Dan Fleming.  No explanation of how the textbooks were chosen. 
 
*1982 version used in United States History Textbooks: Cloned Mediocrity by 
Carl Siler.  He used a representative sample of 14 books from the submission list 
of Texas in 1986 and the 1984 official adoption list from the Indiana Department 
of Education. 
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1986: Triumph of the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
*1982 version used in Molding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High School 
History Texts by Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai, and Stanley Rothman.  All state 
departments of education were surveyed with 72 percent responding.  The largest 
120 school districts in the nation were also surveyed to obtain titles used prior to 
the 1980s since most did not have statewide adoption prior to 1980.  The list came 
from the Digest of Educational Statistics as compiled by Dr. Vance Grant in 
education statistics for the U.S. Department of Education.  The top five books in 
the state and district lists were merged into a single list per decade.  Top ranking 
books common to both state and district lists were given priority in the study.  
 
*1982 version used in Fourteen Ninety-Two in the Textbooks: A Critique by 
Charlie Sugnet.  Author chose seven books commonly used or likely to be 
adopted in Minnesota schools.  
 
*1982 version used in Visual and Verbal Content of U.S. History Textbooks of the 
1950s and 1980s  by Charlene Regester.  She used textbooks adopted by four of 
the largest textbook purchasing states: Texas, California, Florida and North 
Carolina.  She also cross referenced this with textbooks appearing the most 
frequently on state or district level adoption lists of these four states. 
 
*1982 version used in The Portrayal of Black Americans in U.S. History 
Textbooks by Jesus Garcia and David Tanner.  Texts were selected from the 
Social Studies Laboratory of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at 
Texas A&M University. 
 
*1986 version used in Ahistoricism and Fragmentation in United States History 
Textbooks of the 1980s at Elementary, Middle, and High School Levels: A 
Content Analysis by Mark Larsen.  The author began with all United States 
History textbooks used in Michigan public schools in the 1980s, and then 
obtained a sample population through three surveys conducted by the Michigan 
Department of Education to determine the most frequently used United States 
history textbooks. 
*1986 version used in Looking at History: A Review of Major U.S. History 
Textbooks by O.L. Davis, and sponsored by People for the American Way.  Texts 
selected for review were those submitted to the 1985 Texas State Textbook 
Committee, as well as other ―best-selling texts available in other states‖.  This 
textbook was labeled as ―outstanding‖ by the review panel. 
  
*1986 version used in American History Textbooks: An Assessment of Quality by 
Gilbert Sewall.  This study concentrated on what was claimed to be ―established 
texts in the marketplace.‖   
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*1986 version used in Lies My Teacher Told Me by James Loewen.  This book 
was a general review of twelve United States history textbooks written between 
1974 and 1991. 
 
*1990 version used in Fleeing Democratic Ideals by Michael Romanowski .  The 
author used the top five publishing companies ―best sellers‖ according the 
marketing departments of each publisher. 
 
1995: Todd and Curti’s the American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
****2003: American Nation (Boyer) 
 
*1995 version used in America in World War II: An Analysis of History 
Textbooks From England, Japan, Sweden, and the United States by Stuart Foster 
and Jason Nicholls.  Two textbooks were selected from each country from within 
a particular publication time frame and all textbooks were designed for use at the 
high school level.  No attempt was made to explain how the authors determined 
what constituted a ―popular‖ textbook.   
 
*1995 version used in The Treatment of Asian Americans in U.S. History 
Textbooks Published 1994-1996 by Violet Harada.  This author based textbook 
selection on a survey conducted by the Hawaii Department of Education to 
identify the most widely used textbooks in U.S. history courses in the state‘s 
public schools. 
 
*1998 version used in Assessing ‘Herstory’ of WWII: Content Analysis of High 
School History Textbooks” by Laurie Gordy, Jennifer Hogan, and Alice Pritchard.  
Sample included ten of the major textbook publishers.   
 
*2001 version used in The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What 
Students Learn by Diane Ravitch.  There is no explanation of how the author 
chose the textbooks that were evaluated. 
 
*2003 version used in Framing American Indians as the ‘First Americans’: Using 
Critical Multiculturalism to Trouble the Normative American Story by Annalee 
Good.  The author used six U.S. History textbooks from the American Textbook 
Council‘s list of widely adopted books.   
 
*2003 version used in A Consumer’s Guide to High School History Textbooks by 
Diane Ravitch for the Thomas B. Fordham Institute.  All six United States history 
textbooks were claimed to be ―in wide circulation and broadly representative of 
the genre.‖  This book earned Ravitch‘s rating of ―runner up‖ behind Glencoe‘s 
The American Journey, which she considered the best overall of the six American 
history texts reviewed.   
 
Prentice Hall (Pearson) 
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1957: The United States-the History of a Republic (Hofstadter) 
 
*1957 version used in Women in U.S. History High School Textbooks by Janice 
Law Trecker.  She surveyed twelve of what she claimed were the most popular 
U.S. history textbooks. 
 
*1957 version used in How Much of the Sky?  Women in American High School 
History Textbooks from the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s  by Roger Clark.  Sampled 19 
textbooks, six each from the 1960s, 1980‘s, and 1990‘s.  1990 textbooks were 
taken from the American Textbook Council‘s website of ―widely adopted‖ books.  
1980 textbooks were derived from a simple random sample of Mary Kay 
Thompson Tetreault‘s study, who wrote to textbook companies at the Nation 
Council for the Social Studies Annual Conference in 1980.  1960 textbooks were 
a simple random sample of Janice Law Trecker‘s list of the most popular 
textbooks of the 1960s. 
 
1967: The United States-the History of a Republic (Hofstadter) 
 
*1984 version used in United States History Textbooks: Cloned Mediocrity by 
Carl Siler.  He used a representative sample of 14 books from the submission list 
of Texas in 1986 and the 1984 official adoption list from the Indiana Department 
of Education.  
 
*1988 version used in Ahistoricism and Fragmentation in United States History 
Textbooks of the 1980’s at Elementary, Middle, and High School Levels: A 
Content Analysis by Mark Larsen.  The author began with all United States 
History textbooks used in Michigan public schools in the 1980‘s, and then 
obtained a sample population through three surveys conducted by the Michigan 
Department of Education to determine the most frequently used United States 
history textbooks. 
 
1976: The United States (Hofstadter) 
 
1986: The American Nation (Davidson) 
 
*1998 version used in Assessing ‘Herstory’ of WWII: Content Analysis of High 
School History Textbooks” by Laurie Gordy, Jennifer Hogan, and Alice Pritchard.  
Sample included ten of the major textbook publishers.   
 
*1994 version used in Evaluation of Secondary-Level Textbooks for Coverage of 
the Middle East and North Africa by the Middle East Studies Association and the 
Middle East Outreach Council; Elizabeth Barlow, editor. 
 
*2005 version used in Whose History? An analysis of the Korean War in History 
Textbooks from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China by Lin Lin.  
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The author chose books that had been published by major publishers in the 
market. 
 
1995: America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton) 
 
*1995 version used in Assessing ‘Herstory’ of WWII: Content Analysis of High 
School History Textbooks” by Laurie Gordy, Jennifer Hogan, and Alice Pritchard.  
Sample included ten of the major textbook publishers.   
 
*1998 version used in America in World War II: An Analysis of History 
Textbooks From England, Japan, Sweden, and the United States by Stuart Foster 
and Jason Nicholls.  Two textbooks were selected from each country from within 
a particular publication time frame and all textbooks were designed for use at the 
high school level.  No attempt was made to explain how the authors determined 
what constituted a ―popular‖ textbook.   
 
*1998 version used in How Much of the Sky?  Women in American High School 
History Textbooks from the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s  by Roger Clark.  Sampled 19 
textbooks, six each from the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s.  1990 textbooks were taken 
from the American Textbook Council‘s website of ―widely adopted‖ books.  1980 
textbooks were derived from a simple random sample of Mary Kay Thompson 
Tetreault‘s study, who wrote to textbook companies at the Nation Council for the 
Social Studies Annual Conference in 1980.  1960 textbooks were a simple 
random sample of Janice Law Trecker‘s list of the most popular textbooks of the 
1960s. 
 
****2005: America: Pathways to the Present (Cayton) 
 
*2000 version used in The Quality of Pedagogical Exercises in U.S. History 
Textbooks by Bruce Lavere.  The author chose thirteen textbooks, five of them 
secondary, currently in use in the state of South Carolina. 
 
*2002 version used in The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What 
Students Learn by Diane Ravitch.  There is no explanation of how the author 
chose the textbooks that were evaluated. 
 
*2002 version used in Framing American Indians as the ‘First Americans’: Using 
Critical Multiculturalism to Trouble the Normative American Story by Annalee 
Good.  The author used six U.S. History textbooks from the American Textbook 
Council‘s list of widely adopted books.   
 
*2003 version used in Treatment of Japanese-American Internment During World 
War II in U.S. History Textbooks by Masato Ogawa.  Six textbooks were chosen 
from Idaho‘s adoption list in 2002. 
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*2003, 2005, and 2007 versions reviewed in Islam and the Classroom: What the 
Textbooks Tell Us by Gilbert Sewall for the American Textbook Council.  The 
textbooks chosen were tailored to California standards. 
 
*2003 version used in A Consumer’s Guide to High School History Textbooks by 
Diane Ravitch for the Thomas B. Fordham Institute.  All six United States history 
textbooks were claimed to be ―in wide circulation and broadly representative of 
the genre.‖   
 
*2005 version used in The Limits of Master Narratives in History Textbooks: An 
Analysis of Representations of Martin Luther King, Jr. by Derrick Alridge.  This 
author examined six books and chose this one based on the list created by the 
American Textbook Council for widely used textbooks. 
 
*2005 Modern American history version used in Whose History? An analysis of 
the Korean War in History Textbooks from the United States, South Korea, Japan, 
and China by Lin Lin.  The author chose books that had been published by major 
publishers in the market. 
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Appendix B 
 
This appendix contains edition specific information on each textbook and for each 
category of analysis.  Decade summaries in chapter four were derived from the specific 
information in this appendix. 
Mandate System/Balfour Declaration/1948 War/Establishment of Israel: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?    
(HM 1952) The 1952 Houghton Mifflin (HM) text does not mention Palestine at all, 
except to include it on a map displaying Axis territories between 1940 and 1944 (p. 710).   
(Holt 1950) The 1950 Holt (previously Harcourt, Brace and Company) textbook first 
mentions Palestine in the context of a discussion on the benefits of the United Nations, 
which ―prevented or ended armed conflict‖ in this and other regions since the creation of 
the United Nations (p. 803).  Palestine is listed with India, Pakistan, and Indonesia as 
having been areas where UN intervention was necessary and successful.  Tensions in the 
Middle East are highlighted in the context of East-West conflict.   
(PH 1957) This text first mentions the Middle East, again in the context of East-West 
tensions, describing it as ―strategic‖ and ―the weakest spot in western resistance to 
communist penetration‖ (p. 753). 
(1962 HM) Israel is first mentioned in the context of the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis.  Israel‘s 
beginnings and historic tensions in the Middle East are not mentioned except to say that, 
―Arab nations had never recognized the new republic of Israel…[and] had vowed to drive 
Israel into the sea‖ (pp. 780-781).   
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(1966 Holt) This textbook is unique in that it explains the mandate system that was 
established after WWI, although Israel is not mentioned specifically.  Although it does 
not go into details, the explanation includes the requirement that the new owners of the 
mandates were accountable to the League of Nations for their colonial administrations.  
The book goes into more detail on the mandate system when discussing rising tensions in 
the Middle East after WWII.  Problems in Palestine are specifically cited when Great 
Britain, ―…voluntarily gave up [their] mandate [and] the Jews in Palestine proclaimed 
the independence of the new state of Israel‖ (p. 773).  It is interesting to note that all of 
the above is discussed under the textbook heading, ―Communist Aggression Leads to 
‗Hot War‘ in Asia‖, signifying that the Middle East was not the main focal point of the 
text‘s section on postwar tensions.  
(PH 1967) In this text, Israel is first mentioned under the text heading, ―The Truman 
Administration and Foreign Affairs‖, amid discussion on the end of British supremacy in 
the Mediterranean.  This text spends less time than the last PH edition on Israel‘s 
declaration of statehood, and more time on why and how Great Britain gave up it‘s 
mandate: ―In March, 1946, Britain had acknowledged the independence of Transjordan 
(renamed Jordan in 1949), and in April, 1947, had turned over the future of Palestine to 
the U.N., leading in May, 1948, to the creation, with mixed United States reactions, of the 
independent state of Israel‖ (p. 815).     
(HM 1975) The first mention of Israel is under the text heading, ―President Eisenhower 
also faces Cold War problems‖, and is in the context of discussion on the 1956 Suez 
Canal Crisis. 
 
  
 
149 
(Holt 1977) This edition‘s account remains largely unchanged from the 1966 edition.  
Israel, and tensions in the Middle East are first mentioned under the heading, ― ‗Hot War‘ 
in Asia as a result of Communist Aggression.‖  Explaining that Palestine had been ruled 
by Great Britain under a mandate from the League of Nations since World War I, the text 
explains that, ―…when Great Britain voluntarily gave up this mandate, the Jews in 
Palestine proclaimed the independence of the new state of Israel‖ (p. 684). 
(PH 1976) This edition also remained mostly unchanged from the 1967 edition.  First 
mention of the Middle East is found under the heading, ―Truman Administration and 
Foreign Affairs‖ and is in the context of its strategic value in the Cold War.  The 
statehood of Israel is mentioned in the context of Britain‘s decline in the Middle East—
the wording is unchanged from the 1967 edition, even to the ―mixed reaction‖ of the U.S. 
toward Israel‘s independence. 
(HM 1986)  First mention of Israel is found under the heading, ―How Did President 
Eisenhower Meet the Problems of the Cold War?‖ and ―A Crisis Arises in the Middle 
east‖ (p. 676).  The Middle East is described as being, ―…the chief danger spot for world 
peace‖ during Eisenhower‘s term, and the establishment of Israel is summarized in the 
following statement: ―After World War II the state of Israel had been established as a 
Jewish homeland.  But Arab countries in the Middle East refused to accept Israel‘s right 
to exist and threatened to destroy the new nation.  This situation gave the Soviet Union an 
opportunity to increase its influence in the Middle East by offering aid to Israel‘s Arab 
neighbors‖ (p. 676).   
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(Holt 1986)  After a discussion about NATO and the American policy of containment by 
the end of 1949, tension in the Middle East is alluded to with the statement: ―Meanwhile, 
trouble was brewing in the Middle East and in Asia‖ (p. 829).  Further details about 
trouble in the Middle East are found under the heading ―Growing nationalism and 
Communist aggression lead to war in Asia‖ (p. 830).  The text simply explains that 
tensions between ―Jews and Arabs‖ in Palestine caused trouble to break out.     
(PH 1986)  This text is arranged very differently from previous textbook and publishers‘ 
editions.  While the peace treaty that President Carter helped to negotiate between Egypt 
and Israel is the textbook‘s first mention of Middle East affairs, it is only one sentence in 
a lengthy passage about President Carter‘s administration (p. 679).  The text‘s entire 
history of conflict in the Middle East is included in section three of chapter thirty-one, 
entitled ―Challenges to Peace‖ (p. 706).  In the introduction to section three, the United 
States‘ difficult diplomatic position is immediately highlighted.  Israel is identified as a 
U.S. ally, but the Middle East‘s strategic location and oil reserves are also given as 
reasons why the U.S. desires to maintain ties with ―Arab states that oppose Israel‖ (p. 
706).  The text identifies Israel as being ―the center of controversy since it was set up as 
an independent nation in 1948‖ (p. 706). 
(HM 1996)  Israel‘s history from the mandate period first appears in a chapter on the 
1970s about Ford and Carter, under the heading, ―World Tensions Increase‖, and the 
subheading, ―Crisis Follows in the Middle East‖ (p. 913).  Oil and concern over Soviet 
expansion, according to the text, were the United States‘ primary reasons for involvement 
in the Middle East after World War II.  As an introduction to the Camp David Accords, 
the mandate period is summarized. 
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(Holt 1995)  While Israel is not mentioned specifically, this text summarizes the mandate 
system in the context of a discussion on the Treaty of Versailles (p. 608).  To end 
discussion on World War I, the text goes a step further under the subheading, ―The 
Global Impact of the War‖ (p. 610).  The text states: ―In the Middle East, Arab 
nations…found themselves living under French and British mandates.  Tensions in the 
region heightened after Britain issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, declaring British 
support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine‖ (p. 611).  The Balfour Declaration is even 
included in the section review, along with the mandate system.  More in-depth 
information on Israel and Middle East tensions is found in a special section of the chapter 
entitled, ―The Postwar Years‖.  The one focus question at the top of the page dealing with 
the Middle East states: ―Why did Israel and Arab nations go to war‖ (p. 796)?  Cold War 
concerns in China and Korea were also included in this section. 
(PH 1995)  The 1948 War is in the context of a chapter entitled, ―The Cold War and 
American Society‖, under the subheading, ―the Middle East‖ (p. 731).  American oil 
interests and concern over Soviet expansion were given as the main reasons for U.S. 
involvement in the region.. 
(HM 2003)  The first mention of Israel appears in Chapter 26 entitled, ―Cold War 
Conflicts‖ (p. 831).  A special ―World Stage‖ text box of three sentences summarizes 
Israel‘s beginnings, and is meant to provide context for the text‘s two paragraphs on the 
Suez War.  
(Holt 2003)  This text is much the same as the last edition in context.  First mention of 
the Balfour Declaration is under the heading, ―The Global Impact of War‖, in a chapter 
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on World War I.  The text explains that the mandates, along with the Balfour Declaration, 
were growing sources of tension in the region (p. 653).  A whole section entitled, ―The 
Founding of Israel‖, appears in a chapter on the Cold War.  The main body of text is 
surrounded by a special textbox on ―American Judaism‖, and a picture of three Jewish 
immigrants arriving in Palestine, holding an Israeli flag (p. 837).  The underlying 
problem is conflict between Jews and Arabs over the land. 
(PH 2005)  Israel‘s history of and prior to 1948 appears in a chapter on the Cold War, 
under the subheading, ―The Middle East‖ (p. 891).  The book provides no context for 
underlying problems in the region, except to say that there were ―historic tensions‖.   
2.  What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(Holt 1950) In describing the diplomatic position of the United States toward Israel in 
1948, points out that many Americans, ―sympathized with the Jews who were fighting to 
protect the independence of their newly created state of Israel‖, but also points out the 
desire of the United States for ―friendly relations with the Arabs, who controlled vast oil 
deposits in Saudi Arabia‖ (p. 816).  It is interesting to note that the text does not point out 
why Israel needed to defend itself, and from whom specifically.   
(PH 1957) This text describes the ―restless Arab peoples [and] Arab nationalism‖ as 
threatening American, British, and French oil interests, as well as access to the Suez 
Canal.  The dilemma America faced between supporting its old allies, and undermining 
NATO by sympathizing with Arab nationalists is highlighted, with the conclusion that, 
―American policy tended steadily to favor the Arab states‖ (pg. 753).   
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(PH 1967) The Middle East is mentioned because of its ―strategic‖ location between 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) countries of the Far East and North 
American Treaty Organization (NATO) countries of the West. 
(HM 1975) It is interesting to note that this text places the primary responsibility for the 
creation of the state of Israel on President Truman‘s shoulders, stating: ―President 
Truman had taken the lead in helping to establish the state of Israel as a homeland for the 
millions of European Jews who had survived the persecutions and fightings of World 
War II‖ (p. 697).  Assumptions implicit in this statement are that Israel was established 
by cooperating western powers that sympathized with European Jews after World War II.   
(Holt 1977)  This text implies that Israel was declared a state because Great Britain gave 
up its mandate.  Interestingly, a caption picturing Dr. Bunche receiving his Nobel Prize 
states that Dr. Bunche, ―…arranged an armistice ending the Palestinian War‖ (p. 685).   
(PH 1977)  Widespread sympathy for Israel among Jewish urban voters is cited by the 
text as the reason why the U.S. did not join the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) 
in 1955.   
(HM 1986)  Israel‘s establishment, according to this text, was to provide a homeland for 
the Jewish people.  Precipitating causes other than a homeland are not stated. 
(Holt 1986)  The text explains that Great Britain had ruled Palestine under a mandate 
from the League of Nations since the end of World War I.  Great Britain‘s voluntary 
acquiescence to the UN of their mandate in Palestine is seen as the cause for Jews in 
Palestine claiming independence for Israel. 
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(PH 1986)  Specific dates (1929-1948) for Britain‘s mandate period in Palestine are 
identified, and the text states: ―The British allowed Jews to settle there in part because 
Palestine was the home of the Jews in ancient times.  In the 1930s, many Jews fled from 
Hitler‘s Germany to live in Palestine‖ (p. 706).  World War II is also cited as the impetus 
that caused ―…Jews from around the world [to flock] to Palestine‖ (p. 706). 
(HM 1996)  It is interesting to note that this text states: ―In 1948 Britain ended its 
mandate, and the republic of Israel was proclaimed by the United Nations‖ (p. 914).   
(Holt 1995)  This text is unique in that it gives a reason for why Great Britain gave up its 
mandate, stating: ―Unable to resolve conflicting claims over territory, Britain in 1947 
turned the problem over to the United Nations‖ (p. 796).  The text even explains the UN 
Partition Plan to divide Palestine into two states, and mentions that, ―…Arabs rejected the 
proposal‖ (p. 796).  Much of the texts‘ explanations are also in the context of the Zionist 
movement and Ben-Gurion‘s leadership.  Under a map of Israel in 1949, the caption 
states: ―Success story: The memory of the Holocaust and the struggle to create a Jewish 
state unified the Israelis in a common cause‖ (p. 797). 
(PH 1995)  The strategic importance of the Middle East for the U.S., and Jewish 
immigration to Palestine for the Zionists are the main causes of tension, according to this 
textbook.   
(HM 2003)  This text does not give a lot of description or explanation regarding Israel‘s 
independence, except to say: ―The creation of Israel was one of the few issues upon 
which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, as the world reacted uniformly to 
the horror that had befallen the Jews in the Holocaust‖ (p. 831).  Sympathy for Jews 
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surviving the Holocaust was the primary motivation for the creation of Israel, according 
to this text. 
(Holt 2003)  Zionism is defined and explained in the text‘s section on the founding of 
Israel, along with Ben-Gurion‘s leadership of the movement.  Zionism, combined with 
support from the American Jewish community is seen as the impetus for the creation of 
the state of Israel.  Arab protest against Jewish immigration and the UN partition plan is 
crystallized in their response to Israel‘s declaration of statehood. 
(PH 2005)  Jewish immigration to Palestine prompted by the Holocaust is seen as the 
impetus for intensifying demand for Jewish homeland, although the Zionist movement is 
never mentioned specifically. 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(Holt 1950) This text includes a friendly, relaxed picture of Dr. Ralph Bunche and Israeli 
Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.  No date for the picture is given, but in the context of 
the textbook‘s section on the UN, a student could reasonably assume the picture was 
taken during peace negotiations, but is left to wonder with whom Israel may have been 
negotiating.  Interestingly, Dr. Bunche is highlighted in the picture caption as having 
helped to ―avert war between the new nation of Israel and the neighboring Arab state‖ (p. 
804).  What Arab state is being spoken of is not in the text, and from the caption, students 
might incorrectly assume that war was averted entirely.   
(PH 1957) This text is unique among the 1950s texts, in that it highlights some of the 
causes of antagonism between Israel and the Arab states; the 1917 Balfour Declaration, 
and its promise to provide a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people, is cited among 
those causes.  The Arab League, its refusal to accept Israel as a new state, and its vow to 
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destroy Israel are also cited as causes of intermittent war and ―an uneasy  truce‖ between 
the two sides (p. 753).   
(1966 Holt) The textbook cites Israel‘s declaration of statehood as the immediate cause 
that, ―plunged Israel into war with the neighboring Arab countries of Egypt, Transjordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia‖ (p. 773).  A map of ―Critical Areas in the World 
After 1945‖ included the Middle East and its 1948 ―Israeli/Arab War‖ (p. 784).  U.N. 
efforts to end the fighting are acknowledged in the, ―leadership of Dr. Ralph J. Bunche 
[who] managed to get both sides to agree to an armistice‖ (p. 773). In the 1967 PH 
textbook, Great Britain‘s relinquishment of Jordan and Palestine is seen as the cause of 
independence in both countries, and the consequence is the hastening of Britain‘s 
―decline in the Middle East‖ (p. 815).  A consequence of Israel‘s statehood as mentioned 
in the text, is the inflaming of Arab nationalism and setting the stage in Egypt for Nasser 
to take power, with his ―ambitions to unite the neighboring Arab lands‖ (p. 838). 
(HM 1975)  A consequence of ―American aid and friendship to Israel‖, according to the 
text, was the continued displeasure of the Arab states, who, ―…fought an unsuccessful 
war against Israel [and] refused to accept its right to exist, and continually threatened to 
destroy it‖ (p. 697).  The ultimate consequence of this situation, according to the text, 
was the opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit the unrest and increase its influence 
in the Middle East.   
(Holt 1977)  The consequence of Israel‘s independence―plunged Israel into war with the 
neighboring Arab countries of Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia‖ (p. 684).  Dr. Bunche‘s efforts to achieve peace are highlighted, and the only 
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indication that it was a long and difficult process is the word, ―finally‖, in the statement, 
―Finally a UN mission…managed to get both sides to agree to an armistice‖ (p. 684). 
(PH 1977)  The text states that the Arab powers in METO, ―…had sworn to destroy the 
Jewish state‖ (p. 655).   
(HM 1986)  The consequence of Israel‘s establishment, according to this text, is clearly 
the hatred of the Arab nations.     
(Holt 1986)  Israel‘s declaration of statehood earned them Arab hatred and resulted in 
war.  The text notes that the UN took immediate action to end the fighting, and 
particularly highlights Dr. Ralph Bunche‘s efforts in ―manag[ing] to get both sides to 
agree to an armistice‖ (p. 831).  This text is unusual in that it notes in the caption under a 
picture of Dr. Bunche that his predecessor was assassinated for similar efforts (p. 831).  
The text notes that the armistice was an ―uneasy peace‖.  Students are asked in a section 
review question to, ―Describe the postwar events that created tension in the Middle East‖ 
(p. 835).   
(PH 1986)  Jewish settlement in Palestine is cited by the text as the cause of Arab 
resentment, only made worse in 1948, when, ―…Jewish residents of Palestine announced 
that they were setting up the State of Israel‖ (p. 706). 
(HM 1996)  After Israel became a state, this text explains why Arab states were angered: 
―They [Arabs] claimed the nation had been created out of land that belonged to the 
Arabs‖ (p. 914).  The consequence in the text were the four wars fought between Israel 
and ―Arab nations‖, and the text also points out that most of the Arab ―manpower and 
weaponry‖ came from Egypt. 
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(Holt 1995)  Ben-Gurion‘s leadership of the Zionist movement, in this text, was 
instrumental in Israel‘s independence.  This text, unlike others, states: ―Ben-Gurion and 
other Jewish leaders promptly proclaimed the new state of Israel‖ (p. 797).  It also 
recognized that the U.S. and Soviet Union extended immediate diplomatic recognition.  
Arab states‘ refusal to recognize Israel, according to this text, stemmed from their desire 
to keep Palestine in Arab territory.  The attack on Israel by five Arab states (which are 
listed) was the consequence, and again, Ben-Gurion was instrumental in capturing and 
holding much of Palestine, until ―the millions of dollars that poured in from the American 
Jewish community‖, sustained the Israeli soldiers and the war effort (p. 797).  This text 
also goes into more detail than others, on the peace process after the 1948 war.  
Explaining that ―Israeli extremists‖ assassinated the first UN mediator, the text also 
explains that even after the armistice, Arab states still refused to recognize Israel.  Also 
the first to delve into the issue of Arab refugees, the text states: ―Also left unresolved was 
the fate of the Arabs remaining in Israel and the hundreds of thousands of Arabs who had 
fled or been driven out of Israel‖ (p. 797). 
(PH 1995)  It is interesting to note that this text identifies the UN as the creator of Israel: 
―Tensions between Palestinian Jews and Arabs erupted with the UN announcement of the 
new Jewish state, called Israel, on May 14, 1948‖ (p. 731).  Immediate diplomatic 
recognition on the part of the U.S. and Soviet Union is mentioned, as is the immediate 
invasion of Israel by Arab countries.  The book declares that, ―Israel defeated those states 
and annexed most of the Palestinian territory as shown on the map on page 732.‖  U.S. 
sympathy for Israel along with interest in Arab oil, ends the discussion on the Middle 
East. 
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(HM 2003)  Jewish immigration to Palestine before and after World War II, along with 
world sympathy for survivors of the Holocaust, are seen as causes leading to the creation 
of Israel as an independent state.  The text highlights U.S. and Soviet agreement 
regarding Israel, and identifies the UN Partition Plan as responsible for the Israel‘s 
independence.  
(Holt 2003)  The relationship between Zionism and the American Jewish community, 
along with the hatred of the Arab world, are clear in this text.  Ben-Gurion‘s dedication to 
the Zionist movement, along with American support, resulted in its eventual success in 
the new state of Israel.  The consequence of this success was war with the surrounding 
Arab states. 
(PH 2005)  British inability to meet the demand for a Jewish homeland caused them to 
turn the question over to the UN.  The text acknowledges ―historic tensions‖ in the 
region, but does not provide specific information on the sources of those tensions.  The 
claim to Palestine as an ancient homeland by both Jews and Arabs is seen as the main 
source of conflict.  Interestingly, the text does acknowledge that Palestine was ―…the 
Biblical home of the Jewish people…‖ (p. 891).  The consequence of these conflicting 
claims was an attack on Israel by its ―Arab neighbors‖, a successful defense by Israel, 
and newly mediated borders by the UN.  Another consequence included in a caption 
above a map of Israel after the 1948 War was Egypt‘s blockade of the Suez Canal of any 
ships going to or from Israel. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
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(Holt 1950) This text assumes that most Americans sympathized with the Jews defending 
Israel.  The most thorough text on this topic is undoubtedly the 1957 PH text.  It is 
interesting to note that in discussing the ―uneasy truce‖ between Israel and the Arab 
League after 1948, the text states that the Arab League accepted a truce, ―…not because 
they were reconciled to Israel‘s existence but because they had been unable to subdue 
her‖ (p. 754).  Again, the dilemma of U.S. policy toward Israel is highlighted, with 
American sympathy for Jewish refugees after World War II on the one hand, and the 
desire for friendly relations with Arab nations on the other hand.   
(PH 1957) This text reinforces that the Arab nations harbored an ―implacable hostility‖ 
against the state of Israel, but also implies that a common statement made by the U.S., 
Britain, and France in 1950 about weapons sales to Israel and the Arab states, along with 
a pledge to take action against aggression by either side, was a success in assuring peace 
in the region (p. 754).     
(1966 Holt) The text ends discussion on the Middle East by stating that an, ―uneasy 
peace‖ had been restored (p. 773).  The one review question on the Middle East asks, 
―What were the events that created tension during the postwar years?‖  The only two 
conclusions students would be able to come to, based on the text, is that tension was 
created by Israel‘s declaration of statehood, as well as the remaining Soviet forces in Iran 
(p. 773).   
(HM 1975)  The end of chapter review questions simply states: ―What events in the 
Middle east threatened world peace‖ (p. 699)? 
 
  
 
161 
(Holt 1977)  Students are asked in the section survey to, ―Describe the postwar events 
that created tension in the Middle East‖ (p. 687).  According to the text, one of the only 
two answers would be Israel‘s declaration of statehood. 
(PH 1977)  U.S. politics and the perceived powerful influences of Jewish urban voters 
color this texts‘ interpretation of U.S. relations with Israel. 
(HM 1986)  The importance of the Middle East is still seen in the context of the 
opportunities it presents for the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  The only two review 
questions, one for the chapter and one for the unit, asked what events in the Middle East 
and what trouble spots threatened world peace during President Eisenhower‘s term.     
(Holt 1986)  This texts‘ account of the Middle East is borne out of its discussion on 
nationalism and a main concern about events in Asia, particularly China and Korea.  The 
Middle East is seen as a peripheral problem and strategic only for stemming the tide of 
growing Soviet influence.  
(PH 1986)  Worldwide Jewish emigration and Arab hatred of Jewish immigrants to 
Palestine is the premise for this text‘s account of early conflict in the Middle East.  The 
Arab nations‘ refusal to recognize Israel as a legitimate state is the motivation for their 
attack on Israel.  Going a step further than any other textbook thus far, the closing 
sentences of Israel‘s period of independence state: ―Israel successfully defended itself 
and even added to its lands.  After 1948, about 700,000 Arabs fled Palestine.  They 
gathered in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria‖ (p. 706).   
(HM 1996)  One major assumption is that the United Nations proclaimed Israel a nation.  
Another problem is that the book states: ―As you know, between 1948 and 1973, four 
wars were fought between Arab nations and Israel‖ (p. 914), but aside from the mention 
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of the 1948 war in the previous statement, it is not mentioned elsewhere.  The 1967 Six 
Day War is only included on a timeline at the beginning of the chapter.  This texts‘ whole 
account is based on a premise of eventual peace, with the Camp David Accords as the 
climax.  It also highlighted the United States‘ difficult diplomatic position between 
supporting Israel and finding a solution ―to the Palestinian issue‖ (p. 914). 
(Holt 1995)  Undoubtedly, the premise for war, according to this text, was over the 
territory of Palestine itself.  One statement in this text, which could be considered by 
some scholars as an assumption and by others as fact, was: ―Although vastly 
outnumbered in the Arab-Israeli war, Israeli forces…captured and held much of 
Palestine‖ (p. 797).   
(PH 1995)  The premise of this text‘s account is clearly in the context of the Cold War 
and American oil interests in the region.  The major assumption in this passage is that 
Israel‘s defeat of the invading Arab nations negated any necessity for a peace process and 
left no unresolved issues in the region. 
(HM 2003)  This account is based on the assumption of worldwide sympathy for Jews 
after World War II.  The text implies that the world was in agreement (―…as the world 
reacted uniformly‖) about the horrors of the Holocaust, and by extension, the Jews‘ need 
for a homeland.  The text also implies that Jews had never lived in a ―promised land‖, 
even in biblical times:  ―Thousands of Jews had immigrated to Palestine from Europe 
before and during World War II, and Israel became the ‗promised land‘ they had been 
seeking since biblical times‖ (p. 831).  Students could be left with the impression that 
Jews had never been or continued to be residents of Palestine since biblical times. 
  
 
163 
(Holt 2003)  The whole premise of this passage is the founding of Israel.  One possible 
assumption that remains from the last edition was that Israel was ―vastly outnumbered‖ in 
the 1948 war (p. 837).  The most important information in this passage, as identified by 
the section review questions are: ―What events led the UN to try to resolve the conflict 
over Jewish and Arab claims to Palestine?  [and] How successful was the effort?‖ 
(PH 2005)  The premise of this account is the Cold War, along with conflicting Jewish 
and Arab claims in Palestine.  A major assumption in the text includes students‘ prior 
knowledge of ―historic tensions‖ in the region. 
5.  What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
(Holt 1950) In a paragraph on tensions in the Middle East, the text simply states there 
was an outbreak of war between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.  Causes of the outbreak are 
not acknowledged, and the conflict is seen in the light of the threat it presented to United 
States oil interests in the Middle East.  Holt states that the conflict was ―finally resolved 
by a United Nations mission under the leadership of an American, Dr. Ralph Bunche, 
who took the job of mediator after his predecessor, Count Folke Bernadotte, had been 
murdered late in 1948‖ (p. 816).  The preceding statement gives the impression that no 
issues of contention remained after negotiations, and fails to address why Bunches‘ 
predecessor was assassinated.   
(PH 1957) This text, although acknowledging the promises of a Jewish homeland made 
in the Balfour Declaration, and the hostility of the Arab League toward Israel‘s existence, 
does not give details about what prompted the Jews‘ desire for a national homeland and 
why the establishment of Israel angered Arab nations.  Competing promises made to both 
sides by the British during the mandate period are not acknowledged.  Most importantly, 
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the text does not address the unresolved issues of the 1948 war over Arab refugees and 
does not explicitly mention the Arab League‘s refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the new state of Israel, thereby hampering direct negotiations.  There are no timelines, 
pictures, or maps that picture exactly what territory was involved. 
(1966 Holt) The text does not answer why Great Britain ―voluntarily‖ gave up their 
mandate in Palestine, and does not put Israel‘s declaration of statehood in any kind of 
context.  While Bunche‘s peace negotiations, and Nobel Peace Prize, are acknowledged, 
the fact that his predecessor was assassinated for similar efforts is not mentioned.  The 
text simply states that an ―uneasy peace‖ was restored through Bunche‘s efforts, but does 
not say what the points of negotiation were and what issues were left unresolved.   
(PH 1967) The text does not acknowledge why Britain agreed to Jordan‘s independence 
or why Palestine was turned over to the U.N.  It also leave unsaid why U.S. reactions to 
the new state of Israel were ―mixed‖ (p. 815).  The 1948 war resulting from Israel‘s 
declaration of statehood is not addressed. 
(HM 1975)  This text does not answer why President Truman ―took the lead‖ in 
establishing the state of Israel, other than to imply he also felt sympathy for survivors of 
the Holocaust.  The text also leaves out why the Arab nations fought in a war against 
Israel and why they ―continually threatened to destroy it‖ (p. 697).  Also left unsaid are 
which Arab states were part of this continued Arab threat. 
(Holt 1977)  Left unsaid in this text are reasons why Britain gave up its mandate, why 
Israel declared statehood, why Arab nations reacted by going to war, and how America 
reacted to these changes.  Also not included are details of the peace negotiations, the fact 
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that Bunche‘s predecessor was assassinated, and what issues were left unresolved, even 
after an ―uneasy‖ peace was restored. 
(PH 1977)  Familiar questions are left unanswered in this text as well, including why 
Britain turned over its mandate to the UN, why Israel declared independence, and why 
Arab nations were ―inflamed‖ by the creation of Israel (p. 654).  The 1948 war that 
resulted from Israel‘s declaration, and ensuing peace negotiations are entirely absent. 
(HM 1986)  The following questions are left unanswered by this text: Why was the 
Middle East the ―chief danger spot for world peace‖ during Eishenhower‘s term?  Why 
did Jews need a homeland?  Why did Arab nations refuse to acknowledge Israel and want 
to destroy it? 
(Holt 1986)  U.S. feelings about the establishment of Israel are not acknowledged and 
neither are reasons for tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine.  While the text is 
specific about which Arab nations were ―angered‖ by Israel‘s establishment, the text 
reduces the fact that these nations went to war in 1948, with the simple statement that 
―trouble broke out‖ (p. 831).  The passage does nothing to explain what the causes were, 
and fails to give any detail about armistice negotiations and issues left unresolved.   
(PH 1986)  U.S. reaction, aside from officially recognizing Israel as a state, is not 
addressed in this text.  It is also interesting to note that the text statement, ―The British 
allowed Jews to settle…‖ implies that there were none living in Palestine after ancient 
times and prior to the mandate period.  It also does not mention that many Jews were 
denied entrance to Palestine when fleeing Hitler and even into the mandate period.  
Britain‘s voluntary ending of the mandate period as well as the armistice negotiations to 
end the 1948 are completely absent.  While the book does well to mention Arab refugees 
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after 1948, Jewish refugees from Arab countries are not mentioned.  The fact that the 
refugees became a main source of contention between Jews and Arabs is not mentioned 
either.  In spite of these shortcomings about the mandate period and 1948 War, this text 
provides the most complete picture thus far of the establishment of Israel and on of the 
main sources of contention between Arabs and Jews—the land itself. 
(HM 1996)  Familiar unanswered questions include: Why did Great Britain give up its 
mandate?  What was the impetus for Israel‘s statehood?  Why did Egypt supply the Arab 
world with weaponry and, financially, how could they?  While Arab reaction to the state 
of Israel is included in the text, Jewish and American reactions to the developments in the 
Middle East are not. 
(Holt 1995)  The most detailed account thus far, this text still conspicuously avoids a 
conclusive statement on whether Arab refugees fled or were driven out of Israel prior to 
1948.  It does not mention at all, Jewish refugees from Arab lands.  Nonetheless, this text 
does the most complete job so far, on endeavoring to present both sides of the conflict.  A 
special text box on the ―Arab response‖ to the 1948 War is included, with a lengthy quote 
from Musa Alami, a contemporary of the 1948 War, and an Arab lawyer and diplomat.  
Interestingly, the text introduction states that Alami was a promoter of ―Palestinian 
nationalism and unity‖, but the quote from Alami only addresses Arab unity and the land 
of Palestine itself (p. 798). 
(PH 1995)  This text leaves many unanswered questions, in large part, because it does 
not begin a history of the region until the 1947 UN Partition Plan.  Causes of the UN 
Partition Plan are totally left out, as is any mention of the mandate period.  Although the 
Zionist desire for a Jewish homeland is mentioned, the text implies that the only problem 
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in achieving this desire, was a lack of Jewish immigration to Palestine.  ―…it was not 
until World War II, when thousands of European Jews immigrated to the region, that the 
Jewish population was large enough to form a new state‖ (p. 731).  Arab, American, and 
Jewish reactions to the creation of Israel are also excluded, except for the statement that 
tensions ―erupted‖ with the announcement of Israel‘s statehood. 
(HM 2003)  This text leaves much to be desired.  Aside from including the date of 
Israel‘s independence, this text addresses nothing regarding Israel‘s perspective, Arab 
response, and American involvement in the events leading up to 1948, and after. 
(Holt 2003)  This text offers the most complete picture of the events leading up to and 
immediately following 1948.  The major question left unanswered is why Arab countries 
refused to recognize Israel even after the 1949 agreement.  The book does state that the 
―…fate of Palestinian Arabs remaining in Israel‖ was left unresolved, but implies that this 
issue was separate from Arab states refusing to recognize Israel (p. 837).   
(PH 2005)  “Historic tensions‖ in the region are not specifically addressed.  The text does 
not identify where calls for a Jewish state were coming from, only that they ―intensified‖ 
with Jewish immigration to Palestine after the Holocaust.  The UN mediation process is 
not discussed and neither are unresolved issues after the 1948 war.  The text simply 
states: ―Arab hostility to the idea of a Jewish state continued…‖ (p. 891). 
1956 Suez Canal Crisis: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(PH 1957)  For having a copyright date of 1957, this text is surprisingly detailed in its 
account of the 1956 Suez War.  The underlying problems generating discussion of the 
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conflict are the tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France and the U.S. to supply 
arms to Israel and Arab states, only with assurances that the arms would not be used for 
aggression toward other countries.  Growing tensions with Egypt also provide context for 
discussion of the 1956 war.   
(HM 1962)  ―Rising Egyptian nationalism‖ and the withdrawal of British troops from the 
Canal Zone, are seen in this text as the impetus in creating conditions favorable for 
unrest.  This text is also very detailed in its account of the Suez War.  Underlying 
problems include Nasser seeking financial backing from western and Soviet sources, 
along with his nationalization of the canal.  
(Holt 1966)  The major underlying problem which generates this text‘s discussion of the 
Suez War specifically is ownership, use, operation and protection of the Suez Canal.  The 
text provides a detailed history of the building of the canal and the international treaty 
guaranteeing its international status and protection by the British.  In general, the 
underlying problem is increasing discontent in the Middle East toward western powers, 
addressed specifically in the textbook in a post-Suez war paragraph about the United 
Arab Republic‘s formation, with Nasser as its president, and widespread support from 
communists in Arab nations.  The Eisenhower Doctrine is highlighted as the response to 
such unrest, and in order to ―[fill] the vacuum left by the decline of British and French 
power and influence‖ (p. 780). 
(PH 1967)  Putting the 1956 war in context is this text‘s preceding statement on METO 
(Middle East Treaty Organization) and Nasser‘s decision to stay out of the organization: 
―Nasser resented the inclusion of Iraq, a fellow Arab state which preferred American aid 
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to Arab unity.  He [Nasser] also wished freedom of action in playing off the U.S.S.R. and 
the West against one another to Egypt‘s national advantage‖ (p. 838).   
(HM 1975)  The underlying problem in this text is clearly the Soviet Union‘s  attempts to 
gain a foothold in the Middle East.  Soviet financing of the Aswan Dam is given as an 
example of these efforts. 
(Holt 1977)  With the exception of some grammatical changes and a picture of the 
Aswan dam rather than UN troops stationed along the Suez Canal cease-fire line, this text 
is identical to the the 1966 edition.  The major underlying problem which generates this 
text‘s discussion of the Suez War specifically is ownership, use, operation and protection 
of the Suez Canal.  The text provides a detailed history of the building of the canal and 
the international treaty guaranteeing its international status and protection by the British.  
In general, the underlying problem is increasing discontent in the Middle East toward 
western powers, addressed specifically the textbook in a post-Suez war paragraph about 
the United Arab Republic‘s formation, with Nasser as its president, and widespread 
support from communists in Arab nations.  The Eisenhower Doctrine is highlighted as the 
response to such unrest. 
(PH 1976)  The underlying problem in this text is the competing agendas between the 
Soviet Union and the United States regarding the Middle East.  Egypt‘s refusal to join 
METO (Middle East Treaty Organization) stemmed from its desire, according to the text, 
to have, ―…freedom of action in playing off the USSR and the West against each other‖ 
(p. 655).     
(HM 1986)  This text‘s account is very trimmed down in comparison to all of the other 
texts thus far, although it does have some significant changes.  The underlying problems 
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are, like always, the tensions of the Cold War, with the Middle East being labeled a 
―danger spot‖ in the conflict (p. 676).   
(Holt 1986)  This edition is very similar to the previous two Holt editions, with one 
primary difference.  For the first time, this text mentions that Nasser‘s nationalization of 
the Suez Canal concerned western Europe because it affected the free flow of oil from the 
Middle East.  This is the first text to mention concerns about oil, along with concerns 
about the balance of power in the region and between NATO and Soviet Union nations 
during the Cold War.  The account of the Suez War, like all other texts studied thus far, 
still appears within a section titled, ―The United States Continues to Meet the Challenges 
of Communism‖ (p. 835).   
(PH 1986)  Although this text has a section entitled, ―Search for Peace in the Middle 
East‖ within a chapter on ―Challenges to Peace; 1960 to Present‖ (also including Cold 
War rivalries, Southeast Asia, and America‘s neighbors), this text mentions nothing of 
the Suez War in its short history of ―Conflict Over Israel‖. 
(HM 1996)  The Suez Canal crisis appears in this text, under the heading, ―The Cold War 
Spreads Eastward‖ (p. 808).  (It is interesting to note that any historical context regarding 
Israel appears later in the book, when Camp David is discussed.  So a student reading 
chronologically would have no framework for understanding the historic tensions 
between Egypt and Israel at the time of the Suez Canal crisis.)   
(Holt 1995)  The major underlying problem in this textbook involved the question of who 
would have the greater influence in the Middle East—the U.S. or the Soviet Union.  A 
secondary problem related to this was Nasser seeking financing from the U.S., Britain, 
and the Soviet Union for the Aswan Dam.   
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(PH 1995)  Although this text has a chapter entitled, ―The Cold War and American 
Society 1945-1960‖ (and the timeline includes the 1956 uprising in Hungary) this text 
mentions nothing of the Suez War in its short history of ―The Middle East‖ (p. 731). 
(HM 2003)  This text‘s brief account of the Suez War appears in the chapter titled, ―Cold 
War Conflicts‖ and in the section, ―Two Nations on the Edge‖.  While the account is told 
within a Cold War context, the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States 
for influence in the Middle East is actually downplayed in this text‘s short history of the 
Suez War.  The main problem seems to be control of the Suez Canal itself, and from the 
text, it appears that Britain and France were really the countries that were most concerned 
and Egypt‘s nationalization of the canal. 
(Holt 2003)  This text‘s account of the Suez War appears in a chapter titled, ―The Cold 
War‖ and section subtitled, ―The Cold War Turns Hot‖ (p. 844).  The underlying problem 
seems to be fighting communism abroad, although that is not readily apparent until the 
last two sentences when the text mentions the enhanced influence of the Soviet Union in 
the Middle East after the Suez War, and the American response with the Eisenhower 
Doctrine.  Until then, a primary underlying problem is hard to find and this text‘s too 
concise account seems to string together events, mostly without a historical or diplomatic 
context. 
(PH 2005)  The underlying problem in this text is found in the following opening 
statement to explain events in the Middle East, after the founding of Israel: ―Meanwhile, 
the United States also worked to prevent oil-rich Arab nations from falling under the 
influence of the Soviet Union‖ (p. 891).  The free flow of oil, and the effects 
Communism would have on that, seems to be the predominant concern in this text. 
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2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(PH 1957)  The 1955 Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet Union, ―continuing anti-
Western gestures‖, Dulles‘ canceling of American support for the Aswan dam, and 
Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal are all reasons the text cites in leading up to 
the war (p. 754).   
(HM 1962)  Nasser‘s bargaining with the Soviets is seen as the reason why the United 
States pulled funding from the Aswan Dam project, just as Nasser was willing to accept 
U.S. conditions.  Israel‘s motivations for going to war, according to this text, include: 
Egypt‘s continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition, its closing of the canal to 
Israeli shipping, and Egypt‘s vow ―to drive Israel into the sea‖ (p. 780).  Great Britain 
and Frances‘ motivations were seen as protecting their interests in the Suez Canal.   
(Holt 1966)  This text implies that Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal was 
revenge for the U.S. withdrawing its offer to finance the Aswan Dam.  Israel‘s invasion 
of the Suez Canal is seen as igniting an already tense situation, and the reason for Israel‘s 
invasion, as stated in the text: ―The Israeli government announced that its troops had 
invaded Egyptian territory in order to forestall a carefully planned attack upon Israel by 
Egypt‖ (p. 780).  The text does not propose any possible connection at all between Israel, 
France and England, and in fact, ―western powers‖ are portrayed as trying very hard to 
persuade Nasser to agree to international use and control of the Canal Zone.  Egypt‘s 
refusal of international control, and to a cease fire with Israel, is seen in the text as the 
impetus for France and England‘s invasion of the Canal Zone, and for the U.S. 
diplomatic embarrassment of having to go against its NATO allies in the United Nations 
when voting for a cease-fire and withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops.   
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(PH 1967)  This text begins specific discussion of the Suez crisis by stating, in 1955: 
―Israeli forces invaded the Gaza strip, a contested area on their Egyptian border.  Nasser‘s 
difficulty in dislodging them underscored his military weakness…‖ (p. 839).  This 
military weakness is seen as the impetus for Egypt‘s arms build up and deal with Russia, 
and Israel‘s bid to the U.S. for a similar arms deal.  
(HM 1975)  Theories and descriptions in this text are very general.  The account simply 
begins with the statement: ―The crisis developed in 1956 when Egypt took over the Suez 
Canal…‖ (p. 697), which according to this text is the major impetus for the 1956 war.   
(Holt 1977)  This text implies that Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal was 
revenge for the U.S. withdrawing its offer to finance the Aswan Dam.  Israel‘s invasion 
of the Suez Canal is seen as igniting an already tense situation, and the reason for Israel‘s 
invasion, as stated in the text: ―The Israeli government announced that its troops had 
invaded Egyptian territory  to forestall a carefully planned attack upon Israel by Egypt‖ 
(p. 689).  The text does not propose any possible connection at all between Israel, France 
and England, and in fact, ―western powers‖ are portrayed as trying very hard to persuade 
Nasser to agree to international use and control of the Canal Zone.  Egypt‘s refusal of 
international control, and to a cease fire with Israel, is seen in the text as the impetus for 
France and England‘s invasion of the Canal Zone, and for the U.S. diplomatic 
embarrassment of having to go against its NATO allies in the United Nations when 
voting for a cease-fire and withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops.   
(PH 1976)  This text presents a theory about why the U.S. did not join METO: 
―Widespread sympathy for Israel, especially among Jews, who contributed heavily to the 
urban vote, constrained the administration from appearing to huddle too closely with 
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Arab powers, who had sworn to destroy the Jewish state‖ (p. 655).  Undoubtedly, the 
Cold War is the most prominent theory providing descriptions and explanations 
throughout.  The U.S. withdrawal of financial aid for the Aswan Dam, in this text, is due 
to Nasser‘s ―anti-Western gestures‖ (p. 655).  Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal is in 
retaliation to this U.S. decision.   
(HM 1986)  The predominant theory that underlies this text‘s explanation of the Suez 
War is Nasser‘s action to ―[take] over the Suez Canal and [close] the waterway to Israeli 
shipping‖ (p. 676).  The second part of this statement mentioning Israeli shipping is a 
significant change from previous editions and publishers, since most often this aspect of 
Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal was not mentioned.   
(Holt 1986)  Increasing Egyptian dissatisfaction with British military occupation around 
the Canal Zone after World War II is given as the reason why the British evacuated the 
area in 1956.  Nasser‘s goals to modernize Egypt and ―extend Egyptian influence 
throughout the Middle East‖ are given as reasons why Nasser wanted to build the Aswan 
Dam.  Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal is seen in this text as revenge for U.S., 
British, and Soviet refusals to finance the Aswan Dam.  Israel‘s attack on Egypt is seen as 
a preemptive strike to prevent a ―planned attack upon Israel by Egypt‖ (p. 839).  Britain 
and France‘s cause for invasion, according to this text, was over Egypt and Israel‘s 
refusing to agree to a cease-fire and to allow the French and the British to occupy ―key 
points in the Canal Zone‖ (p. 839).  U.S. intervention was done primarily to avoid the 
appearance that the Soviet Union, ―was the only champion of Egypt and other small 
nations against ‗Western imperialism‘‖ (p. 839). 
(PH 1986)  N/A 
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(HM 1996)  The predominant theory prompting all other actions in this textbook is found 
in the statement: ―In 1955 Great Britain and the United States, eager to keep Soviet 
influence out of Egypt, agreed to help finance construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile 
River‖ (p. 809).  All explanation that follows stems from this statement and resulting 
decisions on the part of Egypt, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. (and by extension France, 
Britain, and Israel). 
(Holt 1995) The most prominent theory underlying this texts‘ explanations was the U.S. 
financing of Aswan as a means to influence foreign policy (although what foreign policy 
exactly is not mentioned),  
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  The predominant theory in this text seems to be that the United States was 
not going to play Nasser‘s game of competing with the Soviet Union, and consequent 
choices on all sides stem from this diplomatic decision. 
(Holt 2003)  The predominant theory of this text‘s account can be found in the following 
opening statement to the Suez War: ―In some cases, Eisenhower used diplomacy rather 
than covert actions to influence foreign policy‖ (p. 849).  Exactly what Eisenhower was 
trying to influence or whom is, unfortunately, not very clear in this text. 
(PH 2005)  This text opens discussion on the Suez War by explaining that Nasser was 
seeking Soviet support.  What he was seeking support for is not mentioned, but this 
decision on the part of Nasser is the impetus for all other explanation of the Suez War.  
This text states that Britain and France attacked Egypt to ―regain control‖ of the canal (p. 
891).   
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
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(PH 1957)  America‘s strained relationship with Egypt is highlighted; along with 
―possib[le]‖ collusion between Britain, France, and Israel in coordinating an attack on 
Egypt are cited (p. 754).  Causes for the war include Egypt‘s continued drift toward 
Soviet influence along with the 1955 arms deal, Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal, and for Israel, ―…destroying the bases from which a number of provocative 
Egyptian raids had been made on Israeli territory‖ (p. 754).  One consequence of the war, 
according to this text, was British and French political and economic upheaval.  The 
primary result was: ―The Egyptians had learned how successfully they could play off the 
ambitions of Russia against the western powers.  And the western alliance had been 
profoundly shaken‖ (p. 754). 
(HM 1962)  Russia, the United States, and the United Nations are seen as acting 
separately to pressure Britain, France, and Israel into a cease-fire.  Egypt and Israel‘s 
refusal to pull back their forces from the canal area are given as the cause for Britain and 
France‘s involvement.  Nasser‘s ambitions to ―extend his power into other Arab 
countries‖ through formation of the UAR (United Arab Republic) is mentioned with post-
war consequences.  Expanding influence of the Soviet Union is also seen as a 
consequence of the unrest caused by the Suez War.   
(Holt 1966)  This text states that after World War II: ―…the Egyptians became 
increasingly dissatisfied with British military occupation of the Canal Zone‖ (p. 780).  
Nasser‘s ambitions to ―modernize the country, improve living standards, and extend 
Egyptian influence throughout the Middle East‖, according to this text, were the primary 
reasons Nasser wanted to build the Aswan Dam (p. 780).  The United States‘ difficult 
diplomatic situation in voting against NATO allies, and in favor of a cease-fire between 
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Britain, France, and Israel, is highlighted in the text because of U.S. fears that a failure to 
do so would confirm western imperialist fears in the Middle East and allow the Soviet 
Union, ―…to claim that it was the only champion of Egypt and other small nations‖ (p. 
780).  It is also assumed that there was no connection or coordination between Israel, 
France, and Britain in the Suez War.  The Eisenhower Doctrine is listed in the text as an 
―immediate result of the Suez crisis‖ (p. 780). 
(PH 1967)  America‘s diplomatic position, in relation to the arms build up between 
Egypt and Israel prior to 1956, is seen as a delicate one, hoping to ―maintain Egyptian 
friendship‖, even amid Israeli requests for arms, which the U.S. ―rebuffed‖ (p. 839).  The 
breaking point for this hope of friendship, and cancellation of the United State‘s offer to 
finance the Aswan Dam, according to this text, was Egypt‘s ―continuing anti-western 
gestures‖ (p. 840).  Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal is seen as ―retaliation‖ to 
these events.  It is interesting to note that this text states: ―…Israel launched an invasion 
of Egypt with the announced objective of destroying the bases from which Egyptian raids 
had been made on Israeli territory.  This action was followed by a sudden Anglo-French 
invasion of the Suez area‖ (p. 840).  U.S. response was one of ―consternation‖ that they 
had to join with the Soviet Union in condemning their allies‘ use of force (p. 840).  While 
the U.N. voted for a cease-fire, this text makes it clear that only the threat of ―unilateral 
Soviet intervention‖ forced them to accept the U.N. vote (p. 840).  The text states that it 
took ―American and Soviet warnings‖ to get Israel to withdraw.  The major consequences 
of the Suez Crisis, according to this text: ―Nothing was solved in the Middle East by 
these steps and the Western alliance itself was badly shaken‖ (p. 840)  The Eisenhower 
Doctrine is seen in this text as the direct response to the Suez Crisis and a ―unilateral 
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warning to the U.S.S.R. that the United States would defend the whole Middle East 
against Soviet attack‖ (p. 840). 
(HM 1975)  This text states that the war was between Egypt and Israel, but that France 
and Britain sided with Israel, implying that there was no premeditated planning between 
Britain, France and Israel.  The text also points out that the U.S. and Soviet Union were 
―for once‖ on the same side of an international dispute (p. 697).  The major consequence, 
according to this text, was continued U.S. suspicion of the Soviet Union, and the resulting 
Eisenhower Doctrine to stem the tide of Soviet influence in the Middle East. 
(Holt 1977)  This text states that after World War II: ―…the Egyptians became 
increasingly dissatisfied with British military occupation of the Canal Zone‖ (p. 689).  
Nasser‘s ambitions to ―modernize the country and extend Egyptian influence throughout 
the Middle East‖, according to this text, were the primary reasons Nasser wanted to build 
the Aswan Dam (p. 689).  The United States‘ difficult diplomatic situation in voting 
against NATO allies, and in favor of a cease-fire between Britain, France, and Israel, is 
highlighted in the text because of U.S. fears that a failure to do so would confirm western 
imperialist fears in the Middle East and allow the Soviet Union, ―…to claim that it was 
the only champion of Egypt and other small nations‖ (p. 690).  It is also assumed that 
there was no connection or coordination between Israel, France, and Britain in the Suez 
War.  The Eisenhower Doctrine is listed in the text as an ―immediate result of the Suez 
crisis‖ (p. 690). 
(PH 1976)  Relationships in this text include the competition for influence in the Middle 
East between the U.S. and Russia, Nasser‘s 1955 arms deal with Russia and the 
―remarkable‖ collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in condemning the Anglo-
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French invasion of Egypt (p. 655).  The ultimate cause of the war, according to this text 
was ―the rising tension in the Middle East‖, and the consequence was Israel‘s invasion of 
Egypt.  The Eisenhower Doctrine is also seen as the U.S. response to the Suez War. 
(HM 1986)  This text is also one of the first to intimate diplomatic collusion between 
Israel, Britain and France.  The book states that Nasser‘s closing of the canal to Israeli 
shipping led, ―…in 1957, to a war in which Britain and France sided with Israel and 
attacked Egypt‖ (p. 676).  It is stated that the United States and Soviet Union called for 
an end to the fighting, but this text places responsibility for the cease-fire on UN 
shoulders: ―In time, the UN was able to establish a cease-fire and Israel, Britain, and 
France reluctantly withdrew their forces from Egypt‖ (p. 677).  A major consequence, 
according to this text, was that the U.S. ―…was still suspicious of what the Soviet Union 
might be planning in the Middle East‖ (p. 677).  The Eisenhower Doctrine policies are 
mentioned as a final U.S. response, although the title ―Eisenhower Doctrine‖ is not 
mentioned in the text, oddly enough. 
(Holt 1986)  Diplomatic relationships existing in this text, very similar to others, include: 
Egypt‘s dissatisfaction with British military occupation, Nasser‘s ―furious‖ reaction to 
Soviet, British, and American refusals to finance the Aswan Dam, the Soviet Union‘s 
effective pressuring of Israel, France, and Britain to agree to a cease-fire, and the 
embarrassing American situation of siding with the Soviet Union against its NATO allies 
in condemning the attack on Egypt.  The major consequence of the Suez War for 
American diplomacy was the Eisenhower Doctrine, which the book explains in detail.   
(PH 1986)  N/A 
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(HM 1996)  Nasser, in this textbook, is painted as a leader with no ties to either East or 
West—simply as a leader wanting to get the best deal on financing for the Aswan Dam.  
―Furious‖ about the withdrawal of financing from the West, Nasser‘s nationalization of 
the canal is seen as revenge for this decision.  Like one text of the 1980s, this text 
mentions oil as a key reason for British and French involvement: ―Now it was the turn of 
the British and French to be furious, especially since two-thirds of the oil they needed for 
heat and industrial production came through the canal‖ (p. 809).  A rarity in other texts, 
this book also tries to present Israel‘s reason for involvement: ―In the meantime, the 
Egyptians had been making raids into Israel.  Also, since 1950, contrary to international 
law, Egypt had not allowed Israeli ships to use the canal‖ (p. 809).  The previous two 
statements are tied together by the text in order explain why Israel, France, and Britain 
cooperated in their attack on Egypt.  This assumption of collusion between the three 
nations is a newly emerging pattern in the textbooks, only really beginning in the 1980s.  
In fact, this text for the first time does not even mention France or Britain‘s call for a 
cease-fire between Israel and Egypt.  While previous texts typically used the word 
―embarrassed‖ to describe U.S. reaction to its NATO allies‘ invasion of Egypt, this text 
uses the word ―shocked‖, implying total surprise on the part of the U.S. at unfolding 
events over the canal.  This text totally downplays the cooperation between the U.S. and 
Soviet Union in calling for a cease-fire: ―The United States accordingly asked the United 
Nations to order both a cease-fire in Egypt, and the withdrawal of British, French, and 
Israeli troops.  However, when the Soviet Union threatened to use missiles against 
Britain, and France, the United States warned that it would not tolerate such action‖ (p. 
809).  This text places responsibility for ending the fighting with the U.N and states: 
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―Eventually the Suez Canal crisis simmered down‖ (p. 809).  This textbook, like many 
others, lists the Eisenhower Doctrine as a consequence of the Suez crisis and increased 
―prestige‖ of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (p. 809). 
(Holt 1995)  In this text, Eisenhower‘s offer to finance Egypt‘s Aswan Dam is seen as a 
diplomatic rather than ―covert‖ effort to ―influence foreign policy‖ (p. 811).  Like in 
other texts, Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal is seen as revenge for the withdrawal of 
U.S. financing.  The major consequence of Nasser‘s nationalization, following with more 
recent editions of textbooks: ―Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal posed many problems, 
including a threat to the Western oil trade‖ (p. 811).  U.S. response to the invasions of 
Egypt is seen as a ―difficult task‖.  It is interesting to note that the text makes it seem that 
that the U.S. sided with the U.N. more than the Soviet Union, even quoting Eisenhower‘s 
reasoning to support a U.N resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.  Soviet threats 
to become involved with military force are not even mentioned.  Consequences of the 
conflict included increased Soviet influence in the Middle East and the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in response.  
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  Obvious relationships in this text are the antagonism Nasser tried to build 
upon between the U.S. and Soviet Union, Nasser‘s anger when the U.S. withdrew its 
financing offer, and French and British ―[outrage]‖ at Nasser‘s nationalization of the 
canal (p. 831).  The predominant cause for French and British involvement was their 
ownership of the ―Egyptian waterway‖, and Israel‘s involvement stemmed from Egyptian 
blockage of ships bound for Israel.  The text does state that the canal ―…was supposed to 
be open to all nations‖ (p. 831).  Major consequences of the Suez War, according to the 
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text, were the increased prestige of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and the 
Eisenhower Doctrine in response. 
(Holt 2003)  The only relationships readily apparent in this text are Eisenhower‘s 
―support‖ of a UN cease-fire resolution, and after the Suez War, ―…a friendlier 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Arab nations‖ (p. 849).  The cause of the war 
seems to be Israel‘s initial attack into Egyptian territory.  The UN resolution rather than 
Soviet threats are the cause of the cease-fire in this text and the two major consequences 
were increased prestige for the Soviet Union in the Middle East and the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in response. 
(PH 2005)  An obvious relationship in this text is the antagonism between the U.S. and 
Soviet Union because the U.S. ―cut off their aid to Egypt‖ after learning Nasser was also 
seeking Soviet support (p. 891).  The awkward diplomatic triangle resulting from the 
Suez War is found in this statement: ―Reacting to Soviet threats of ‗dangerous 
consequences,‘ a furious Eisenhower persuaded his NATO allies to withdraw from 
Egypt, which retained control of the canal‖ (p. 891).  It is interesting to note that the UN 
is not even mentioned in this text and responsibility for a cease-fire is given to 
Eisenhower.  Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal is seen as the cause of Britain and 
France‘s attack (Israel is not even mentioned!), and the consequence of the whole crisis, 
according to the text, is the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
(PH 1957)  This text‘s account is included in a section entitled, ―Middle East Crisis‖, and 
is based on the premise that Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal, ―…represented a 
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powerful implicit danger to the economies of the western European countries, and flatly 
challenged American prestige throughout the world‖ (p. 754).  The second part of this 
statement is interesting, since many historians view the Suez War as solidifying U.S. 
influence in the Middle East, as opposed to British and French influence prior to the war.  
Israel‘s motivation for going to war is based on the closed canal and in order to destroy 
bases being used for raids into Israel.  The text states that although the fighting ended 
with the arrival of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Middle East remained a 
trouble spot. 
(HM 1962)  The assumption that Israel ―suddenly‖ attacked Egypt in 1956 implies that it 
was not particularly planned, and may have been without cause (p. 781).  It is also 
interesting to note that the text states Great Britain and France were ―restrained by the 
United States‖ from using force to protect their interests in the canal.  The assumption 
that Great Britain and France were later acting independently of Israel, when they sent 
bombers and a landing force to the canal is made in this text.  Russia‘s threats of 
intervention, rather than the UN emergency force, are seen as the major factor in ceasing 
hostilities.  The text states that although Nasser‘s army had been defeated, ―…his position 
in the Arab world had been strengthened‖ (p. 781). 
(Holt 1966)  The major premise of this account is the increasing dissatisfaction with and 
distrust of western powers in the Middle East, along with American fears that the Soviet 
Union would gain a stronger foothold there by financially supporting projects like the 
Aswan dam and politically, by supporting small countries against western influences.  It 
is assumed in this text that the U.S. withdrew its offer to pay for the Aswan dam because, 
―…it became clear that the U.S.S.R. could not at the time afford to finance the project…‖ 
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(p. 780).  No mention of Nasser‘s increasing anti-western sentiments is made in this text.  
Israel‘s motivation is seen in light of efforts to prevent a planned attack from Egypt.   
(PH 1967)  The premise of this text‘s account is the United States‘ jockeying for 
diplomatic leverage in the Middle East, particularly with Egypt and its leader, Nasser. 
Later, the text states that Israel acted alone in their invasion of Egypt and also implies 
with the words ―announced objectives‖ of the invasion, that there may have been other 
motives for Israel‘s attack, other than the officially announced objectives, although no 
collusion between Israel, Egypt, and France is implied (p. 840).  After discussion of the 
Suez war, the text states: ―…the Soviets continued to arm Arab nations…‖ (p. 840).  
(HM 1975)  The major premise of the war‘s account in this text is that, ―Egypt had been 
unfairly attacked, and the United States took a stand against the three invaders‖ (p. 697).  
It is assumed that Britain, France and Israel ―reluctantly‖ withdrew their forces after 
pressure from the UN (p. 697).  No motivation for Israel‘s role in the invasion is given. 
(Holt 1977)  The major premise of this account is the increasing dissatisfaction with and 
distrust of western powers in the Middle East, along with American fears that the Soviet 
Union would gain a stronger foothold there by financially supporting projects like the 
Aswan dam and politically, by supporting small countries against western influences.  It 
is assumed in this text that the U.S. withdrew its offer to pay for the Aswan dam because, 
―…it became clear that the U.S.S.R. could not at the time afford to finance the project…‖ 
(p. 689).  No mention of Nasser‘s increasing anti-western sentiments is made in this text.  
Israel‘s motivation for involvement is given as forestalling a carefully planned attack on 
Israel, by Egypt. 
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(PH 1976)  The premise of this text‘s account is based on a Cold War context.  A major 
assumption is that Israel invaded Egypt unilaterally, and based its invasion only on 
―rising tensions‖, as indicated by the statement: ―American threats combined with those 
of the USSR brought the Israeli invasion to a halt a week later‖ (p. 655).  The book also 
states that UN calls for a cease-fire went unheeded, and it was not until the Soviet Union 
stepped in with threats of unilateral action that a cease-fire was achieved.  The book 
states that the UN peacekeeping force ―solved nothing in the Middle East‖ (p. 655).  The 
text also mentions that NATO alliances were strained by the events of the Suez War. 
(HM 1986)  As seen in other texts, this account is based on a Cold War premise.  It is 
assumed in this text that Israel, France, and Britain worked together in their attack on 
Egypt.  Israel‘s only motivation for invasion is based on the closed canal in this text. 
(Holt 1986)  The Cold War serves as this text‘s premise, with a secondary one possibly 
in Nasser‘s goals for the Middle East.  Assumptions within the war‘s description include 
the Israeli governments reasoning that Egypt was orchestrating a planned attack on Israeli 
territory, as well as the assumption that Israel, France, and Britain were operating 
independently of one another. 
(PH 1986)  N/A  
(HM 1996)  This book is based on a Cold War premise, and Egypt is seen as a bargaining 
chip for influence in the Middle East between the United States (and Britain) and the 
Soviet Union.  It is assumed that Israel, France, and Britain were cooperating in their 
attack on Egypt.  Israel‘s motivation for invasion in this text are both the closed canal and 
terrorist raids into Israeli territory. 
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(Holt 1995)  Once again, the Suez War is seen in the light of the Cold War.  One of the 
first assumptions in this text is that the U.S. cancelled its financing of the Aswan Dam 
simply because Nasser also turned to the Soviet Union for an offer.  It is implied, but not 
explicitly stated that France and Britain may have been working in cooperation with 
Israel: ―Great Britain and France, claiming they were protecting the canal, seized the 
Mediterranean end of the waterway a few days later [after Israel‘s attack]‖ (p. 812).  
Israel‘s motivation for attack in this text is the closed canal. 
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  The premise of this text‘s account seems to be a search for peace in the 
Middle East.  The paragraph on the Suez War follows directly after a summary of the 
Geneva Summit, in which the U.S. and Soviet Union attempted to work out an ―open 
skies‖ policy between them.  Although the Soviet Union rejected the idea, the book 
states: ―…the world hailed the ‗spirit of Geneva‘ as a step toward peace.  In 1955, the 
same year in which the Geneva Summit took place, Great Britain and the United States 
agreed to help Egypt finance construction of a dam at Aswan on the Nile River‖ (p. 830-
831).  It seems the text is trying to make the connection for the student that American 
financing was an effort to achieve peace in the Middle East, rather than a diplomatic 
attempt for influence in the Middle East.  It is also assumed in this text that Nasser‘s 
playing the U.S. and Soviet Union against one another was simply an attempt to get more 
aid.  It is difficult to conclude from this text, whether Great Britain, France, and Israel 
were working independently or together.  In response to Nasser‘s nationalization, the text 
simply states: ―Israel responded by sending troops.  So did Great Britain and France.  The 
three countries seized the Mediterranean end of the canal‖ (p. 831).  The text states that 
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the UN responded ―quickly‖ and implies that the Suez War was solved without any real 
threat of war. 
(Holt 2003)  The premise for this text is within a Cold War context, but the paragraphs 
on the Suez War alone make little connection to the larger theater of the Cold War.  The 
Suez War paragraphs do appear right next to a graph on ―The Nuclear Threat, 1955-
1960‖ that depicts U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities (p. 849).  On the topic of Israel, 
France, and Britain, the implicit assumption seems to be that Israel attacked first and 
independently, then ―a few days later‖, Britain and France attacked the Mediterranean 
end of the Suez Canal.  This text however, does not mention Britain and France‘s 
attempts at a ―cease-fire‖, which could imply that the three nations were working 
together, but unless a student knew that background information, the impression would 
be that Israel attacked separately from the other two nations.  Israel‘s motivation for 
attacking in this text is the closed canal. 
(PH 2005)  The premise of this account involves U.S. efforts to keep Soviet influence out 
of the Middle East.  There is very little text to pull out assumptions from, however, the 
text does imply that Britain and France coordinated their attack on Egypt. 
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
(PH 1957)  Nasser‘s motivations in turning to Russia for arms in 1955, and in 
nationalizing the canal are not addressed.  French and British motivations for joining with 
Israel, aside from the canal, are not mentioned.  U.S. response is seen only in the context 
of the United Nations, and does not indicate that the U.S. was surprised or even put into a 
difficult diplomatic position by the Anglo-French, Israeli alliance.  Israel‘s motivation for 
going to war, other than Egyptian raids on Israeli territory are not mentioned, and neither 
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is the 1955 Israeli raid into Gaza.  The Baghdad Pact and the Lavon Affair (Egypt‘s 
execution of Israeli spies, plotting to blow up British and American areas in Cairo, in the 
hopes that Egypt would be blamed) are not mentioned either.  Nasser‘s ―anti-western‖ 
gestures (including his diplomatic recognition of communist China, and his decision to 
remain ―non-aligned‖) are not explicitly mentioned. 
(HM 1962)  Questions left unanswered include why Nasser wanted to build the Aswan 
dam and why the U.S. was originally willing to help, why Nasser made an arms deal with 
the Soviets and why Nasser nationalized the canal.  More specific motivations, other than 
the canal, for Great Britain, France, and Israel going to war with Egypt are also left out.  
U.S. response to the Anglo-French alliance, other than diplomatic pressure, is not 
included.  Territorial gains and losses by Egypt and Israel are not mentioned.  
(Holt 1966)  Questions left unanswered include why the British decided to withdraw 
their troops from the canal zone in 1954, why the U.S. withdrew its offer to pay for the 
Aswan dam (aside from the text‘s assumption that the Soviet Union could not afford to 
pay for it).  Important details left out include the arms build up in Egypt and Israel prior 
to 1956, the fact that Nasser closed the canal only to Israeli ships,  
Nasser‘s relationship with other diplomats, particularly how western diplomats viewed 
him, is not mentioned. 
(PH 1967)  When the text states that the Gaza Strip was a ―contested‖ area of Israel‘s 
border, it does not explain why, or that Egypt had occupied it since the 1948 war.  It does 
later explain that Egypt had been launching raids into Israel, but does not specifically 
state weather they were from Gaza or from somewhere else within Egypt.  Specific ―anti-
western gestures‖ on Egypt‘s part are not listed.  What Nasser‘s nationalization of the 
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canal meant for other nations, specifically Israel‘s lack of continued access to the canal, is 
not addressed.  Reasons for the ―sudden‖ Anglo-French invasion of the Suez area are not 
given, although it is implied that the attack was in response to Israel‘s invasion of Egypt.  
Ulterior motives regarding use and control of the canal itself are not mentioned. 
(HM 1975)  This text is the most incomplete of those examined thus far.  No context or 
specific information is given for growing ―anti-Western feeling‖ in the Middle East.  The 
complicated diplomacy regarding international financing of the Aswan Dam is not 
mentioned at all.  Reasons for Egypt‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal and Israel‘s 
attack are not given, neither are France‘s or Britain‘s motivations for getting involved.   
(Holt 1977)  Questions left unanswered include why the British decided to withdraw 
their troops from the canal zone in 1954, why the U.S. withdrew its offer to pay for the 
Aswan dam (aside from the text‘s assumption that the Soviet Union could not afford to 
pay for it).  Important details left out include the arms build-up in Egypt and Israel prior 
to 1956, the fact that Nasser closed the canal only to Israeli ships,  
Nasser‘s relationship with other diplomats, particularly how western diplomats viewed 
him, is not mentioned. 
(PH 1976)  It is interesting that this text does not mention, like the last edition, the 
―contested area‖ of the Gaza Strip.  Bases, ―…from which raids had been made on 
[Israeli] territory‖ are mentioned, but a specific location is not (p. 655).  What Nasser‘s 
nationalization of the canal meant for other nations, specifically Israel‘s lack of continued 
access to the canal, is not addressed.  Reasons for the ―sudden‖ Anglo-French invasion of 
the Suez area are not given, although it is implied that the attack was in response to 
Israel‘s invasion of Egypt.  Ulterior motives regarding use and control of the canal itself 
  
 
190 
are not mentioned.  Cooperation between Israel, Britain and France is not considered in 
this text. 
(HM 1986)  While concise, this text leaves out a lot of background information necessary 
to put the Suez War into any kind of historical or Cold War context.  The Aswan Dam is 
not even mentioned and neither are Nasser‘s goals for Egypt and the entire Middle East.  
The arms build-up prior to the war is not mentioned.  Egypt‘s decision to take over the 
canal is not put into any kind of context and seems to come out of the blue.  Britain and 
Frances‘ motivations for joining with Israel are not clear in the text, and for that matter, 
neither is Israel‘s decision to attack Egypt made clear.  (Although, a student could assume 
that Israel‘s involvement stemmed from their lack of access to the canal zone, even 
though no other reasons are mentioned in the text.)   
(Holt 1986)  Diplomatic negotiations and nuances of the Aswan Dam financing are 
completely overlooked, aside from a footnote stating: ―In 1959 the Soviet Union agreed 
to provide money and engineers to build the [Aswan] Dam.  Construction began in 1960 
and was completed in 1969‖ (p. 839).  Causes and consequences of this decision are 
overlooked.  Nasser‘s anti-western sentiments are not mentioned at all in this book, 
Israel‘s involvement seems to be a side note to the real story between the U.S. and its 
NATO allies and Soviet threats to become involved with its own military force.  
Implications of Nasser‘s nationalization of the dam for other nations, other than the free 
flow of oil to western Europe, which is a significant addition from all previous editions 
and publishers.   
(PH 1986)  N/A 
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(HM 1996)  One unanswered question includes why Britain withdrew its troops from the 
Suez Canal Zone.  Reasons for why Nasser delayed signing an agreement for the U.S. 
and Great Britain to finance the Aswan Dam are not given, other than implying Nasser 
hoped to get better terms from the Soviet Union.  Reasons why the United States and 
Britain withdrew the financing offer for Aswan are not given, other than implying the 
wait (seven months) had been too long.  Egypt‘s and Israel‘s arms build-up prior to the 
Suez War are not discussed, and any plans on the part of Egypt to attack Israel are not 
mentioned.  Egyptian attacks on Israeli territory prior to 1956 are mentioned, but where 
those attacks were being made from and where they were taking place is not mentioned.  
Whatever happens with the canal (i.e. who ended up financing and building it) is not in 
the text. 
(Holt 1995)  While the U.S. offer to finance the Aswan dam is mentioned, and the reason 
given, according to the textbook, was meant to ―influence foreign policy‖, the desired 
influence this financing was meant to have is not explicitly mentioned.  Why Nasser also 
turned to the Soviet Union for financing is not addressed.  (Arms deals on the part of 
Egypt and Israel prior to the Suez War are not mentioned.)  International reaction to 
Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal is not addressed—only Israel‘s reaction to launch an 
attack.  The only motivation for Israel to launch an attack, as seen in this textbook, is 
Egypt‘s blockage of ―ships bound for Israel‖ (not Israeli ships as some other textbooks 
state) (p. 811).  Attacks by Egypt into Israeli territory and counter-raids by Israel are not 
mentioned.  Soviet threats to become involved with military force are not even 
mentioned, and unlike other texts which treated the Suez Crisis as the brink of another 
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world war, this text makes the outcome seem ordered by the U.N. and almost pre-
determined.   
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  Unanswered questions include why the U.S. and Great Britain agreed to 
finance construction of the Aswan Dam, specifically how Nasser ―[played] the 
Americans and the Soviets against each other‖, and what sort of ―deals‖ Nasser was 
making with the Soviets (p. 830).  U.S. reaction to Britain, France, and Israel‘s invasion 
of Egypt is totally left out, as is all steps toward negotiating a cease-fire.  The text simply 
states: ―The UN quickly stepped in to stop the fighting.  It persuaded Great Britain, 
France, and Israel to withdraw‖ (p. 830).  Israel‘s only motivation for involvement, 
according to this text, is Egypt‘s refusal to allow ships bound for Israel to pass through 
the canal.  Egypt‘s reasoning for blocking these ships is not given.  It is interesting to 
note that historical context for the founding of Israel is in a special text box right next to 
the Suez War paragraphs, but the text box gives no indication that Israel‘s founding 
created any problems in the Middle East, in fact implying that the whole world was in 
favor of it.  Neither do the Suez War paragraphs contain any context for understanding 
tensions between Israel, Egypt, and the rest of the Middle East. 
(Holt 2003)  Although very similar to the last edition, this text does not include details on 
the U.S.‘ original offer to finance Aswan, or reasons for its decision to withdraw 
financing.  Reasons why Nasser decided to nationalize the canal are not even clear 
because of this text‘s efforts at brevity.  The ―many problems‖ resulting from Nasser‘s 
nationalization are not listed, except for the threat to Western oil trade (p. 849).  Reasons 
for British and French involvement are not given—simply that they were involved is 
  
 
193 
included.  The only reason given for Israel‘s involvement is Egypt‘s blockage of the 
canal to ships bound for Israel.  It is interesting to note that the text does not state this was 
contrary to international law.  U.S. response to the attacks on Egypt or threats by the 
Soviet Union to become involved, are not included, other than Eisenhower‘s support for a 
UN cease-fire.  
(PH 2005)  The most glaring oversight in this text is the fact that Israel is nowhere 
mentioned in the Suez War!  Diplomatic nuances involved in the financing of the Aswan 
Dam are not included, what Nasser was seeking aid for from the Soviet Union is not 
mentioned, UN involvement is not included, and in general, most historical context 
necessary for understanding the decisions that are mentioned were left out of this text. 
1967 Six Day War: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(HM 1975)  The three sentences on the Six Day War appear in this text between a 
discussion on Kennedy‘s attempts at nuclear disarmament, and Johnson‘s involvement in 
the Vietnam War.  There is no apparent underlying problem, only the statement that 
fighting ―broke out‖, leaving Arab nations even more bitter than ever (p. 707). 
(Holt 1977)   This text‘s account of the war is in a chapter entitled, ―Re-examining the 
Nation‘s Role in World Affairs 1960-1970‘s‖ (p. 693).  The changing balance of power 
among Communist and Western leadership, and continued competition for influence, 
only this time in developing third-world countries, seems to be the predominant concerns 
in opening the chapter.  The ―Arab-Israeli conflict‖ subheading is between Kennedy‘s 
problems in Africa and his concerns over Cuba.  The Middle East is seen as a continuing 
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trouble spot in international tensions, and the underlying problem in this account is the 
Israeli belief that Arab nations were preparing to destroy their state. 
(PH 1976)  The underlying problem in this text can be found in the text statement, ―The 
Egyptian leader [Nasser] immediately called for a ‗Holy War‘ of Arabs against the 
Jewish state, Israel…for it was Soviet aid in arms and training that had encouraged 
Nasser‘s militancy‖ (p.694). 
(HM 1986)  There is really no apparent underlying problem in this text‘s account.  The 
account is found under the heading, ―International problems demand President Johnson‘s 
attention‖, but is not connected to the paragraphs before or after the three-sentence 
summary. 
(Holt 1986)  Much like the 1977 edition, the underlying problem in this account is the 
Israeli belief that Arab nations were preparing to destroy their state.   
(PH 1986)  The underlying problems in this text seem to be American and Soviet arms 
supplies to Israel and the Arab nations, respectively, along with Egyptian troop build up 
on the Sinai Peninsula (p. 706). 
(HM 1996)  The Six Day War is never explicitly mentioned in this text.  In an 
introduction to the Camp David negotiations, the text does state: ―As you know, between 
1948 and 1973, four wars were fought between Arab nations and Israel‖ (p. 914).   
(Holt 1995)  The underlying problem in this text‘s account are post-1967 continued Arab 
and Israeli strikes and counterstrikes, and Soviet and U.S. arms supplied to Arab states 
and Israel following the Six Day War. 
(PH 1995)  Aside from being included on an international timeline at the start of chapter 
twenty-nine (―Civil Rights Movement‖ p. 795), the only other mention of 1967 is in an 
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introduction to the Camp David Accords: ―In that unstable region, conflicts between 
Israel and the Arab nations had existed, for nearly thirty years, most recently in 1967 and 
1973‖ (p. 917).  
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
(PH 2005)  N/A 
2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(HM 1975)  There are no theories put forth in this text; the wording simply states: ―There 
was further action too, in the Middle East, though this did not involve Americans.  
Fighting broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors in June of 1967.  It lasted for 
only a few days, but it left the Arab nations more bitter and the situation in the Middle 
East more tense than before‖ (p. 707). 
(Holt 1977)  According to this text, from an Arab perspective, the Suez crisis had 
continued to breed bitterness, while Israelis in 1967, believed ―Arab nations‖ were 
building up arms in an effort to destroy Israel (p. 694).  ―Occasional raids‖ by Israel and 
the ―Arab nations‖ are also seen as a cause of the conflict. 
(PH 1976)  Soviet encouragement of Nasser‘s militancy is certainly the predominant 
theory that provides the explanations of the Six Day War.  It is also interesting to note 
that Palestinian refugees are addressed in this account.  Israel is seen as ―evad[ing]‖ the 
issue, and Arab states ―cynically exploited‖ them in their ―overall determination to 
destroy Israel altogether‖ (p. 694). 
(HM 1986)  No underlying theory is found in this text.  Fighting simply ―broke out‖ 
between Israel and ―Arab neighbors‖ (p. 691). 
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(Holt 1986)  The Israeli belief that Arab states were preparing to destroy Israel is the 
predominant theory leading to the 1967 conflict.  A further source of bitterness stemmed 
from Israel keeping ―large areas of land that had belonged to [Egypt, Jordan, and Syria]‖, 
after the conclusion of the conflict (p. 928).  Unlike the last edition, raids by both sides 
prior to the conflict are not mentioned. 
(PH 1986)  The theory for Israel‘s surprise attack given in this text, is that Israel feared 
an attack from Egypt, based upon their troop movements in the Sinai Peninsula.  
Although the dates or actual duration of the conflict (six days) is not given, an interesting 
side note is this text‘s explanation for why this conflict is called the Six Day War: 
―Because the Israelis advanced so quickly…‖ (p. 706). 
(HM 1996)  N/A 
(Holt 1995)  Egypt, Jordan, and Syria‘s crushing defeat in the Six Day War and the 
bitterness that resulted, is seen as the motivation for continued Arab raids into Israeli 
territory, and in return, counterstrikes by Israel. 
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
(PH 2005)  N/A 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(HM 1975)  The only obvious relationship is hostility between Israel and ―Arab 
neighbors‖ that was worsened by the 1967 conflict.  There is no apparent cause in this 
text and the only consequence, according to the text, is increased Arab hostility and 
continued tension in the Middle East. 
  
 
197 
(Holt 1977)  Relationships in this text include the continued Arab hostility toward Israel, 
and after 1967, ―more [determination] than ever to destroy Israel‖, Soviet aid and military 
supplies to Arab nations, U.S. aid for Arab nations aimed at poverty and U.S. military aid 
aimed at nations resisting Communism (p. 694-95).  Causes of the war in this text are 
―occasional raids‖ by both sides, and Arab nations‘ massing of military forces.  
Consequences include Israel keeping ―large areas of land that had belonged to [Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria]‖, Arab bitterness at their swift defeat, Arab nations sending ―trained 
guerrilla fighters into Israel‖ even after the war, Soviet military aid to Arab nations and 
not to Israel, and constant raids along Israel‘s border areas after the war (p. 694-95).    
(PH 1976)  Relationships in this text include the UN function of ―keeping Egypt and 
Israel apart for 10 years‖, Nasser‘s militancy toward Israel, an ―Israeli-Arab conflict 
[which] defied solution‖, and Arab and Israeli avoidance of Palestinian refugees (p. 694).  
Nasser‘s militancy is seen as the cause of Israel‘s preemptive strike, and the consequence 
was Egypt‘s, and by extension Soviet, ―humiliation‖ and an even bigger arms build up on 
both sides.  Oil as an economic and political weapon caused the U.S. to ―reassess its 
Middle East policies‖.  Ultimately, enhanced Soviet prestige in the Middle East is seen as 
the consequence of American preoccupation with the Vietnam War (p. 694). 
(HM 1986)  The major consequence included in this three-sentence summary is that the 
1967 conflict left the Middle East ―more tense than before‖ (p. 691). 
(Holt 1986)  Relationships in this text include Israel‘s wariness of Arab intentions, Arab 
bitterness at their defeat and loss of land, U.S. aid for Arab nations aimed at poverty and 
U.S. military aid to Israel and also to nations resisting Communism (p.928).  The major 
cause of the war in this text is Israel‘s belief that Arab nations wanted to destroy their 
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state.  Consequences include Israel keeping ―large areas of land that had belonged to 
[Egypt, Jordan, and Syria]‖, Arab bitterness at their swift defeat, Arab nations sending 
―trained guerrillas‖ into Israel after the war, Soviet military aid to Arab nations and not to 
Israel, and retaliatory raids by Israel (p. 928).    
(PH 1986)  The only obvious relationship, although still not accompanied by any kind of 
descriptive adjectives or commentary to indicate what kind of relationship existed, the 
fact that Jordan and Syria joined Egypt in the fighting is mentioned.  The cause of the war 
as stated in the text are the arms supplies coming to Israel and Arab states from the U.S. 
and Soviet Union, along with Egyptian troop build up in the Sinai.  Text summary on the 
outcome of the war states: ―It [Israel] drove the Egyptian forces from the Sinai Peninsula.  
It also captured territory from Jordan and Syria‖ (p. 706).  No other commentary is 
provided. 
(HM 1996)  N/A 
(Holt 1995)  This text‘s account of the Six Day War is really given as historical 
background to the Yom Kippur War.  Israel‘s crushing victory and Arab bitterness is the 
most obvious relationship in the account.  Soviet allies among the Arab states and Israel 
as an ally of the U.S is also apparent.  Since the account is an introduction to the Yom 
Kippur War, no initial cause for the Six Day War is given and there is no apparent 
conclusion or consequence, only that it was a ―simmering‖ conflict in the Middle East, 
fueled by the Cold War (p. 904).   
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
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(PH 2005)  N/A 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1975)  This account is based on the premise that Johnson had to face many 
international conflicts, chief among them, Vietnam.  This is confirmed by the section 
review question on the following page: ―What international problems developed during 
the Johnson administration‖ (p. 708)?  The two biggest assumptions are that fighting 
simply, ―broke out‖, and that Americans were not involved.   
(Holt 1977)  The premise of this text‘s account is that the Middle East had long been and 
would continue to be a trouble spot for international conflict.  The text‘s concluding 
statement on the 1967 war confirms this: ―In 1970 the United States was able to secure a 
truce in the border raids, but a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict still seemed 
a distant prospect‖ (p. 695).  One implication made in this text is that Israel‘s belief that 
Arab nations were massing military forces to destroy Israel may not have been correct—
it is never confirmed or denied in the text.  It is only stated that Israel believed that to be 
the case, and so attacked with ―powerful‖ force, in the process keeping land that had not 
previously belonged to them. 
(PH 1976)  The premise of this account is the diplomatic position of the U.S. in the 
Middle East, and its eventual reassessment of this position after considering oil‘s 
economic and political power, along with the 1967 conflict.  The account itself is situated 
between a general discussion of President Johnson‘s international diplomacy and specific 
information on the Vietnam War.  It is assumed in this text that UN troops were the only 
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thing keeping Egypt and Israel apart, the overall Arab-Israeli conflict ―defied solution‖, 
and that Arab states‘ exploitation of refugees was in an effort to destroy Israel (p. 694). 
(HM 1986)  The premise of this account seems to be simply that the 1967 conflict was 
another challenge to Johnson‘s international diplomacy issues.  From the lack of 
information, this text‘s implicit assumption is that the conflict was not important, in and 
of itself, and also because Americans were not directly involved. 
(Holt 1986)  This account is an interesting change from previous texts in that the premise 
is the American diplomatic policy of détente, and the challenge that the Middle East in 
general, represented for this policy.  The text‘s account is found in a chapter entitled, ―A 
New Role in World Affairs‖ (p. 914), and under the heading, ―Détente with the Soviet 
Union‖ (p. 927).  The 1967 conflict does not really seem to fit here since American and 
Soviet competition in aid and influence to the Middle East is still apparent after the 
conflict; it is not until the following paragraphs on the Yom Kippur War that détente is 
seen as having survived ―its first critical test‖ (p. 929).  One implication made in this text 
is that Israel‘s belief that Arab nations were massing military forces to destroy Israel may 
not have been correct—it is never confirmed or denied in the text.  It is only stated that 
Israel believed that to be the case, and so attacked with ―powerful‖ force, in the process 
keeping land that had not previously belonged to them (p. 929).  Unlike the last edition, 
no assumptions or opening and concluding commentary are made about the possibilities 
of peace between Israel and its surrounding Arab states. 
(PH 1986)  This text‘s account is found in an entire section of chapter thirty-one 
(―Challenges to Peace‖), entitled ―Search for Peace in the Middle East‖ (p. 706).  The 
text‘s introduction to this entire section mentions U.S. diplomatic balancing in the region, 
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between ―its ally Israel‖, and ―Arab states that oppose Israel‖ (p. 706).  This text avoids 
most of the assumptions of previous texts by making simple and concise factual 
statements, but in doing so, the text also misses many important points.   
(HM 1996)  It is interesting that this text assumes the student knows about the four wars 
fought between Israel and Arab states between 1948 and 1973, but that the Six Day War 
is never previously mentioned in the text itself. 
(Holt 1995)  This text‘s account of the Six Day War is found in the chapter ―From Nixon 
to Carter 1970-1980, under the heading, ―Relations with China and the Soviets‖ and the 
subheading, ―Trouble spots‖ (p. 904).  Like the last edition, détente is really the context 
which warrants the mention of the Middle East as a trouble spot to Nixon and Kissinger‘s 
policies.  Much of the background to the Six Day War is eliminated in this edition.  One 
quote by Golda Meir within the body of text includes the following assumption: ―The 
only time that the Arab states were prepared to recognize the existence of…Israel was 
when they attacked it in order to wipe it out‖ (p. 904).   
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
(PH 2005)  N/A 
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1975)  Almost everything about the Six Day War is left unanswered in this text, 
except for the fact that it involved Israel; even the ―Arab neighbors‖ are not listed 
specifically.  The text‘s statement that it did not involve Americans leaves the student 
with the impression that the only way to be involved in international conflicts is with 
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military force, and of course, any historian would acknowledge that American arms 
shipments were instrumental in Israel‘s 1967 victory. 
(Holt 1977)  Arms shipments to Israel and the Arab states are not mentioned prior to the 
war—only after the war are continued arms shipments to both sides mentioned.  Arab 
perspective, other than bitterness at their defeat, and retaliatory border raids, is left out.  
No context for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan‘s involvement is given, through any discussion 
on politics and dissention within the Arab world, except for their unified hatred of Israel.  
The U.S.‘ decision to become Israel‘s primary arms supplier is not mentioned, nor are the 
motivations for the U.S. military aid that is mentioned in the textbook.  Soviet arms 
supplies, according to the text, were meant to strengthen Soviet influence in the Middle 
East.  International reaction to the conflict is left out, along with what really happened 
after the war was over, other than the continued border raids which the U.S managed to 
negotiate a stop to in 1970 (p. 695).  Arab refugees are not mentioned in this text. 
(PH 1976)  Only Egypt is explicitly mentioned as an aggressor in this account, although 
other ―Arab states‖ are mentioned, but not specifically.  Reasons for Nasser‘s request of 
the UN to remove their troops are not given; the mention of Nasser‘s ―Holy War‖ against 
Israel appears to have no motivation or context, other than a later mention of the goal to 
destroy Israel.  American reaction to the conflict itself is not given, except regarding 
American consideration of oil in the region and general preoccupation with the Vietnam 
War at the time.   
(HM 1986)  The three-sentence summary of the conflict in this text leaves much to be 
desired.  The only things answered about the conflict are that Americans were not directly 
involved in the fighting, it was between Israel and Arab neighbors, and it lasted for only a 
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―short time‖ (691).  The results of the conflict, or even who ―won‖ are not there—only 
that it ―left the situation in the Middle East more tense than before‖ (p. 691). 
(Holt 1986)  Arms shipments to Israel and the Arab states are not mentioned prior to the 
war—only after the war are continued arms shipments to both sides mentioned.  Arab 
perspective, other than bitterness at their defeat, and retaliatory border raids, is left out.  
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan‘s reaction to Israel‘s initial invasion is not included, except for 
their bitterness at defeat.  The U.S.‘ decision to become Israel‘s primary arms supplier is 
not mentioned, nor are the motivations for the U.S. military aid that is mentioned in the 
textbook.  Motivations for Soviet arms supplies to the region are not mentioned, although 
a student could assume they were in response to similar American supplies.  International 
reaction to the conflict is left out, and the 1967 conflict is really seen as a bridge to the 
main discussion on the Yom Kippur War (p. 928).  Arab refugees are not mentioned in 
this text. 
(PH 1986)  Motivations for why the U.S. and Soviet Union continued supplying arms 
prior to the 1967 conflict is not included, and neither are the continued supplies to both 
sides, after the conflict.  The impetus for Egypt‘s move to the Sinai Peninsula, and Jordan 
and Syria‘s motivations for joining them are not given.  Specific territory that had been 
captured by Israel in the conflict is not included, only that territory from these three 
nations had been taken over by Israel.  Who actually won the conflict is not explicitly 
stated, and any results or lingering consequences of the conflict are not included.  
International and U.S. reaction, along with the Arab states‘ reaction to Israel‘s 
preemptive strike are not given. 
(HM 1996)  N/A 
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(Holt 1995)  Much has been left out in this text‘s account.  Most of the focus is on what 
happened after the conflict.  The motivations of both sides in the conflict are not 
included, and no historical background or context for the conflict is given, although it is 
implied that Israel attacked first.  No mention of the change in territorial borders after 
1967 is made.  International and U.S. reaction are not included. 
(PH 1995)  N/A 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
(PH 2005)  N/A 
1973 Yom Kippur War: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(HM 1975)  This text‘s account of the Yom Kippur or October War appears in a chapter 
entitled, ―Americans Face the Challenge of a Modern World‖, under the subheading, 
―The Middle East flares up again‖.  The very general subheading is also indicative of the 
general description given of the war.  A major concern underlying this text‘s analysis was 
the possibility for direct conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a result of the 
1973 war.  A problem related to this possibility was the continuing shipments of military 
supplies from the Soviet Union and the U.S. to their Middle East allies, Egypt and Israel 
respectively. 
(Holt 1977)  The underlying problem in this text‘s account was whether or not détente 
would really end the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union.  Interestingly, (and 
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extremely unique) is that this text ties the hope of détente‘s effectiveness to the easing of 
Soviet restriction on emigration, particularly emigration of Jews wanting to go to Israel. 
(PH 1976)  The underlying problem in this text‘s account is American dependence on 
―the new reality of a unified bloc of oil exporting nations…[that] made suddenly urgent 
the long debated energy question‖ (p. 719). 
(HM 1986)  This text‘s account of the Yom Kippur or October War appears in a chapter 
entitled, ―Americans Face the Challenge of a Modern World‖, under the subheading, 
―The Middle East flares up again‖.  The very general subheading is also indicative of the 
general description given of the war.  A major concern underlying this text‘s analysis was 
the possibility for direct conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a result of the 
1973 war.  A problem related to this possibility was the continuing shipments of military 
supplies from the Soviet Union and the U.S. to their Middle East allies, Egypt and Israel 
respectively. 
(Holt 1986)  The underlying problem in this text‘s account was whether or not détente 
would really end the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the dangers that 
the Middle East posed to détente policies. 
(PH 1986)  This textbook‘s whole discussion of the Middle East and Arab-Israeli wars 
appears in a subsection of chapter thirty-one (Challenges to Peace), entitled ―Search for 
Peace in the Middle East‖ (p. 706).  The underlying problems are many, but the 
predominant underlying problem for the 1973 conflict in this text is Egypt and Syria‘s 
attempt to regain lost territory from the 1967 Six-Day War. 
(HM 1996)  The underlying problem in this text can be found in the subheading to the 
section: ―Crisis Follows Crisis in the Middle East‖ (p. 913).  Because the text quickly 
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summarizes the history of the region after World War II, the student would imply that the 
primary reason for conflict in the region is that ―Arabs believed Israel had been created 
out of land that belonged to the Arabs‖ (p. 914). 
(Holt 1995)  The underlying problem in this text is (surprisingly for a 1990s text) Cold 
War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, played out through 
their respective support of Egypt and Israel.   
(PH 1995)  There are two separate underlying problems in this text, because the 1973 
conflict and the oil embargo are mentioned in separate sections of the textbook.  Mention 
of 1973 is only to illustrate that previous attempts at peace, along with Kissinger‘s efforts 
at shuttle diplomacy, had been thus far unsuccessful.  The underlying problem at the 
mention of the oil embargo is America‘s already ―troubled‖ economy (p. 888).   
(HM 2003)  The underlying problem in this text is ―years of intense border disputes‖ 
between Israel and Egypt and Syria (p. 1005). 
(Holt 2003)  The Yom Kippur War is not mentioned in this text, except on a map where 
the locations of the fighting (Egypt and Syria) are labeled.  The map is titled, ― Conflicts 
in the Middle East, 1948-1981‖ (p. 1030).  The Arab oil embargo is mentioned at length, 
and the underlying problem is primarily American demand for oil increasing above its 
production capabilities.  The secondary problem is American support for Israel ―in a new 
Arab-Israeli war‖ (p. 1015). 
(PH 2005)  The underlying problem in this text is simply ―unrest in the Middle East 
[which] turned the energy problem into a crisis‖ (p. 1060).   
2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
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(HM 1975)  The predominant theory in this account can be found in the following quote: 
―The Soviet Union and the United States have always been vitally interested in the 
Middle East‖ (p. 720).  Specifics of that statement are not expounded on except regarding 
shipments of military arms to the region.  The account is concisely but insufficiently 
summed up with: ―But, as in the past, a cease-fire, supervised by the United Nations, was 
worked out‖ (p. 720).  The theory is presented that peace was possible between Israelis 
and Arabs because of the 1974 talks in Geneva, Switzerland between ―Arab countries, the 
Soviet Union, Israel, the United States, and the United Nations‖, whereas before, ―…it 
had been impossible to get the Arabs and Israelis even to talk to one another…‖ (p. 720). 
(Holt 1977)  The predominant theory in this text was that the Yom Kippur War was the 
first ―major test of détente and of Secretary Kissinger‘s skill as a diplomat‖ (p. 707).  It is 
recognized that only the influence of ―the two great powers persuaded the Arabs and the 
Israelis to accept the cease-fire and to prepare of negotiations‖ (p. 707).  This text is 
much less hopeful about the long-term prospects of the ―precarious‖ peace that was 
established in the region. 
(PH 1976)  The theory here is that the Arab oil embargo was the result of the Arab-Israeli 
war. 
(HM 1986)  The underlying theory can be found in the following quote: ―During this 
October War, the Soviet Union gave help to the Arabs, while Israel received supplies 
from the United States‖ (p.695-696).  This text‘s account is still seen, for the most part, in 
a Cold War context, however, a map on page 696 does point out the strategic importance 
of the Suez Canal.  The account is concisely but insufficiently summed up with: ―But, as 
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in the past, a cease-fire was worked out‖ (p. 698).  No other mention of the conclusion of 
the war or the proceeding negotiations is made. 
(Holt 1986)  The predominant theory in this text was that the Yom Kippur War was the 
first ―critical trial‖ of détente (p. 929).  It is recognized that only the influence of ―the two 
great powers persuaded the Arabs and the Israelis to accept the cease-fire and to prepare 
of negotiations‖ (p. 929).  This text is much less hopeful about the long-term prospects of 
the ―uneasy‖ peace that was established in the region. 
(PH 1986)  Prominent theories that prompt discussion of the 1973 war in this text 
includes Soviet and American arms supplies to Egypt and Israel and international 
pressure on Israel to give back ―occupied lands‖ gained from Israel‘s victory in 1967 (p. 
707).   
(HM 1996)  The predominant theory for continuing conflict in the region is found in the 
short statement: ―Between 1948 and 1973, four wars were fought between Arab nations 
and Israel.  Much of the Arab manpower and weaponry came from Egypt‖ (p. 914).   
(Holt 1995)  The predominant theory in this text is that ―embittered‖ Arab states 
continued to ―harass‖ Israel after the Six-Day War, and this ―simmering conflict was 
fueled by Cold War competition‖ (p. 904).  A quote included by Golda Meir reinforces 
the idea that the Arab states‘ sole objective was destroy Israel. 
(PH 1995)  The theory for the 1973 conflict is found in the following statement: ―In that 
unstable region, [Middle East] conflicts had existed for nearly thirty years, most recently 
in 1967 and 1973‖ (p. 917)  So the only theory for the conflict is simply that it was an 
―unstable region‖.  Theory regarding the oil embargo is that Americans were so crippled 
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by it because they ―depended on cheap, imported oil for about a third of their energy 
needs‖ (p. 888).   
(HM 2003)  Theory apparent in this account is that even though the U.S. was supplying 
Israel with ―massive amounts of military aid‖, U.S. efforts were primarily directed at 
obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and her enemies.   
(Holt 2003)  The only apparent theory is that America‘s energy crisis was due in part to 
its support of Israel, but primarily because demand for oil exceeded production, and 
relied heavily on foreign imports. 
(PH 2005)  This text‘s theory is very similar to Holt‘s (2003), in that America‘s energy 
crisis was due in part to its support of Israel, but primarily because demand for oil 
exceeded production, and relied heavily on foreign imports.  
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(HM 1975)  Relationships include the ―uneasy peace‖ in the region, a clear alliance 
between Egypt and Syria in their attack on Israel, Soviet aid to Arab states, American aid 
to Israel, and Henry Kissinger‘s central role in the cease-fire and peace talks, and Arab 
use of oil as political leverage.  The cause of the October War, as this text calls it, is 
unknown from the account that is given.  The ―uneasy peace‖ between Israel and Arab 
neighbors simply ―broke down again‖ (p. 720).  One cause could be implied from a later 
mention of Soviet and American military supplies in the region, but it is never explicitly 
stated as the cause.  Causes of Israel‘s successful counterattack, after their initial surprise, 
are not given, although the arms shipments could again be implied.  The United Nations 
is seen as the reason both sides agreed to a cease-fire.  The only consequence mentioned 
was the possibility ―to hope that peace might at last come to the Middle East‖ (p. 720). 
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(Holt 1977)  Relationships include the alliance between Egypt and Syria, the 
ineffectiveness of the UN at negotiating a cease-fire, American diplomatic influence over 
Israel, heightened tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union as a result of the war, 
Israeli ―bitterness at being forced to end the fighting just as a decisive victory was within 
grasp‖, Arab anger at American support for Israel, and a ―precarious peace‖ in the region 
(p. 708).  One cause of the war is explicitly stated in this text: ―Egypt and Syria, seeking 
to recover territories lost in the 1967 war suddenly launched an attack upon Israel‖ (p. 
707).  The cause of an eventual cease-fire agreement ultimately begins in this text, with 
Israel‘s success at a counter-attack, which forced Egypt to call upon the Soviet Union for 
help, whose threats to send troops of their own caused American diplomacy to favor a 
cease-fire and work at persuading Israel into agreement.  Consequences of the conflict 
included Israeli ―bitterness at being forced to end the fighting just as a decisive victory 
was within grasp‖, Arab anger at American support for Israel, and the oil embargo 
(although this is mentioned at the end of the text account, and seems to be a consequence 
of the war, rather than being enacting during the war).  The text does state that the 
embargo was aimed at nations ―friendly to Israel‖ (p. 709).  The ultimate consequence in 
this text is that détente had survived its first real international test. 
(PH 1976)  Relationships evident in this very short mention of October 1973 are 
America‘s preoccupation with Watergate, as well as its dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil.  There is no mention of a cause for the outbreak of war in 1973, and its only 
consequence seems to be the oil embargo, that ―raised havoc with available domestic 
supplies [and] sent gasoline prices skyrocketing…‖ (p. 718).   
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(HM 1986)  Relationships include the ―uneasy peace‖ in the region, a clear alliance 
between Egypt and Syria in their attack on Israel, Soviet aid to Arab states, American aid 
to Israel, and Arab use of oil as political leverage.  The cause of the October War, as this 
text calls it, is unknown from the account that is given.  The ―uneasy peace‖ between 
Israel and Arab neighbors simply ―broke down‖ (p. 695).  One cause could be implied 
from a later mention of Soviet and American military supplies in the region, but it is 
never explicitly stated as the cause.  Causes of Israel‘s successful counterattack, after 
their initial surprise, are not given, although the arms shipments could again be implied.  
Unlike the last edition, the United Nations and Henry Kissinger‘s efforts are not even 
mentioned.  Consequences, aside from the oil embargo and fuel shortages, are not 
mentioned. 
(Holt 1986)  )  Relationships include the alliance between Egypt and Syria, the 
ineffectiveness of the UN at negotiating a cease-fire, American diplomatic influence over 
Israel, heightened tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union as a result of the war, 
Israeli ―bitter[ness] at being forced to end the fighting just as a final victory was within 
grasp‖, Arab anger at American support for Israel, and an ―uneasy peace‖ in the region 
(p. 928-929).  One cause of the war is explicitly stated in this text: ―Egypt and Syria, 
seeking to recover territories lost in the 1967 war suddenly launched an attack upon 
Israel‖ (p. 707).  The cause of an eventual cease-fire agreement ultimately begins in this 
text, with Israel‘s success at a counter-attack, which forced Egypt to call upon the Soviet 
Union for help, whose threats to send troops of their own caused American diplomacy to 
favor a cease-fire and work at persuading Israel into agreement.  Consequences of the 
conflict included Israeli ―bitter[ness] at being forced to end the fighting just as a final 
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victory was within grasp‖, Arab anger at American support for Israel, and the oil 
embargo (although this is mentioned at the end of the text account, and seems to be a 
consequence of the war, rather than being enacting during the war).  The text does state 
that the embargo was aimed at nations ―friendly to Israel‖ (p. 929).  The ultimate 
consequence in this text is that détente had survived its first real international test. 
Interestingly, (and like the last edition) is that this text ties the hope of détente‘s 
effectiveness to the easing of Soviet restriction on emigration, particularly emigration of 
Jews wanting to go to Israel.  Continued Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration is seen 
in this text as a ―setback for the policy of détente‖ (p. 929). 
(PH 1986)  Relationships include Egypt and Syria‘s alliance, Soviet support for Egypt 
and U.S. support for Israel, OPEC‘s (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) use 
of oil as an economic weapon, and continued Arab refusal to officially recognize Israel.  
Causes of the 1973 War in this text stem from Egypt and Syria‘s grievances left over 
from the 1967 Six-Day War.  The continuation of the conflict was made possible by 
Soviet and American arms shipments to the region.  The immediate consequence of the 
conflict was the Arab oil embargo, meant to ―protest American support for Israel…[and] 
put pressure on the United States and other nations to make Israel give back the 
‗occupied lands‘ Israel had taken from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria‖ (p.706-707).  Interesting 
to note is that this is the first text to actually use the term ―occupied lands‖ to describe 
territory gained by Israel in 1967.  This is also the first text to mention Kissinger‘s 
―shuttle diplomacy‖ by that name, and according to this text, it was his efforts that 
arranged the 1973 cease-fire.  This text also states that Kissinger was unable to resolve 
continued Arab refusal to recognize Israel‘s legitimacy.  Overall, this text had a lot of 
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―firsts‖: mention of ―occupied lands‖ and OPEC‘s role in bargaining for the return of 
those lands, continued Arab refusal to recognize Israel, and Palestinian refugees as a 
―major stumbling block to peace‖ that any peace settlement would have to solve (p. 709). 
(HM 1996)  Relationships include continuing hostility between Arab states and Israel and 
Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy.  No cause for the 1973 war is given, other than the root 
cause for all of the wars according to the textbook, that Arabs believed Israel was created 
out of Arab lands.  No other mention of 1973 is made, but Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy 
resulted in a ―temporary agreement‖ in 1975.  ―Israel promised to partially withdraw its 
troops from Egypt‘s Sinai Peninsula.  In exchange, the United States promised to supply 
Israel with advanced arms and aircraft‖ (p. 914).  Another consequence was the Arab oil 
embargo and Americans‘ surprise ―that the United States was dependent on foreign 
nations for more than a third of its oil‖ (p. 905). 
(Holt 1995)  Relationships include the alliance between Egypt and Syria, American 
diplomatic influence over Israel, heightened tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union 
as a result of the war, and Soviet and American arms supplies to Egypt and Israel.  One 
cause of the war is explicitly stated in this text: ―Then, in October 1973, Egypt and Syria 
invaded Israel, seeking to recover land lost in the 1967 war‖ (p. 904).  The cause of an 
eventual cease-fire agreement ultimately begins in this text, with Israel‘s success at a 
counter-attack, which forced Egypt to call upon the Soviet Union for help, whose threats 
to send troops of their own caused American diplomacy to favor a cease-fire and work at 
persuading Israel into agreement.  Consequences of the conflict are not really mentioned, 
aside from a doubtful prospect for peace in the region.  The ultimate consequence in this 
text is that détente had survived its first real international test.  Interestingly, this text 
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does not mention the oil embargo in the paragraphs discussing the Six-Day War and Yom 
Kippur War, but there is mention earlier in the textbook under the subheading, ―Energy 
Crisis‖ (p. 902).  The text does explain that the embargo was a consequence of American 
support for Israel during the 1973 war.  Unlike the last two editions, this text does not 
mention continued Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration, particularly to Israel.  
(PH 1995)  Relationships in this text include American dependence on foreign oil, Egypt 
and Syria‘s alliance, American friendship with Israel, OPEC retaliation for American 
support of Israel during the 1973 war, and Kissinger‘s efforts on behalf of both Israel and 
Arab nations to obtain peace.  No apparent cause for the 1973 conflict is given in the text.  
It is only stated: ―In 1973, Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria went to war‖ 
(p.888).  The cause of the oil embargo is America‘s support for Israel during the war.  
Consequences of the oil embargo that the text addresses are higher inflation, and 
economic recession, and higher unemployment.  The only consequence of the 1973 war 
apparent in the text, is Kissinger‘s failed attempt at shuttle diplomacy (p. 917).   
(HM 2003)  Relationships in this text include Syria and Egypt‘s alliance in invading 
Israel, U.S. support of Israel, OPEC‘s protests of U.S. military aid to Israel, and 
Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy.  The cause of the 1973 war in this text was ―the climax of 
years of intense border disputes‖ (p. 1005).  The cause of the oil embargo was American 
support for Israel.  Consequences of the war were its ―brutal‖ nature (the textbook lists 
casualty numbers for Egypt, Syria, and Israel) and Kissinger‘s successful efforts at shuttle 
diplomacy, which resulted in peace agreements for all three nations.  Consequences of 
the oil embargo were the permanent rise in prices for oil and economic inflation for the 
U.S. economy (p. 1005). 
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(Holt 2003)  Continuing American support for Israel and OPEC‘s displeasure over this 
continued support are the two most apparent relationships in this text.  No other 
discussion of the Yom Kippur War is included.  The only consequence given is that even 
after the embargo was lifted, the price of oil remained high.  
(PH 2005)  Relationships in this text (including a special text box on Kissinger‘s shuttle 
diplomacy on page 1069) include American dependence on foreign oil, OPEC‘s 
retaliation for American support of Israel, Israel and Egypt/Syria‘s warring status, and 
Kissinger‘s efforts at shuttle diplomacy.  Causes of the 1973 war are not included in this 
text.  The cause of the oil embargo is American support for Israel.  Consequences of the 
oil embargo were inflation and recession.  Consequences of the war include Kissinger‘s 
success at negotiating a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Syria, and current 
diplomats‘ efforts to copy Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy in order to ―further U.S. foreign 
policy goals‖ (p. 1069). 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1975)  The premise of this account is that the October War was just another 
conflict, in a long line of historical tensions in the region, and although there may have 
been hope for peace because of the 1974 talks, it was not a guarantee.  It is assumed that 
because Arabs and Israelis were talking, that the possibility for peace was real this time.  
It is interesting to note that this text does not blame the October War for the nation‘s 
energy crisis, but only mentions that the oil shortage was made worse by the conflict.  
The text does state the Arab nations‘ motivation for cutting production: ―…Arab nations 
cut off supplies of oil to the United States and other nation, hoping thus to persuade these 
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countries not to support Israel‖ (p. 720).  In the very next sentence however, the text 
states that Arab nations lifted the embargo because, ―…they were grateful for America‘s 
help in bringing an end to the fighting…‖ (p. 720).   
(Holt 1977)  The premise of this account is that the war was the first real (and successful) 
test of détente and Kissinger‘s skills as a diplomat.  A major implicit assumption is that 
the U.S. and Soviet Union were only involved in negotiating the cease-fire and peace 
talks, because no mention of arms shipments prior to the war are made.  Also because of 
this is the assumption that it was Israel‘s ―powerful‖ force that drove Egypt back across 
the Suez Canal to ―certain defeat‖ and Syrian troops further north (p. 707).   
(PH 1976)  The premise of this account is really America‘s preoccupation with 
Watergate.  The implicit assumption is that the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict was only 
important because it affected domestic oil supplies. 
(HM 1986)  The premise of this account is that the October War was just another 
conflict, in a long line of historical tensions in the region.  One assumption implicit in the 
text is that this war was unique since Israel was not the aggressor: ―This time Egypt and 
Syria launched a surprise attack…‖ (italics added p. 695).  Unlike the last text, the 
possibilities for peace, or even the negotiations following the cease-fire, are not 
mentioned.  Although the 1975 edition did not blame the October War for the nation‘s 
energy crisis, but only mentions that the oil shortage was made worse by the conflict, the 
1986 edition does make a direct correlation between the conflict and the oil embargo.  
The text does state the Arab nations‘ motivation for cutting production: ―At the time of 
the October War, some Arab nations cut off oil shipments to the United States.  They did 
this to try to stop our country from helping Israel‖ (p. 696).  The text only states that the 
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Arab oil embargo ―soon‖ ended, but does not explain why.  Consequences of the war are 
not really addressed, except the statement: ―[The oil embargo] made Americans see the 
danger of depending on other nations for such an important source of energy as oil‖ (p. 
696).   
(Holt 1986)  The premise of this account is that the war was the first real (and successful) 
test of détente.  A major implicit assumption is that the U.S. and Soviet Union were only 
involved in negotiating the cease-fire and peace talks, because no mention of arms 
shipments prior to the war are made.  Also because of this is the assumption that it was 
Israel‘s ―powerful‖ force that drove Egypt back across the Suez Canal to ―certain defeat‖ 
and Syrian troops further north (p. 707).   
(PH 1986)  The premise of this text‘s account is found in the following statement: ―For 
years, the United States has worked for peace in the Middle East‖ (p. 707).  It is assumed 
that the 1973 conflict really did nothing to change territorial borders or the status-quo in 
the Middle East, and that Kissinger‘s efforts alone arranged the 1973 cease-fire.  The 
text‘s concluding commentary on the Arab-Israeli conflict also includes its prominent 
assumptions: ―The major stumbling blocks to peace in the Middle East have been the 
Palestinian refugees and the occupied lands…Any peace settlement will have to solve 
this difficult problem‖ (p. 708). 
(HM 1996)  The premise of this account can be found in the opening statements to the 
section: ―The Middle East is one of the world‘s trouble spots.  It is an area of many 
ethnic, religious, and economic conflicts‖ (p. 913).  The major assumption the text makes 
is that students already know about all four Arab-Israeli conflicts between 1948 and 
1973. 
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(Holt 1995)  The premise of this account is that the war was the first real (and successful) 
test of détente.  The primary assumption is found in the following statement: ―Détente 
had survived its first critical test, but prospects for a lasting peace in the Middle East 
remained in doubt‖ (p. 904).    
(PH 1995)  The major premise of this text‘s account is that no solution had yet been 
found to establish a long lasting peace in the Middle East.  The text‘s primary assumption 
is that students have prior knowledge of the Yom Kippur War. 
(HM 2003)  This account is based on the premise that although the Yom Kippur War was 
short, it was unusually brutal.  An assumption implicit in the text is that both sides may 
have been justified in going to war, and also that Kissinger‘s peace agreements were a 
long lasting solution for peace in the region. 
(Holt 2003)  This account is based on the premise that American dependence on foreign 
oil creates a vulnerable and fragile economy.  The implicit assumption in this text‘s 
summary is that Arab-Israeli conflicts are relevant only because they affect American 
access to Middle Eastern oil. 
(PH 2005)  The premise of this text is similar to Holt (2003) in that American 
dependence on foreign oil creates a vulnerable and fragile economy.  The implicit 
assumption in this text‘s summary is that Arab-Israeli conflicts are relevant only because 
they affect American access to Middle Eastern oil.  The text also assumes that Kissinger 
was successful in establishing a long-standing peace in the Middle East and that his 
efforts should be copied. 
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)?  
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(HM 1975)  Significant oversights in this text include: historical context prior to the war 
or even initial causes of the breakdown in peace between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; 
motivations for why Syria and Egypt formed an alliance are not given; no mention of 
Yom Kippur or the significance for the date of the surprise attack on Israel;  actual 
locations of the fighting (Suez Canal, Sinai, Golan Heights) are not mentioned; the death 
of Nasser and succession of Sadat in Egypt; the breakdown of relations between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union prior to the war; no mention of the PLO‘s increased importance in 
Middle East diplomacy (Palestine Liberation Organization) or even changing 
international opinion toward Palestinians (favorable) and Israel (negative);  Israel‘s 
technical military victory and the Arab states‘ psychological victory are not addressed;  
Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy is not mentioned; international reaction to the oil embargo; 
and finally, growing international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along with 
America‘s increased influence in the region are not included in this account. 
(Holt 1977)  Significant oversights in this text include: historical context prior to the war 
or even initial causes of the breakdown in peace between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; actual 
locations of the fighting (Suez Canal, Sinai, Golan Heights) are not mentioned; the death 
of Nasser and succession of Sadat in Egypt; the breakdown of relations between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union prior to the war; no mention of the PLO‘s increased importance in 
Middle East diplomacy (Palestine Liberation Organization) or even changing 
international opinion toward Palestinians (favorable) and Israel (negative);  Israel‘s 
technical military victory and the Arab states‘ psychological victory are not addressed;  
Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy is not mentioned; international reaction to the oil embargo; 
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and finally, growing international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along with 
America‘s increased influence in the region are not included in this account. 
(PH 1976)  Since this text‘s account is so short, everything remains unacknowledged 
with the following exceptions: an Arab-Israeli war ―broke out‖ in October 1973 and it 
resulted in an Arab oil embargo that raised domestic oil prices and increased American 
awareness of the ―energy question‖ (p. 718). 
(HM 1986)  Significant oversights in this text include: historical context prior to the war 
or even initial causes of the breakdown in peace between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; 
motivations for why Syria and Egypt formed an alliance are not given; no mention of 
Yom Kippur or the significance for the date of the surprise attack on Israel; the death of 
Nasser and succession of Sadat in Egypt; the breakdown of relations between Egypt and 
the Soviet Union prior to the war; no mention of the PLO‘s increased importance in 
Middle East diplomacy (Palestine Liberation Organization) or even changing 
international opinion toward Palestinians (favorable) and Israel (negative);  Israel‘s 
technical military victory and the Arab states‘ psychological victory are not addressed;  
Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy is not mentioned; international reaction to the oil embargo; 
and finally, growing international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along with 
America‘s increased influence in the region are not included in this account.  Unlike the 
last edition, some actual locations of the fighting (Suez Canal and Damascus) are 
mentioned. 
(Holt 1986)  Significant oversights in this text include: historical context prior to the war 
or even initial causes of the breakdown in peace between Egypt, Syria, and Israel, other 
than territory lost in 1967; the death of Nasser and succession of Sadat in Egypt; the 
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breakdown of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union prior to the war; no mention 
of the PLO‘s increased importance in Middle East diplomacy (Palestine Liberation 
Organization) or even changing international opinion toward Palestinians (favorable) and 
Israel (negative); why OPEC lifted the oil embargo;  Israel‘s technical military victory 
and the Arab states‘ psychological victory are not addressed;  Kissinger‘s shuttle 
diplomacy is not mentioned;  cease-fire and peace negotiations are not included; 
international reaction to the oil embargo; and finally, growing international awareness of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict along with America‘s increased influence in the region are not 
included in this account. 
(PH 1986)  Significant oversights in this text include: motivations for why Syria and 
Egypt formed an alliance are not given; actual locations of the fighting (Suez Canal, 
Sinai, Golan Heights) are not mentioned; the death of Nasser and succession of Sadat in 
Egypt; the breakdown of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union prior to the war; 
no mention of the PLO‘s increased importance in Middle East diplomacy (Palestine 
Liberation Organization) or even changing international opinion toward Palestinians 
(favorable) and Israel (negative); why OPEC lifted the oil embargo, even though Israel 
still retained ―occupied‖ lands;  Israel‘s technical military victory and the Arab states‘ 
psychological victory are not addressed;  international reaction to the oil embargo; and 
finally, growing international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along with America‘s 
increased influence in the region are not included in this account. 
(HM 1996)  Since this text‘s account is so short, everything remains unacknowledged 
with the following exceptions: there were four Arab-Israeli wars between 1948 and 1973, 
―much of the Arab manpower and weaponry came from Egypt‖, the Arab oil embargo 
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was the result of the ―United States and other western nations giving aid to Israel‖ (p. 
905), and Henry Kissinger carried on ―shuttle diplomacy…trying to get the two nations to 
resolve their differences‖ (p. 914).   
(Holt 1995)  Significant oversights in this text include: initial causes of the breakdown in 
peace between Egypt, Syria, and Israel, other than territory lost in 1967; the death of 
Nasser and succession of Sadat in Egypt; the breakdown of relations between Egypt and 
the Soviet Union prior to the war; no mention of the PLO‘s increased importance in 
Middle East diplomacy (Palestine Liberation Organization) or even changing 
international opinion toward Palestinians (favorable) and Israel (negative); why OPEC 
lifted the oil embargo;  Israel‘s technical military victory and the Arab states‘ 
psychological victory are not addressed;  Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy is not mentioned;  
cease-fire and peace negotiations are not included; international reaction to the oil 
embargo; and finally, growing international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along 
with America‘s increased influence in the region are not included in this account. 
(PH 1995)  Since this text‘s account is so short, everything remains unacknowledged 
with the following exceptions: There was a war between Egypt/Syria and Israel in 1973,  
OPEC used oil as an economic weapon to protest American support of Israel during this 
war, and Kissinger‘s attempts at shuttle diplomacy were unsuccessful in the long-term 
peace of the region.   
(HM 2003)  Significant oversights in this text include: historical context prior to the war 
or even initial causes of the breakdown in peace between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; 
motivations for why Syria and Egypt formed an alliance are not given; actual locations of 
the fighting (Suez Canal, Sinai, Golan Heights) are not mentioned; the death of Nasser 
  
 
223 
and succession of Sadat in Egypt; Soviet military supplies to Egypt are not mentioned, 
even though U.S. supplies to Israel are mentioned; the breakdown of relations between 
Egypt and the Soviet Union prior to the war; no mention of the PLO‘s increased 
importance in Middle East diplomacy (Palestine Liberation Organization) or even 
changing international opinion toward Palestinians (favorable) and Israel (negative);  
Israel‘s technical military victory and the Arab states‘ psychological victory are not 
addressed;  international reaction to the oil embargo; why OPEC lifted the embargo; and 
finally, growing international awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict along with America‘s 
increased influence in the region are not included in this account. 
(Holt 2003)  Since this text‘s account is so short, everything remains unacknowledged 
with the following exceptions: a ―new Arab-Israeli war‖ broke out in October 1973, 
OPEC raised oil prices in protest of American support for Israel during this war, the 
embargo triggered an energy crisis and inflation, and once the embargo was lifted, the 
price of oil remained high (p. 1015). 
(PH 2005)  This text has the particular distinction of not even mentioning who initiated 
the Yom Kippur War.  It states: ―In 1973, Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria 
went to war‖ p. 1060) Since this text‘s account is so short, everything remains 
unacknowledged with the following exceptions:  Israel, Egypt, and Syria‘s warring status 
in 1973, OPEC‘s oil embargo, American support for Israel during the 1973 conflict, the 
fact that Israeli and Syrian forces were fighting on the Golan Heights, and Kissinger‘s 
shuttle diplomacy and success at negotiating a cease-fire. 
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1979 Camp David Accords: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(HM 1986)  The two sentences regarding the peace agreement appear under the heading, 
―The President supports human rights‖, along with mention of Carter‘s goals in Panama, 
and foreign policy of ―cutting off aid to countries that did not respect human rights‖ (p. 
706).   
(Holt 1986)  The underlying problem in this text is a ―troubled Middle East‖ where the 
renewal of war was always a possibility (p. 931). 
(PH 1986)  The underlying problem in this text seems to be the breakdown of peace talks 
prior to Camp David, although no detail of these prior negotiations is given. 
(HM 1996)  The underlying problem in this text can be found in the opening paragraph 
which states: ―The Middle East is one of the world‘s trouble spots.  It is an area of many 
ethnic, religious, and economic conflicts‖ (p. 913).  The underlying problem between 
Egypt and Israel specifically in this text is because in the wars fought between them, 
―Much of the Arab manpower and weaponry came from Egypt‖ (p. 914). 
(Holt 1995)  Underlying problems in this text are two-fold, and include, ―deadlocked‖ 
talks prior to Camp David , as well as Arab criticism of Sadat ―for attempting any peace 
talks with Israel‖ (p. 915) 
(PH 1995)   Two underlying problems are apparent in this text: first is Carter‘s desire to 
find ―ethical solutions to prickly problems…in the Middle East question‖ (p. 917); 
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second, the book introduces Camp David with the statement: ―In that unstable region, 
conflicts between Israel and the Arab nations had existed for nearly thirty years‖ (p. 917). 
(HM 2003)  The underlying problems in this text are the ―long gasoline lines and high 
energy costs‖ Americans were facing as a result of ―ethnic, religious, and economic 
conflict in the Middle East and the long-time antagonism between Israel and Egypt (p. 
1022).   
(Holt 2003)  The underlying problem in this text is that Carter took office ―amid fears of 
more Egyptian-Israeli armed conflict‖ (p. 1031). 
(PH 2005)  Two underlying problems are apparent in this text: first is Carter‘s desire to 
finding ―ethical solutions to complicated problems…in the Middle East‖ (p. 1087); 
second, the book introduces Camp David with the statement: ―In that unstable region, 
Israel and the Arab nations had fought several wars (p. 1087). 
2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(HM 1986)  The only theory present in the two sentence mention of the Egypt-Israel 
agreement is that Carter worked hard at the agreement in order to ―reduce tension in the 
Middle East‖ (p. 706). 
(Holt 1986)  The impetus leading to negotiations in this text is Begin‘s invitation to Sadat 
to visit Israel.  The proceeding visits to Egypt and Israel on behalf of both leaders, along 
with U.S. Secretary of State Vance‘s efforts, ―ended in a stalemate‖ after nine months of 
negotiations (p. 931).  Discussion of Camp David follows this contextual information. 
(PH 1986)  The impetus in this text for beginning negotiations was Sadat‘s agreement o 
visit Israel, ―as the first Arab head of state to visit Israel‖ (p. 708).  Carter‘s efforts to 
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keep peace talks from breaking down even further seem to be his motivation for the 
invitation to Camp David. 
(HM 1996)  The predominant theory in this text is Egypt and Israel fought four wars 
because of disagreement over the land, and official Arab recognition of Israel.  The text 
also mentions that Israel was willing to withdraw from the Sinai because of U.S. 
promises ―to supply Israel with advanced arms and aircraft‖ (p. 914). 
(Holt 1995)  There is a large amount of text on Sadat himself, and the focus seems to be 
largely on Sadat‘s efforts in ―trying to pave the road to peace‖ (p. 916)  An implied 
theory could be that without Sadat, no peace would have been possible.  There is no hint 
that the negotiations were in the least bit arduous, instead the text mentions ―an emotion-
filled ceremony [where] each quoted the prophet Isaiah‖, and highlights the Nobel Peace 
Prize each leader received for their efforts. 
(PH 1995)  The first theory apparent in this text is that Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy was 
ultimately unsuccessful since conflicts had continued in the region.  The second is that 
negotiations before Camp David between Sadat and Begin were unsuccessful because 
―the two men had such different personalities‖ (p. 918).  Carter‘s hopes to ―smooth their 
differences and move the peace process forward‖, is what ultimately prompted Carter to 
invite the leaders to Camp David (p. 918). 
(HM 2003)  The underlying theory in this text‘s account is that is was Carter‘s 
―negotiation and arm-twisting‖ that produced results at Camp David and that is was ―one 
of his greatest diplomatic triumphs‖ (p. 1022). 
(Holt 2003)  The theory underlying this text‘s account is that Camp David was Carter‘s 
chief foreign policy triumph. 
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(PH 2005)  The first theory apparent in this text is that negotiations before Camp David 
between Sadat and Begin were unsuccessful because ―the two men had such different 
personalities‖ (p. 1087).    
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(HM 1986)  The only apparent relationship is Carter‘s role as mediator between Egypt 
and Israel.  The only cause is Carter‘s efforts to reduce tension in the Middle East, and no 
consequences are included, other than reaching ―a peace agreement early in 1979‖ (p. 
706). 
(Holt 1986)  Relationships include U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance‘s efforts; the 
apparent easing of tensions between Sadat and Begin; high emotions of good will at the 
signing of the peace treaty; Arab anger at Sadat and criticism of Carter; continued 
American dependence on Arab oil-exporting nations.  The primary cause of Camp David 
is the stalemate in nine month negotiations prior to Camp David.  There is no explanation 
of how both sides came to agreement, only that they eventually did.  Regarding 
consequences, the following two unresolved issues, or ―details‖ of the treaty that could 
not be worked out are mentioned: ―occupied‖ Israeli lands and Palestinian demands for a 
homeland in the West Bank and Gaza.  There is mention of Israel‘s returning the Sinai to 
Egypt and also of Arab anger at Sadat and criticism of Carter.  The ultimate consequence 
seems to be the continued threat of war in the Middle East.   
(PH 1986)  Relationships include Sadat and Begin‘s rocky negotiations; Arab 
condemnation of Egypt‘s agreement; and Carter‘s personal role in negotiations at Camp 
David.  Sadat‘s willingness to visit Israel and prior breakdowns in peace talks seem to be 
the primary factors leading to Camp David.  Consequences highlighted in the text 
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mention that this was the first agreement between an Arab nation and Israel; Israel‘s 
return of the Sinai to Egypt; Israel and Egypt‘s pledge to ―work toward a solution to the 
Palestinian refugee problem‖; Arab condemnation of Egypt and eventual assassination of 
Sadat; and the fact that the Camp David Accords ended thirty years of fighting between 
Egypt and Israel (p. 708). 
(HM 1996)  Relationships include the historic antagonism between Egypt and Israel, 
Sadat‘s ―bold‖ and ―courageous‖ move to visit Israel, and ―intensive discussions‖ held at 
Camp David.  The only apparent cause leading to Camp David were the prior stalled 
peace talks.  Consequences include ―Muslim extremist‖ threats to Sadat for negotiating 
with Israel; two separate peace agreements, one of which called for a ―five-year transition 
period during which Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians would work out the issue of 
Palestinian self-rule‖ (p. 914); a second agreement ―aimed at ending hostilities between 
Israel and Egypt‖ (p. 914); official Egyptian recognition of Israel and return of the Sinai 
Peninsula; Arab feelings of betrayal toward Sadat; continued PLO terror; and retaliatory 
raids by Israel on PLO targets in Lebanon. 
(Holt 1995)  Relationships in this text include Sadat‘s integral role in peace initiatives, 
and include personal information about him, such as the influence his childhood Imam 
and Islamic faith had on him; a quote by Israeli Premier Begin is meant to highlight 
Begin‘s admiration of Sadat‘s courage in visiting Israel; Sadat‘s belief that his actions 
were part of ―a collective effort by the entire country‖ (p. 916); as well as mention of the 
fact that Sadat and Begin shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978.  The only apparent 
causes for Camp David seem to be prior failed attempts at peace talks, along with Sadat‘s 
recent visit to Israel.  Consequences include a shared Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for Sadat 
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and Begin; criticism that Carter favored ―the Arabs in order to appease Arab oil-
exporting nations, such as Saudi Arabia‖ (p. 916); Arab anger at Sadat; and ultimately, 
Sadat‘s assassination ―by members of an Islamic fundamentalist group within the 
Egyptian army‖ (p. 916). 
(PH 1995) The three main relational roles in this text are summarized in the following 
statement: ―At Camp David in September 1978, Carter assumed the role of peacemaker 
and practiced highly effective personal diplomacy to bridge the gap between Sadat and 
Begin‖ (p. 918).  Causes for Camp David included the thirty prior years of conflict 
between Egypt and Israel, the stalled peace talks, and Carter‘s desire to find a solution.  
Consequences of Camp David include the settlement that Israel would withdraw from the 
Sinai, and Egypt would officially recognize the state of Israel; the text also mentions that 
the Camp David Accords established a process for future peace talks.  Like other texts, 
this edition does recognize that Camp David did not solve all of the problems in the 
region, among them, ―the question of what to do about the Palestinians, many of whom 
had fled their homes when Arab nations declared war on Israel immediately after that 
country was established in 1948‖ (p. 918). 
(HM 2003)  There are really no obvious relationships in this text, other than implied 
difficulties between Sadat and Begin because of stalled peace talks, and mention of 
Carter‘s ―arm twisting‖ in negotiations at Camp David.  Causes for increased American 
awareness of trouble in the Middle East are from long gasoline lines and higher energy 
costs that Americans were facing.  Causes for Camp David seem to simply be that Carter 
―seized on the peace initiative‖ of Sadat and Begin‘s prior talks in Jerusalem and invited 
them to Camp David (p. 1022).  The primary consequence of Camp David in this text is 
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Israel‘s ―first signed peace agreement with an Arab country‖ (p. 1022).  The text does 
mention that Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai in exchange for official recognition 
from Egypt. 
(Holt 2003)  Relationships in this text really only include the previous ―deadlocked‖ talks 
between Sadat and Begin.  The cause of Camp David seems to be American fears of 
more Egyptian-Israeli conflicts.  The consequences of Camp David in this text were ―a 
framework for achieving peace in the Middle East‖, the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for Sadat 
and Begin, and Carter‘s ―most gratifying‖ achievement in his life (p. 1022). 
(PH 2005)  The three main relational roles in this text are summarized in the following 
statement: ―At Camp David in September 1978, Carter assumed the role of peacemaker. 
He practiced highly effective personal diplomacy to bridge the gap between Sadat and 
Begin‖ (p. 1087).  Causes for Camp David included the thirty prior years of conflict 
between Egypt and Israel, the stalled peace talks, and Carter‘s desire to find a solution.  
Consequences of Camp David include the settlement that Israel would withdraw from the 
Sinai, and Egypt would officially recognize the state of Israel; unlike the last edition, the 
text does not mention that the Camp David Accords established a process for future peace 
talks.  Like other texts, this edition does recognize that Camp David did not solve all of 
the problems in the region, among them, ―the question of what to do about the 
Palestinians, many of whom had fled their homes when Arab nations declared war on 
Israel immediately after that country was established in 1948‖ (p. 1087). 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
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(HM 1986)  In this text, President Carter was the impetus behind the peace agreement, 
but the Iranian hostage crisis really trumps the Egypt-Israel peace agreement in this 
edition (and even in summarizing the hostage crisis, there is no apparent cause in the text 
for why the hostages were taken, only that they were).  
(Holt 1986)  The premise in this edition is that the Camp David Accords were an 
extraordinary step towards peace, but there were still several unresolved issues that could 
lead to war.  A major assumption is that American critics of Carter‘s Camp David 
negotiations felt that he ―tilted his influence toward the Egyptian-Palestinian side in order 
to maintain the good will of the Arab oil-exporting nations, particularly Saudi Arabia‖ (p. 
931).  Another assumption was the mention that the possibility of war ―remained a 
constant threat‖ even after the negotiations (p. 931). 
(PH 1986)  This text‘s premise includes the statement that the Camp David Accords were 
―a major breakthrough toward peace‖, but there were still unresolved issues that had to be 
addressed for any lasting peace agreement.  The book lists the unresolved issues as 
―Palestinian refugees and occupied lands‖ (p. 708).  From the textual information given, a 
student would imply that the major point of contention and eventual agreement between 
Egypt and Israel was the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.  The only other point of 
negotiation that is mentioned, deals with both nations‘ agreement to ―work toward a 
solution‖ for Palestinian refugees.  In discussing Arab reaction in particular, the book 
states: ―Other Arab nations condemned Egypt.  In the early 1980s, however, there were 
signs that the more moderate Arab nations might follow Sadat‘s courageous example‖ (p. 
708).  Specific ―signs‖ of moderation are not given though, and considering Egypt‘s 
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expulsion from the Arab League entirely, the preceding statement verges on misleading, 
if not inaccurate.   
(HM 1996)  The premise of Camp David in this text is that it was an extension of the 
temporary agreement Kissinger achieved through shuttle diplomacy, and also an effort to 
overcome previously stalled peace talks.  Assumptions include a textual reference to the 
Accords as ―a detailed peace treaty‖, while later pointing out that the treaty was 
ambiguous about the West Bank and Gaza (p. 914); the text claims that ―many people 
were cheered by the news of the treaty‖; the text states: ―The policy of the U.S. in all this 
was to provide support for Israel while also trying to find a solution to the Palestinian 
issues‖ (p. 914). 
(Holt 1995)  The premise for this text‘s account was that the Camp David Accords were 
Carter‘s ―chief foreign policy triumph‖ (p. 915).  The only obvious assumption is found 
in the statement: ―Sadat always downplayed his own role in bringing about peace‖ (p. 
916); an implicit assumption could include the belief that Sadat played a more active role 
than Begin in seeking peace.  
(PH 1995)  The premise of this text is Carter‘s aim to bring stability and ―ethical 
solutions‖ to the Middle East through his efforts at Camp David.  One of the major 
assumptions in this text is that prior negotiations between Sadat and Begin failed, only 
because the two men had ―such different personalities‖ (p. 918).  It is also implied that 
Camp David was a success because of Carter‘s ―highly effective personal diplomacy‖ (p. 
918).  Another assumption that some might find controversial in this text is the statement 
that Arabs ―fled‖ their homes during the 1948 war. 
  
 
233 
(HM 2003)  The premise of this text‘s account is that Camp David was Carter‘s greatest 
diplomatic achievement, but ―that many issues were left unresolved‖ (p. 1022).  The text 
must assume that students know what these issues are, because they are not included.   
(Holt 2003)  The premise of this text is that Camp David was Carter‘s greatest foreign 
policy triumph, his ―most gratifying‖ lifetime achievement, and an agreement that ended 
―a 30 year state of war between Israel and Egypt‖ (p.1022).  This text‘s account is so 
concise, that there are really no obvious assumptions.  A major implied assumption, 
owing to the mention of the Nobel Peace Prize and no other political results of Camp 
David, is that the negotiations left no unresolved issues. 
(PH 2005)  The premise of this text can be found in the following opening statement to 
Camp David: ―Although Jimmy Carter had little diplomatic experience when he took 
office, his personal beliefs greatly influenced his decisions on foreign affairs.  Support for 
human rights was the cornerstone of Carter‘s foreign policy‖ (p. 1087).  One of the major 
assumptions in this text is that prior negotiations between Sadat and Begin failed, only 
because the two men had ―such different personalities‖ (p. 1087).  It is also implied that 
Camp David was a success because of Carter‘s ―highly effective personal diplomacy‖ (p. 
1087).  Another assumption that some might find controversial in this text is the 
statement that Arabs ―fled‖ their homes during the 1948 war. 
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
 (HM 1986)  Everything in this text remains unacknowledged with the following 
exceptions: Carter‘s motivation and the fact that it was an agreement between Egypt and 
Israel only. 
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(Holt 1986)  The following are not included in this text: Sadat‘s motivations for 
negotiating; Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s motivations for negotiating; 
Carter‘s call for a ―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s 
departure from step-by-step diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive 
diplomatic action is not mentioned; the conditions for each peace agreement, particularly 
the avoidance of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights is not 
included; disagreement within the PLO about a compromise Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; reasons why Israel was willing to give up the Sinai, but 
not the West Bank and/or Gaza is not addressed; Egyptian and American hopes that 
Jordan would be drawn into the negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors that led 
Egypt and Israel to make concessions in the negotiations are not included. 
(PH 1986) The following are not included in this text: Sadat‘s motivations for 
negotiating; Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s call for a ―Palestinian 
homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s departure from step-by-step 
diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive diplomatic action is not mentioned; 
the fact that there were two separate agreements, along with the titles for the those 
agreements, are not mentioned. (―A Framework for Peace in the Middle East‖ and ―A 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel‖); the 
conditions for each peace agreement, particularly the avoidance of the dispute 
surrounding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights is not included; disagreement within the 
PLO about a compromise Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; 
the fact that Israel was willing to give up the Sinai or that they eventually did is not 
mentioned; Egyptian and American hopes that Jordan would be drawn into the 
  
 
235 
negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors that led Egypt and Israel to make 
concessions in the negotiations are not included; Egypt‘s reaction to the Camp David 
Accords is not included; the Arab world‘s reaction to the Camp David Accords is not 
included; Sadat‘s assassination is not included; reasons why Sadat was assassinated are 
not given, as well as who assassinated him. 
(HM 1996) It is interesting to note that this text is the first to mention the promises of 
advanced weaponry as a negotiating tool on the part of the U.S.  It was also the first to 
mention that there were two separate agreements and give some detail for each, as well as 
mention the threats to Sadat for negotiating with Israel. 
The following are not included in this text: Sadat‘s motivations for negotiating; 
Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s motivations for negotiating; 
Carter‘s call for a ―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s 
departure from step-by-step diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive 
diplomatic action is not mentioned; the fact that there were two separate agreements, 
along with the titles for the those agreements, are not mentioned. (―A Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East‖ and ―A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty 
Between Egypt and Israel‖); the conditions for each peace agreement, particularly the 
avoidance of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights is not included; 
disagreement within the PLO about a compromise Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza is not mentioned; reasons why Israel was willing to give up the Sinai, but not the 
West Bank and/or Gaza is not addressed; Egyptian and American hopes that Jordan 
would be drawn into the negotiations are not discussed; U.S. reaction to the Camp David 
Accords is not included; increased Arab suspicion of Israel and the U.S., because of 
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Camp David, is not addressed; Sadat‘s assassination is not included; reasons why Sadat 
was assassinated are not given, as well as who assassinated him. 
(Holt 1995) Two notable ―firsts‖ in this text is the mention that Sadat and Begin shared 
the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize, as well as specific mention of who was responsible for 
Sadat‘s assassination.  Items still excluded from the text include: The date when the 
peace accords were signed; Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s motivations for 
negotiating; Carter‘s call for a ―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not 
mentioned; Carter‘s departure from step-by-step diplomacy and preference for more 
comprehensive diplomatic action is not mentioned; the fact that there were two separate 
agreements, along with the titles for the those agreements, are not mentioned. (―A 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East‖ and ―A Framework for the Conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel‖); specific conditions for each peace agreement; 
the avoidance of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in the Accords 
is not included; disagreement within the PLO about a compromise Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; the fact that Israel was willing to give up the Sinai 
or that they eventually did is not mentioned; reasons why Israel was willing to give up the 
Sinai, but not the West Bank and/or Gaza is not addressed; Egyptian and American hopes 
that Jordan would be drawn into the negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors 
that led Egypt and Israel to make concessions in the negotiations are not included; 
Egypt‘s reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; increased Arab suspicion of 
Israel and the U.S., because of Camp David, is not addressed. 
(PH 1995)  The following is not included in this text: The date is not given for when the 
peace accords were signed; how long the negotiations lasted at Camp David; Sadat‘s 
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motivations for negotiating; Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s call for a 
―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s departure from step-
by-step diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive diplomatic action is not 
mentioned; the fact that there were two separate agreements, along with the titles for the 
those agreements, are not mentioned. (―A Framework for Peace in the Middle East‖ and 
―A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel‖); specific 
conditions for each peace agreement; the avoidance of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem 
and the Golan Heights in the Accords is not included; disagreement within the PLO about 
a compromise Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; reasons why 
Israel was willing to give up the Sinai, but not the West Bank and/or Gaza is not 
addressed; Egyptian and American hopes that Jordan would be drawn into the 
negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors that led Egypt and Israel to make 
concessions in the negotiations are not included; Egypt‘s reaction to the Camp David 
Accords is not included; U.S. reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; the 
Arab world‘s reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; increased Arab 
suspicion of Israel and the U.S., because of Camp David, is not addressed; Sadat‘s 
assassination is not included; reasons why Sadat was assassinated are not given, as well 
as who assassinated him. 
(HM 2003)  The date is not given for when the peace accords were signed; any 
acknowledgment of who initiated the peace process; reasons why previous peace talks 
failed; how long the negotiations lasted at Camp David; Sadat‘s motivations for 
negotiating; Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s motivations for negotiating; 
Carter‘s call for a ―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s 
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departure from step-by-step diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive 
diplomatic action is not mentioned; the fact that there were two separate agreements, 
along with the titles for the those agreements, are not mentioned. (―A Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East‖ and ―A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty 
Between Egypt and Israel‖); specific conditions for each peace agreement; the avoidance 
of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in the Accords is not 
included; disagreement within the PLO about a compromise Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; reasons why Israel was willing to give up the Sinai, but 
not the West Bank and/or Gaza is not addressed; Egyptian and American hopes that 
Jordan would be drawn into the negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors that led 
Egypt and Israel to make concessions in the negotiations are not included; Egypt‘s 
reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; U.S. reaction to the Camp David 
Accords is not included; the Arab world‘s reaction to the Camp David Accords is not 
included; increased Arab suspicion of Israel and the U.S., because of Camp David, is not 
addressed; Sadat‘s assassination is not included; reasons why Sadat was assassinated are 
not given, as well as who assassinated him; issues left unresolved by Camp David are not 
included. 
(Holt 2003)  The following is not included in this text: The date is not given for when the 
peace accords were signed; any acknowledgment of who initiated the peace process;  
reasons why previous peace talks failed; Sadat‘s motivations for negotiating; Begin‘s 
motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s call for a 
―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s departure from step-
by-step diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive diplomatic action is not 
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mentioned; the fact that there were two separate agreements, along with the titles for the 
those agreements, are not mentioned. (―A Framework for Peace in the Middle East‖ and 
―A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel‖); specific 
conditions for each peace agreement; the avoidance of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem 
and the Golan Heights in the Accords is not included; disagreement within the PLO about 
a compromise Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; the fact that 
Israel was willing to give up the Sinai or that they eventually did is not mentioned; 
reasons why Israel was willing to give up the Sinai, but not the West Bank and/or Gaza is 
not addressed; Egyptian and American hopes that Jordan would be drawn into the 
negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors that led Egypt and Israel to make 
concessions in the negotiations are not included; Egypt‘s reaction to the Camp David 
Accords is not included; U.S. reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; the 
Arab world‘s reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; increased Arab 
suspicion of Israel and the U.S., because of Camp David, is not addressed; Sadat‘s 
assassination is not included; reasons why Sadat was assassinated are not given, as well 
as who assassinated him; issues left unresolved by Camp David are not included. 
(PH 2005)  With the exception of a few less sentences, this edition is nearly identical to 
the 1995 edition.  The following is also not included in this text: The date is not given for 
when the peace accords were signed; how long the negotiations lasted at Camp David; 
Sadat‘s motivations for negotiating; Begin‘s motivations for negotiating; Carter‘s call for 
a ―Palestinian homeland‖ in March of 1977 is not mentioned; Carter‘s departure from 
step-by-step diplomacy and preference for more comprehensive diplomatic action is not 
mentioned; the fact that there were two separate agreements, along with the titles for the 
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those agreements, are not mentioned. (―A Framework for Peace in the Middle East‖ and 
―A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel‖); specific 
conditions for each peace agreement; the avoidance of the dispute surrounding Jerusalem 
and the Golan Heights in the Accords is not included; disagreement within the PLO about 
a compromise Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is not mentioned; reasons why 
Israel was willing to give up the Sinai, but not the West Bank and/or Gaza is not 
addressed; Egyptian and American hopes that Jordan would be drawn into the 
negotiations are not discussed; motivating factors that led Egypt and Israel to make 
concessions in the negotiations are not included; Egypt‘s reaction to the Camp David 
Accords is not included; U.S. reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; the 
Arab world‘s reaction to the Camp David Accords is not included; increased Arab 
suspicion of Israel and the U.S., because of Camp David, is not addressed; Sadat‘s 
assassination is not included; reasons why Sadat was assassinated are not given, as well 
as who assassinated him. 
1980s Conflict in Lebanon: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(HM 1986)  N/A 
(Holt 1986)  Two underlying problems are apparent in this text: first, the text provides 
context on the Arab world by explaining Sadat‘s successor in Egypt, Mubarak, had much 
cooler relations with Israel and began re-establishing ties with Arab nations that had been 
broken after Camp David; the text begins its discussion of Lebanon specifically, by 
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stating that ―the Palestinians who had left their land after the founding of Israel in 
1948…still wanted to reclaim their lands from Israel‖ (p. 936).   
(PH 1986)  Underlying problems in this text are found in the statement that Lebanon is 
simply ―another Middle Eastern trouble spot…a small country [that] includes different 
groups of Christians and Muslims‖ (p. 709).   
(HM 1996)  Underlying problems in this text include the statements that Camp David did 
not bring lasting peace to the region, Egypt‘s new leader, Mubarak, was more ―cool 
toward Israel‖ than his predecessor Sadat, and Israel continued establishing settlements in 
the West Bank (p. 937). 
(Holt 1995)  N/A 
(PH 1995)  The underlying problem is found in the simple, opening statement for the 
subheading ―World Trouble Spots‖, that: ―The end of the cold war did not bring peace 
outside Europe either…[and] the Middle East remained a place of religious tension and 
chaos‖ (p. 953-54).   
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A  
(PH 2005)  The underlying problem in this text‘s mention of Lebanon is that the country 
had become ―a battleground for a variety of armed political groups, some backed by 
neighboring countries‖ (p. 1106).  
2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(HM 1986)  N/A 
(Holt 1986)  The predominant theory in this text is that Israel attacked Lebanon because 
―the best-known and strongest Palestinian group, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
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(PLO) was centered there‖ (p. 936).  U.S. involvement, according to this text, stemmed 
from fears that Israel‘s attack could lead to ―wider war‖, and U.S. military presence in 
Lebanon was meant to ensure ―the safety of the PLO as it pulled out‖ (p. 936). 
(PH 1986)  Theory in this text includes Syria‘s invasion of Lebanon because of the civil 
war between religious groups, and Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon to ―drive the PLO out of 
its bases there‖ (p. 936).  The international peacekeeping force, according to this text, 
was meant to ―restore order in Lebanon‖ (p. 936).   
(HM 1996)  Israel‘s attack, in this text, was on ―Palestinian positions in Lebanon‖ and 
the U.S. contingent of American marines, in cooperation with the UN, was meant to 
―ensure the PLO‘s safety as it withdrew [from Lebanon]‖ (p. 938). 
(Holt 1995)  N/A 
(PH 1995)  The theory in this text is that Lebanon was simply caught in the middle of the 
hostilities between Israel and the PLO (although the text does not address exactly how 
they were caught in the middle, or that Lebanon had their own political problems too), 
and that the marines Reagan sent to Beirut were part of a peacekeeping force (although it 
is not explicitly stated between whom the marines were meant to keep the peace).  
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A  
(PH 2005)  The predominant theory in this text is that the Middle East was just another 
international difficulty that the United States had to face during Reagan‘s term in office. 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(HM 1986)  N/A 
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(Holt 1986)  Relationships in this text include: ―cooled‖ relations between Egypt and 
Israel, U.S. protest of Israeli action in Lebanon, along with American deaths due to 
terrorism there, and fighting between Christian and Islamic groups in Lebanon.  The 
cause of Israel‘s invasion is clearly PLO presence in southern Lebanon, in order to ―wipe 
out bases from which the PLO could make raids and to destroy its effectiveness‖ (p. 936).  
Consequences include an international force entering Lebanon, in order to ―ensure the 
safety of the PLO as it pulled out [of Lebanon]‖ (p. 936); public protest in the U.S. over 
American deaths in Lebanon caused Reagan to promise a pull-out of all troops within 
eighteen months, and the text goes on to correlate this promise with the bombings of the 
marine base and American embassy in Lebanon.  The ultimate consequence in this text, 
even after mentioning that Israel pulled its troops back to southern Lebanon, is that ―still, 
peace did not come‖ (p. 936). 
(PH 1986)  Relationships in this text include: hostile Christian and Muslim groups in 
Lebanon; U.S. protest of American involvement in Lebanon; and continued Israeli 
presence in Lebanon.  The cause of civil war in Lebanon is the differing Christian and 
Muslim groups, and results in Syria‘s invasion.  The cause of Israel‘s invasion is clearly 
PLO presence in southern Lebanon.  A consequence of Israel‘s invasion is U.S. 
disapproval and action through the U.N. to send a peacekeeping force, of which 
American troops were a part.  Ultimately, the peacekeeping force was unsuccessful since 
the fighting continued and, ―almost everyday, bombs exploded in Beirut‖ (p. 710).  A 
final consequence in this text was the marine barrack bombing and pull-out of troops. 
(HM 1996)  The most predominant relationships include the cooling between Egypt and 
Israel, and increased Palestinian hostility towards Israel.  In this text, Israel‘s continued 
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West Bank settlements seems to be a direct response to and rejection of Reagan‘s 
suggestion that Israel cede the West Bank to the Palestinians.  In turn, the book states: 
―This led many Palestinians to fear that Israel meant to annex the West Bank, and anti-
Israeli strikes, riots, and suicide bombings became commonplace‖ (p. 938).  The return of 
UN forces in Lebanon, after successfully evacuating PLO forces from Lebanon, was to 
stop the fighting between Christian and Muslim groups there.  According to the text, this 
resulted in many Muslims believing that the U.S. was siding with Christians in the 
conflict.  The 1983 bombing of marine barracks in Beirut is seen as a consequence of that 
belief.  In response, Reagan pulled the marines out.  Another attack on the US embassy in 
Beirut, with twelve American deaths is mentioned, but no real cause is identified (other 
than the continued fighting in Lebanon between Muslims and Christians), and no 
response by the U.S. is given in the text. 
(Holt 1995)  N/A 
(PH 1995)  Relationships apparent in this text include Lebanon being caught in the 
middle between the PLO and Israel, Reagan attempting to keep peace in the region, and 
terrorist attacks directed at the American embassy and marine barracks in Beirut.  The 
only cause of anything in this text seems to be the hostilities between the PLO and Israel.  
The ultimate consequence is simply that Reagan pulled American forces out of Lebanon 
due to public pressure resulting from the terrorist attacks.   
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A  
(PH 2005)  There are no apparent relationships in this text.  The only cause for Reagan‘s 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon is because the country had become home to different 
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armed political groups.  The terrorist attack on the marine barracks is seen as a direct 
response to this peacekeeping force, and the ultimate consequence is Reagan‘s 
acquiescence to political pressure at home for an immediate withdrawal of all troops in 
Lebanon. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1986)  N/A 
(Holt 1986)  The premise of this text is that Israel was successful in driving the PLO out 
of Lebanon, but not in obtaining peace.  A controversial statement at the beginning of the 
text is that Palestinians ―left their lands‖ in 1948.  Another implicit assumption is found 
in the phrase, ―many former Palestinians had settled in Lebanon‖, as if there was or ever 
had been an official state of Palestine.  A student could also imply from the text that the 
PLO, while centered in southern Lebanon, had not yet carried out any attacks on Israel 
from that location, prior to Israel‘s attack: ―Israel was seeking to wipe out bases from 
which the PLO could make raids and to destroy its effectiveness‖ (emphasis added p. 
936).  It is also interesting to note that the text states the international peacekeeping force 
was meant to ensure the safety of the PLO, since at this time, America regarded the PLO 
as a terrorist organization and refused to even open a dialogue with that organization.   
(PH 1986)  The premise of this text is that ultimately, the fighting in Lebanon 
accomplished nothing, and America is still working ―to get Israel to withdraw its troops 
from Lebanon [and support] other efforts to bring peace to Lebanon‖ (p. 710).  One 
implicit assumption is that the civil war in Lebanon was caused only by religious 
differences among Christian and Muslim populations. 
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(HM 1996)  The premise of this text is that while Israel was successful in forcing the 
PLO out of Lebanon, anti-Israeli feelings among the Palestinians only increased, and the 
fighting continued in Lebanon.  One major assumption in this text is that anti-Israeli 
feelings among the Palestinians were Israel‘s fault, because of Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank.  Another assumption in this text is that the sole impetus for terrorist attacks 
on U.S. marines and the U.S. embassy in Beirut was simply the presence of American 
forces with the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.  
(Holt 1995)  N/A 
(PH 1995)  The premise of this text is that tensions between the PLO and Israel required 
American intervention, and Lebanon was simply caught in the middle.  It is implied in 
the text that the terrorist attacks on the marine barracks and embassy were simply the 
response to American forces being in Lebanon. 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A  
(PH 2005)  The premise of this text is that Lebanon required American intervention 
because of the ―variety of armed political groups‖ there (p. 1106). It is implied in the text 
that the terrorist attack on the marine barracks was simply a response to American forces 
being in Lebanon.    
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1986)  N/A 
(Holt 1986)  Perspectives, questions and theories left unacknowledged in this text 
include: why Egypt-Israeli relations cooled since Camp David; how the PLO came to be 
centered in Lebanon; who was in charge of the PLO; divided Israeli opinion on the 
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invasion of Lebanon; international opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon; why Syria 
invaded Lebanon; the tenuous political situation in Lebanon between Christian and 
Muslim groups, and why Israel and Syria involved themselves in Lebanese politics; what 
terrorist organization was responsible for the Lebanon marine base and American 
embassy bombings and what were the motivations of the responsible terrorist group; 
what, if any other actions, did the U.S. take to secure peace in Lebanon and negotiate 
with Israel.    
(PH 1986)  Perspectives, questions and theories left unacknowledged in this text include: 
why Egypt-Israeli relations cooled since Camp David; how the PLO came to be centered 
in Lebanon; who was in charge of the PLO; divided Israeli opinion on the invasion of 
Lebanon; international opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon; the tenuous political 
situation in Lebanon between Christian and Muslim groups, and why Israel and Syria 
involved themselves in Lebanese politics; what terrorist organization was responsible for 
the Lebanon marine base and American embassy bombings and what were the 
motivations of the responsible terrorist group; what, if any other actions, did the U.S. take 
to secure peace in Lebanon and negotiate with Israel.   
(HM 1996) Perspectives, questions and theories left unacknowledged in this text include: 
why Egypt-Israeli relations cooled since Camp David; how the PLO came to be centered 
in Lebanon; who was in charge of the PLO; divided Israeli opinion on the invasion of 
Lebanon; U.S. opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon; international opinion of Israel‘s 
actions in Lebanon; why Syria invaded Lebanon; the tenuous political situation in 
Lebanon between Christian and Muslim groups, and why Israel and Syria involved 
themselves in Lebanese politics; what terrorist organization was responsible for the 
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Lebanon marine base and American embassy bombings and what were the motivations of 
the responsible terrorist group; what, if any other actions, did the U.S. take to secure 
peace in Lebanon and negotiate with Israel. 
(Holt 1995)  N/A 
(PH 1995) Perspectives, questions and theories left unacknowledged in this text include: 
no mention Egypt-Israeli relations since Camp David; how the PLO came to be centered 
in Lebanon; who was in charge of the PLO; this is the first text to exclude the fact that 
Israel even invaded Lebanon; divided Israeli opinion on the invasion of Lebanon; U.S. 
opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon; international opinion of Israel‘s actions in 
Lebanon; why Syria invaded Lebanon; the tenuous political situation in Lebanon between 
Christian and Muslim groups, and why Israel and Syria involved themselves in Lebanese 
politics; what terrorist organization was responsible for the Lebanon marine base and 
American embassy bombings and what were the motivations of the responsible terrorist 
group; what, if any other actions, did the U.S. take to secure peace in Lebanon and 
negotiate with Israel. 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
(PH 2005)  Syria, the PLO, or Israel are not even mentioned by name is this text‘s 
discussion of Lebanon, and this is also the first text not to mention any bombings of the 
American embassy in Lebanon, or that American forces were part of a larger UN 
peacekeeping effort. Like other texts, perspectives, questions and theories also left 
unacknowledged include: no mention of Egypt-Israeli relations since Camp David; how 
the PLO came to be centered in Lebanon; who was in charge of the PLO; the fact that 
  
 
249 
Israel even invaded Lebanon; divided Israeli opinion on the invasion of Lebanon; U.S. 
opinion of Israel‘s actions in Lebanon; international opinion of Israel‘s actions in 
Lebanon; why Syria invaded Lebanon; the tenuous political situation in Lebanon between 
Christian and Muslim groups, and why Israel and Syria involved themselves in Lebanese 
politics; what terrorist organization was responsible for the Lebanon marine base 
bombing and what were the motivations of the responsible terrorist group; what, if any 
other actions, did the U.S. take to secure peace in Lebanon and negotiate with Israel. 
1991-1994 Peace Talks: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(HM 1996)  There are no underlying problems in this text, except perhaps the mention of 
President Clinton‘s lack of foreign policy experience at the beginning of the text‘s section 
on Clinton‘s ―Foreign Policy Accomplishments‖, which the peace accords helped him to 
overcome (p. 962).   
(Holt 1995)  The only underlying problem apparent in the text is found in the opening 
statement of the section ―Regional Conflicts‖: ―As the threat of global war between 
nuclear-armed superpowers fades, regional conflicts have intensified‖ (p.960). 
(PH 1995)  There are three underlying problems apparent in this text: first, President 
Bush‘s ―patient diplomacy had failed to bring the long-sought peace settlement to the 
region‖; second, the PLO and Israel were ―weary of the constant fighting‖; third, the 
peace process was exceptionally difficult since the Israelis and Palestinians had been 
enemies for so long (p. 968). 
(HM 2003)  N/A 
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(Holt 2003)  In this text, there are no underlying problems that lead to the peace 
agreements, however, all of the problems seem to come after the signing, and all the 
reasons the text lists for continued violence (―violence‖ is used three times in the eight 
sentences that describe events after the signing), is due to actions taken by Israel. 
(PH 2005)  The general underlying problem can be found in the opening statements of 
the section titled, ―Post-Cold War Conflicts‖: The [U.S.] government had to balance 
Americans‘ desire to promote peace with their fear of costly commitments—a fear 
magnified by memories of the Vietnam War‖ (p. 1135).  Specific to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the 1993 peace agreement is the statement: ―Radicals on both sides, 
however, tried to destroy the agreement by carrying out terrorist attacks‖ (p. 1137). 
2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(HM 1996)  One theory is that the September 1993 peace talks were an outgrowth of the 
1991 Madrid Conference talks on Middle East peace (although it is not mentioned that 
the PLO was not invited to the Madrid Conference).  Another implicit theory is that the 
Palestinians were willing to participate in the agreements because the U.S. promised 
financial assistance to the PLO. 
(Holt 1995)  The predominant theory in this text is that Arafat‘s and Rabin‘s peace 
agreement renewed hope in the Middle East and in the U.S. that peace between Israelis 
and Palestinians was possible.   
(PH 1995)  The predominant theory in this text is that Israel‘s seizure of the Gaza Strip 
and West Bank after the 1967 war created ―virtual war zones‖ of constant fighting, of 
which both sides had become tired of defending.   
(HM 2003) N/A 
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(Holt 2003)  The theory for this text, found at the beginning of the text section on 
―Foreign and Domestic Dangers‖, is simply that the Middle East, along with an increase 
in international terrorism, was just another of the many challenges that the Clinton 
administration had to face.   
(PH 2005)  The predominant theory in this text is that despite the 1993 agreement, Arab-
Israeli peace efforts were beset by ―radicals on both sides‖, and the inability ―to solve all 
the remaining issues, such as control of the holy city of Jerusalem‖ (p. 1137). 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(HM 1996)  Relationships include a picture of Rabin and Arafat shaking hands as Clinton 
looks on; mention of a personal letter from the King of Jordan to President Clinton 
expressing his desire for peace in the region and Clinton‘s responding promise of ―full 
support‖.  There are no apparent causes for the peace agreements—just factual statements 
that they occurred.  Consequences mentioned in the text include U.S. financial assistance 
to the PLO, the resumption of U.S. military aid to Jordan and the wiping of Jordan‘s $700 
million debt to the U.S., and hostility towards Arafat from ―Islamic militants in Gaza‖ (p. 
962). 
(Holt 1995)  The only relationships apparent in this text include the agreement between 
Arafat and Rabin, and Clinton‘s overseeing of the signing of the accord.  Causes of the 
peace agreement are not addressed.  The only consequence of the agreement, in this text, 
seems to be a short-lived optimism for peace that was dashed by ―…a Jewish gunman 
[who] opened fire on Muslim worshipers in the West Bank…‖ (p. 960). 
(PH 1995)  Relationships apparent in this text include the ―prickly process‖ of peace 
between Israelis and Palestinians, challenges to Arafat‘s authority from within the PLO, 
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and arguing between Rabin and Arafat over border crossings.  Causes of the peace 
agreement seem to be the weariness of both sides in fighting over the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank, and the PLO‘s willingness to officially recognize Israel‘s right to exist.  
Consequences of the agreement were ―renewed violence [from] radical Palestinian 
groups and some Israelis‖ to show their disapproval, challenges to Arafat‘s authority 
from within the PLO who killed Israelis in terrorist attacks, a massacre of more than forty 
Palestinians in Hebron, and continued arguing between Rabin and Arafat over unsettled 
issues of the peace agreement.  Ultimately, the text states: ―Months after the deadline for 
the withdrawal of Israeli troops…Israeli-Palestinian relations hung in a highly uncertain 
balance‖ (p. 969). 
(HM 2003) N/A 
(Holt 2003)  Relationships include the peace agreement between Arafat and Rabin and 
Clinton‘s involvement (although specifics of his involvement are not mentioned, only a 
picture of him facilitating a handshake between Arafat and Rabin).  There seem to be no 
causes for the peace agreement, only that it was another in a long line of peace efforts in 
the Middle East.  Causes of violence after the peace agreement are clearly Israel‘s fault in 
this text: the assassination of Rabin by an ―Israeli with extreme nationalist views‖, 
Netanyahu‘s election as Israeli prime minister and the text‘s statement that he was ―less 
willing to compromise in peace negotiations‖, and Ariel Sharon‘s visit to a ―contested 
religious site in east Jerusalem‖ (p. 1074).  Consequences, or results of that peace 
agreement were that Israel and the PLO formally recognized one another, and ―set 
guidelines for Palestinian self-rule in occupied areas of Israel‖ (p. 1074).  The ultimate 
consequence in this text is simply: ―Violence continued in the area‖ (p. 1074).  
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(PH 2005)  Most of the relational information in this text is commentary on Israeli prime 
ministers.  The text states that the 1993 peace agreement ―was an extremely difficult 
step‖ for both Arafat and Rabin, although it is left to the student to assume why, based on 
the rest of the information in the text.  Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak is described in 
the text as calling ―for a greater commitment to peace talks‖, and his successor, Ariel 
Sharon is described as ―a fierce critic of the concessions Israel had made in the search for 
peace‖ (p. 1137).  The ultimate consequences include continued violence, with Rabin‘s 
assassination, increased Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli ―restaurants, buses, and 
other public places‖, and Israeli military strikes on Palestinian targets, ―often killing 
civilians in the process‖ (p.1137). 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1996)  The underlying premise of this text seems to be that the peace agreements 
were a major foreign policy achievement for President Clinton, and would promote 
economic development in the Middle East.  Implicit assumptions include that Arafat and 
Rabin signed the peace agreement themselves, when in fact, they did not; that the 
Palestinians may have been cooperating only to gain financial assistance from the U.S.; 
and that the ―other issues‖ of negotiations that were left for a later date might be easily 
worked out since a framework for peace was already begun (962).  
(Holt 1995)  The premise of this account is that the peace agreements ―capped years of 
efforts to bring peace to the Middle East‖ (p. 960).  Two implicit assumptions are that 
Arafat and Rabin signed the agreement themselves, and that the only reason for violence 
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following the peace accords was due to a Jewish gunman‘s attack on Muslim worshipers 
in the West Bank (p. 960). 
(PH 1995)  The premise of this account is that the peace agreements were ―more progress 
in the quest for stability [in] the Middle East‖, but that the future peace of the region was 
still in question (p. 968).  Implicit assumptions include that Rabin and Arafat signed the 
agreement themselves, that both sides were weary of fighting over the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank and ready to make concessions, and that the source of continued conflict in 
the region was due to Israeli forces not honoring the withdrawal deadlines set forth in the 
peace agreements. 
(HM 2003) N/A 
(Holt 2003)  The premise of this text is that that the peace process was on track with 
Arafat and Rabin‘s agreement, but ―suffered a setback‖ with Rabin‘s assassination, 
Netanyahu‘s election, and Sharon‘s visit to a ―contested religious site‖ (p. 1074).  Like 
other texts, the implicit assumption is that Sharon and Arafat signed the peace agreement 
themselves.  Another implication is that there were no outstanding issues of contention 
left after the 1993 peace accord. 
(PH 2005)  The premise of this text is that the 1993 agreement was another hope for 
peace that ―faded rapidly as violence again increased‖ (p. 1137). Like other texts, the 
implicit assumption is that Sharon and Arafat signed the peace agreement themselves. 
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 1996) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: No historical context (particularly the end of the Cold War and how it 
resulted in the PLO losing its financial sponsor in the Soviet Union; the Persian Gulf 
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War) for the peace talks; no mention that there were prior secret meetings between PLO 
and Israeli leaders; no mention of the ―Oslo Accord‖ or ―Declaration of Principles‖ by 
name; no mention of what Israel conceded in signing the agreement (withdrawal of forces 
the West Bank, limiting further settlement in the West Bank); no mention of what the 
PLO conceded in signing the agreement (formal recognition of Israel); no mention that 
Rabin and Arafat did not actually sign the agreement themselves; no mention of specific 
issues of contention left unresolved by the agreement; no mention of Jordan‘s 
motivations for negotiating a separate peace with Israel; no mention of Israeli reaction to 
the agreement; no mention of Palestinian division between the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas; 
no mention of increased terrorist attacks against Israel after the signing; no mention of 
Rabin‘s assassination; no mention of who assassinated Rabin and why. 
(Holt 1995) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: No historical context (particularly the end of the Cold War and how it 
resulted in the PLO losing its financial sponsor in the Soviet Union; the Persian Gulf 
War) for the peace talks; no mention that there were prior secret meetings between PLO 
and Israeli leaders; no mention of the ―Oslo Accord‖ or ―Declaration of Principles‖ by 
name; no mention of what Israel conceded in signing the agreement (withdrawal of forces 
from Gaza and the West Bank, limiting further settlement in the West Bank, and 
affirmation of Palestinian right to self-government through the creation of the Palestinian 
Authority); no mention of what the PLO conceded in signing the agreement (formal 
recognition of Israel and responsibility for security in areas the Israeli Defense Force 
evacuated); no mention that Rabin and Arafat did not actually sign the agreement 
themselves; no mention of specific issues of contention left unresolved by the agreement; 
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no mention of Jordan‘s separate peace agreement with Israel; no mention of Jordan‘s 
motivations for negotiating a separate peace with Israel; no mention of Palestinian 
reaction to the agreement; no mention of Palestinian division between the PLO, Fatah, 
and Hamas; no mention of increased terrorist attacks against Israel after the signing; no 
mention of Rabin‘s assassination; no mention of who assassinated Rabin and why. 
(PH 1995) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: no historical context (particularly the end of the Cold War and how it resulted 
in the PLO losing its financial sponsor in the Soviet Union; the Persian Gulf War) for the 
peace talks; no mention of the ―Oslo Accord‖ or ―Declaration of Principles‖ by name; no 
mention of what Israel conceded in signing the agreement (limiting further settlement in 
the West Bank, and affirmation of Palestinian right to self-government); no mention of 
what the PLO conceded in signing the agreement (responsibility for security in areas the 
Israeli Defense Force evacuated); no mention that Rabin and Arafat did not actually sign 
the agreement themselves; no mention of Jordan‘s separate peace agreement with Israel; 
no mention of Jordan‘s motivations for negotiating a separate peace with Israel;  no 
mention of U.S. reaction to the agreement; no mention of Palestinian division between 
the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas; no mention of Rabin‘s assassination; no mention of who 
assassinated Rabin and why. 
(HM 2003) N/A 
(Holt 2003) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: No historical context (particularly the end of the Cold War and how it 
resulted in the PLO losing its financial sponsor in the Soviet Union; the Persian Gulf 
War) for the peace talks; no mention that there were prior secret meetings between PLO 
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and Israeli leaders; no mention of the ―Oslo Accord‖ or ―Declaration of Principles‖ by 
name; no mention of what Israel conceded in signing the agreement (withdrawal of forces 
from Gaza and the West Bank, limiting further settlement in the West Bank); no mention 
of what the PLO conceded in signing the agreement (responsibility for security in areas 
the Israeli Defense Force evacuated); no mention that Rabin and Arafat did not actually 
sign the agreement themselves; no mention of specific issues of contention left 
unresolved by the agreement; no mention of Jordan‘s separate peace agreement with 
Israel; no mention of Jordan‘s motivations for negotiating a separate peace with Israel; no 
mention of Israeli reaction to the agreement; no mention of Palestinian reaction to the 
agreement; no mention of Palestinian division between the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas; no 
mention of increased terrorist attacks against Israel after the signing.  This is the first text 
to mention Sharon‘s controversial visit in Jerusalem, but the text does not mention where 
specifically he visited, or why it was controversial. 
(PH 2005) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: No historical context (particularly the end of the Cold War and how it 
resulted in the PLO losing its financial sponsor in the Soviet Union; the Persian Gulf 
War) for the peace talks; no mention that there were prior secret meetings between PLO 
and Israeli leaders; no mention of the ―Oslo Accord‖ or ―Declaration of Principles‖ by 
name; no mention of what Israel conceded in signing the agreement (withdrawal of forces 
from Gaza and the West Bank, limiting further settlement in the West Bank); no mention 
of what the PLO conceded in signing the agreement (responsibility for security in areas 
the Israeli Defense Force evacuated); no mention that Rabin and Arafat did not actually 
sign the agreement themselves; no mention of Jordan‘s separate peace agreement with 
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Israel; no mention of Jordan‘s motivations for negotiating a separate peace with Israel;  
no mention of U.S. reaction to the agreement; no mention of Palestinian division between 
the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas. 
Post 9/11 Conflicts: 
1.  “What are the underlying problems which have generated this discourse” 
(Larsen, 1991)?  
(HM 2003)  The underlying problem can be found in the opening statement to the text‘s 
epilogue on terrorism in the Middle East: ―Like Black September, many terrorist 
organizations have their roots in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over land in the Middle 
East‖ (p. US7). 
(Holt 2003)  N/A 
(PH 2005)  The text‘s commentary on Israel and Palestine continues uninterrupted from 
events in September 1993 to the 2003 ―roadmap‖ to peace.  The underlying problem 
following the 1993 peace accords, in this text, is Ariel Sharon‘s election as prime 
minister in 2001.  The text states that Sharon was ―a fierce critic of the concession Israel 
had made in the search for peace‖ (p. 1137). 
2. What theories provide the descriptions and explanations thought relevant?   
(HM 2003)  The predominant theory in this text is that Arab terrorist groups ―have 
sought to prevent a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.  They want a 
homeland for the Palestinians on their own terms, with the most extreme among them 
denying Israel‘s right to exist‖ (p. US7). 
(Holt 2003) N/A 
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(PH 2005)  The predominant theory is that the fading hopes for peace after the 1993 
accords were renewed again with the 2003 ―roadmap‖ to peace, proposed by the U.S., 
E.U., Russia, and the UN. 
3.  What relationships, causes, consequences are proposed?   
(HM 2003)  This text identifies Arab terrorist organizations as being separate from 
Palestinians, it mentions that many Muslims feel ―widespread Arab anger‖ at Israel and 
also at the U.S. for its support of Israel, and the text cites a ―continual cycle of violence‖ 
between Israel and terrorists.  The root cause in this text is the unwillingness or inability 
to compromise over the land.  The goal of some terrorist groups to ―eliminate all non-
Islamic influences in Muslim countries‖ through terrorism, in this text, then leads to 
Israeli reprisal raids on Palestinians.  (With the previous text impression that terrorist 
groups and Palestinians are essentially separate, the text could be confusing to a student 
reading that Israel carries out reprisal attacks on ―Palestinian targets‖ rather than 
terrorists.)  In this text, the ultimate consequence was Israel‘s declaration of a ―‗war on 
terrorism,‘ patterned after the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks‖ (p. US8).  
(Holt 2003) N/A 
(PH 2005)  Relationships in this text really only include the increase in violence between 
―Palestinian extremists‖ and Israel.  The sequence of events in this text begins with 
Sharon‘s election, stepped up suicide bombings by Palestinian ―extremists‖, and then 
regular Israeli military strikes on Palestinian ―targets, often killing civilians in the 
process‖ (p. 1137).  The text ends the sequence of events by stating: ―Israeli troops 
reoccupied the West Bank and completely cut off Arafat‘s headquarters, trapping him in 
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his offices‖ (p. 1138).  Israel‘s 2003 acceptance of the ―roadmap‖ ultimately led to the 
first formal recognition by Israel of the Palestinians‘ right to a state. 
4.  On what premises is the account based and what assumptions are made in the 
course of the explanation (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 2003)  The premise of this text can be found in the closing statement of the text‘s 
epilogue section on terrorism in the Middle East: ―Moderates in the region believe that 
the only long-term solution is a compromise between Israel and the Palestinians over the 
issue of land‖ (p. US8).  Two implicit assumptions include that Palestinians would make 
peace with Israel if not for terrorist organizations preventing them from doing so, and that 
the only issue dividing the two sides is the land itself. 
(Holt 2003) N/A 
(PH 2005)  The premise of this text is that the 2003 roadmap to peace would either be a 
positive event that ―would result in a lasting peace or in yet another disappointment‖ (p. 
1138).  An implicit assumption is that both sides approved the three step plan without 
reservations, for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.   
5. What perspectives, questions, theories are not acknowledged (Larsen, 1991)? 
(HM 2003) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: Israeli perspectives and feelings about terrorism; contention over security, 
borders, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem; 
contextual background information on the terrorist groups the text identifies (Palestine 
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hizballah) and what their ―terms‖ are for a Palestinian 
homeland; further U.S. interaction with Arafat, the PLO, and Israeli leaders following the 
1993 peace accords. 
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(Holt 2003) N/A 
(PH 2005) The following perspectives, questions, and theories are left unacknowledged 
in this text: no mention of specific terrorist groups in the Middle East, or their various 
motivations for carrying out attacks against Israel; Israeli perspectives and feelings about 
terrorism; contention over security, borders, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, 
and the status of Jerusalem; no mention of what happened to Arafat after Israel had him 
trapped in his offices in 2002; further U.S. interaction with Arafat, the PLO, and Israeli 
leaders following the 1993 peace accords; specific terms of the roadmap to peace, 
ensuing negotiations, and why both sides agreed to it.
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Appendix C 
 
This appendix contains all charts derived from the following topic matrix.  The topic matrix includes number totals for each textbook, 
category of analysis, and important terms, and is listed by publisher and decade. 
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Houghton Mifflin  
“HM” 
 
1.  1952: The Making of Modern 
America (Canfield and Wilder) 
 
4.  1962: The Making of Modern 
America (Canfield and Wilder) 
  
7.  1975: This is America’s Story 
(Wilder, Ludlum, and Brown) 
 
10.  1986: This is America’s Story 
(Wilder, Ludlum, and Brown) 
 
13.  1996: The Americans: a history 
(Winthrop, Greenblatt, and Bowes) 
 
16.  ****2003: The Americans 
(Danzer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Holt, Rinehart, Winston (Harcourt) 
“Holt” 
 
2.  1950: America’s History (Todd 
and Curti) 
  
5.  1966: The Rise of the American 
Nation (Todd and Curti) 
  
8.  1977: The Rise of the American 
Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
11.  1986: Triumph of the American 
Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
14.  1995: Todd and Curti’s the 
American Nation (Todd and Curti) 
 
17.  ****2003: American Nation 
(Boyer)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prentice Hall (Pearson) 
“PH” 
 
3.  1957: The United States-the 
History of a Republic (Hofstadter) 
 
6.  1967: The United States-the 
History of a Republic (Hofstadter) 
 
9.  1976: The United States 
(Hofstadter) 
 
12.  1986: The American Nation 
(Davidson) 
 
15.  1995: America: Pathways to the 
Present (Cayton) 
 
18.  ****2005: America: Pathways to 
the Present (Cayton)
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Mandate System/Balfour Declaration/1948 War/Establishment of Israel: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM  X   X 2 (P) 1 (P) X 1 (A) 4 
HOLT 2 (N) 3 (N) 3 (N) 2 (N) 3 (P) 3 (P) 16 
PH 3 (P) 2 (A) 1 (A) 3 (A) 2 (N) 2 (N) 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1956 Suez War: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X 1 (P) 1 (A) 2 (P) 3 (P) 2 (N) 8 
HOLT X 3 (A) 2 (A) 3 (A) 2 (N) 3 (N) 13 
PH 1 (P) 2 (A) 3 (A) X X 1 (A) 7 
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1967 Six Day War: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X 1 (N) 1 (N) X X 2 
HOLT X X 2 (A) 2 (A) 1 (A) X 5 
PH X X 3 (N) 3 (N) X X 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1973 Yom Kippur War: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X 2 (P) 1 (N) 1 (A) 3 (P) 7 
HOLT X X 3 (P) 3 (P) 3 (P) 1 (N) 10 
PH X X 1 (N) 2 (A) 2 (N) 2 (A) 7 
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1979 Camp David: 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X 1 (N) 2 (P) 2 (N) 5 
HOLT X X X 2 (P) 1 (N) 1 (N) 4 
PH X X X 3 (N) 3 (N) 3 (N) 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980s Conflict in Lebanon: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X X 2 (A) X 2 
HOLT X X X 1 (A) X X 1 
PH X X X 2 (P) 1 (P) 1 (N) 4 
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1990s Peace Negotiations: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X X 2 (N) X 2 
HOLT X X X X 1 (A) 1 (A) 2 
PH X X X X 3 (N) 2 (N) 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post 9/11: 
 
Publisher 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Totals 
HM X X X X X 3 (N) 3 
HOLT X X X X X X X 
PH X X X X X 2 (A) 2 
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